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Dedication 
 
But then I cried out in the house one morning: “a son is there!” How different the world now 
looked of a sudden! Happy the mother who saw all at once that my past and my future had 
now acquired a quite different meaning. ~Richard Wagner 
 
 
To my son, I cannot wait to meet you. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The present study explores Richard Wagner’s strategic use of liminal space in identity 
construction, as a means of navigating difficult life circumstances, gaining prestige as 
composer/historic figure, and as a method to obtain enduring notoriety for his works. Liminal 
spaces are a nexus of vulnerability and power. They are a locus of potential as they are a 
release from structural limitations, however they can also be a site of contested power and 
susceptibility. Young Wagner as an adolescent and a member of the lower middle class 
experienced the condition of economic marginality felt by many Germans of that time period. 
His adaptive strategies toward self-identity building included the necessity of navigating 
liminal spaces. As Wagner went through an imposed period of exile the knowledge he had 
previously gained of the utility of such liminal positions was further explored and allowed 
him increased freedom in both his behaviors and musical techniques. After a period of exile, 
the composer was reintegrated back into society and found patronship at long last. He then 
consciously attempted to create a permanent liminal space to house his art in the Bayreuth 
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festival. However, despite his attempts at creating an ideal liminal ritual event, the realities of 
structure rendered it a liminoid affair.    
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 1 
Introduction 
  
 Composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883) created a dynamic narrative for himself, yet 
strove to fabricate a static place for his legacy and his musical oeuvre. The power of both, 
resides in their position, always at the threshold, never crossing definite structure or agreed 
upon definition. Wagner attempted to place his creations outside of time and space. Whether 
in the future, deeper reality, or the unconscious, meaning was never to be found in the 
structures of everyday existence. In this light Wagner could be regarded as a mediator 
between two realms: order and disorder, structure and anti-structure. For him music occupied 
a space betwixt and between such realms, and intermediary linking the material and the 
ideological. Much like dreams between sleep and conscious waking, music stood at the 
margin between the two, as the only way to get a glimpse of true reality or gain 
understanding of self. Thus, Wagner came to understand this threshold, or liminal position, 
as one of great power. Threshold places are what Wagner flourished in, needed, and 
consciously created. Appropriating such positions allowed Wagner to simultaneously escape 
from the expectations and normative behaviors inherent in the role he was cast within the 
societal structures of his time, and achieve the prestige and respect he desired for both 
himself and his art. In the present study I argue that Wagner strategically positioned himself 
in such threshold places. Threshold, generally defined, is a point at which something may or 
may not happen, take effect, or become true. In other words, it is a point of possibilities or 
potentials. Anthropologist Victor Turner used the concept of “liminality” to delineate such a 
threshold position, a moment out of everyday time and space where history teeters on the 
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brink, full of potential energy. It is this liminal state, a moment outside of normal cultural 
space and time, which allows these possibilities to become visible. During such a state, one is 
released from usual constraints, roles, and status positions of societal structure, freed to 
experience new alliances perhaps the deeper connections of humanity. Turner used the term 
“communitas” to delineate such a shared feeling or group experience of unity that may occur 
in a liminal space.  
 Communitas often emerges during a period of transition when there is a leveling of 
statures essentially creating a group of equals. Turner stated that, “prophets and artists tend to 
be liminal and marginal people, ‘edge-men,’ who strive with a passionate sincerity to rid 
themselves of the clichés associated with status incumbency and role playing and to enter in 
vital relations with other men in fact or imagination.”1 Wagner himself could be considered 
such an edge-man. In fact he has been variously described as types of edge-men, as a prophet 
of the music of the future, a genius, and as the high priest of an aesthetic religion. Wagner’s 
festival ground at Bayreuth is often talked about using religious or otherworldly metaphors. 
Spectators make their pilgrimages to Bayreuth not to witness mere entertainment, as when 
one goes to the theater, but as if attending a sacred, life-altering event. The entire 
construction of Bayreuth was meant to change the relationship between the events on stage 
and the audience. Bayreuth was Wagner’s attempt to take normative steps to create the ideal 
environment for the facilitation of communitas, to create a permanent liminal space. This 
endeavor was fraught with problems; the process of creating a structure to house the un-
structurable is a contradiction that is often only resolved in conflicting ways. Despite the 
                                                
1 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), 
128. 
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realities that betrayed the ideal, Wagner’s construction of Bayreuth was an attempt to “enter 
into vital relations with other men,” if not directly, then most definitely indirectly in both the 
individual and collective imagination. 2  
 Chapter one, “Social and Material Factors in the Development of Richard Wagner’s 
Liminal Identity,” investigates aspects of Wagner’s social identity formation through the 
changing political and economic conditions of the time, with reference to Henri Tajfel’s 
concept of social identity formation, and Victor Turner’s work regarding liminality. I argue 
that navigating liminal positions in response to the problems of adolescence and economic 
marginality became a beneficial strategic vantage point for Wagner. He attempted to form a 
positive identity though alternative aesthetic means as structural constraints kept him from 
the usual channels of status building. This eventually led Wagner and many of his Young 
German peers to a complete rejection of the political structures at the time through 
participation in a political revolution. The failure of this uprising was immanently followed 
by a period of exile that proved extremely productive for Wagner’s writings and theoretical 
ideas. Thus Wagner’s participation in the 1848 Dresden uprising was significant not for its 
success but for its failure, as it allowed the composer to actively create new myths for 
himself, a new archetype for his art, and new initiatives for what he saw as an authoritarian 
and oppressive German society.  
Chapter two, “From Exiled Outsider to Artist of the Future: The Creation of a 
Liminal Present Through an Imagined Future,” discusses the issues surrounding Wagner’s 
exile. After the failure of the uprising to bring about such a utopic political situation, Wagner 
was forced to live through a period of exile, residing in a liminal state betwixt and between. 
                                                
2 Ibid., 128. 
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While removed from his normal surroundings, not knowing when and if he could return, he 
was free to envision alternative situations and indeed wrote about such possibilities towards 
cultural change. Through his Zurich writings he imagined a future where humanity is unified 
through art, the normal roles inherent in everyday structure removed, allowing the experience 
of spontaneous communitas. Drawing from an imagined ancient Greek past to justify a future 
as yet unseen, Wagner, as prophet, envisioned a future new society, a universal brotherhood 
through and for his art. Thus, by means of his writings, the composer created an imagined 
future to be reintegrated back into where he could take his rightful status position. In 
Turner’s work, liminality, in most instances, represents such a midpoint, a transition from 
one status position to another. For Wagner this transition would be going from a lowly 
composer of a corrupted art to the genius savior of its integrity, the prophet of a utopic future. 
Turner believed that whenever societal structure becomes too repressive, there are 
revolutionary ventures for a restoration of communitas. Indeed many significant social 
theorists of the time, such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Ludwig Feuerbach, whom both 
influenced Wagner greatly, reflected the utopic yearnings for a situation where one may 
experience communitas. However, when his idealistic hopes for such a political solution 
failed, Wagner became disillusioned. 
Chapter three, “Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche: The Charismatic Founding of 
a Tragic Culture, Liminal Vision, Liminoid Reality,” considers Wagner’s strategic use of 
liminal roles in the accommodation of his changed viewpoint and as an aid in his struggles to 
reconcile his earlier vision with the structural reality he returned to. Wagner’s period of 
political disillusion ended most notably in the fall of 1854 after he was introduced to the 
philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. This philosophy had a variety of implications for 
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Wagner as he experienced a turn around of sorts regarding several of his established beliefs. 
His new outlook manifested itself in the creative changes he placed in his writings and his 
musico-dramatic works. In regards to the construction of his personal identity, the concept of 
Schopenhauerian genius endowed Wagner with a philosophically justified position of 
admiration and influence outside the bounds of social structure. Enriched by such a 
viewpoint, Wagner still understood his art as occupying a liminal space outside of normal 
time, however it was now an internal space where music was the mediator between the 
ultimate oneness of all being and this phenomenal world. More specifically as genius 
composer, it was he who stood as liaison in between ultimate reality and the everyday world; 
a vessel through which creativity itself, residing in this place, was communicated though 
music or in some instances the unconscious of dreams. Wagner as representative of the 
Schopenhauerian concept of genius stood in between the inner most essence of the world and 
the veil of illusory everyday life. Much as a priest stands between God and congregants as an 
interpreter of deeper meaning thus rendering it comprehendible to the masses, Wagner as 
genius believed he was able to channel the deepest secrets of human willing through his 
music. As a model of Max Weber’s charismatic leader, his authority however was 
legitimized through and dependent on the belief and support of his followers.  
Wagner attempted to create a permanent liminal place outside of everyday social 
structure to house his art, a temple for his followers. In its early inception, his Bayreuth 
festival was to be a place of egalitarianism, attempting to escape the symbolic structures of 
hierarchy and excess that had been established in nineteenth-century opera. Once these status 
hierarchies and role incumbencies had been removed, those who listened were free to 
experience a deeper level of humanity, a communitas through the music. However, despite 
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the powerful and preternatural experience of communitas, its power cannot easily be 
transformed and applied to the organizational details needed for everyday material existence. 
This realization led Turner to differentiate between three different types of communitas: 
existential (spontaneous) communitas, an unplanned feeling of human connection among a 
group of equals; normative communitas, an attempt among those who experienced existential 
communitas to organize group members and create and enduring social system; and, 
ideological communitas, a utopian model society based on the feeling of existential 
communitas. Unlike the dreamlike and temporary state of communitas itself, a sustained will 
and cogent thought are needed to manifest structural reality. Therefore any attempt at 
structuralizing the anti-structural experience of communitas, as normative or ideological 
types attempt, is in some regard doomed to conflict and failure. Such contradictions occurred 
between Wagner’s ideological and philosophical beliefs and the constraints imposed by 
social and financial structures.  
In his meditation “Richard Wagner at Bayreuth,” Friedrich Nietzsche slyly captured 
the betrayal between the noble ideological form that Bayreuth was supposed to take and the 
reality it assumed. The philosopher also addressed the humiliations Wagner endured 
throughout his life to achieve his vision. Nietzsche had wondered, “how the feeling and 
recognition that whole stretches of [Wagner’s] life are marked by a grotesque lack of dignity 
must affect an artist.”3 Wagner’s life proved a constant struggle with the dynamic factors of 
reality, leaving him with no recourse but to become a mediator between his ideology and the 
conditions of his reality.  
                                                
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Richard Wagner at Bayreuth,” in Untimely Meditations, ed. trans., R.J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 205. 
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 The financial support needed from his followers dwindled as Wagner fought to 
salvage the Bayreuth festival. He realized he needed to legitimate his authority from a place 
outside of everyday structure. Leading from a position of self-proclaimed musical genius had 
become inadequate. Wagner was to place himself in a position Turner considered as 
representative of outsiderhood as distinct from the state of liminality. Where liminality 
suggests a return in some way to the given social system and status roles, outsiderhood refers 
to the state of being permanently outside of the social system, either by forced situation, or 
voluntarily setting oneself apart, not engaging in the normal status occupation and role 
assumptions of the social system. Examples of such outsiders from various cultures might 
include shamans, healers, spirit mediums, diviners and priests. Through his writings, Wagner 
would imagine an art-religion guided by a poet-priest who would lead the world back to 
compassion through a rejuvenation of the symbols of Christianity. Despite his best attempts 
to cement his legacy and legitimate it through means beyond structure, he was inexorably 
linked to the liminoid structures of the post-industrial commodified world, creating tension 
between the liminal obligations of a sacred art-religion, and the optional attendance of an 
upper-class musical event. Wagner continued to struggle with these conflicts until the day he 
died; likewise Cosima and his heirs continue to mediate between a static state of reverence 
and dynamic innovation. 
 As a composer, writer, and historical icon, Wagner continues to be of interest not 
only to musicologists and performers, but also to scholars from diverse disciplines. This has 
resulted in a large repository of resources that addresses Wagner’s output and persona from a 
myriad of methodological approaches most of which focus on either cultural or socio-
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political matters, or on the specifically musical.4 Many also attempt to link the significance 
and meaning of Wagner and his work to contemporary societal norms and aesthetics. The 
study of Wagner’s music has been approached from materialist, feminist, psychological, 
romanticist, philosophical, literary, and modernist perspectives. The present study adds to 
current musicological scholarship on Wagner by incorporating anthropological, sociological, 
and social psychology perspectives, all of which center on issues surrounding Victor 
Turner’s concept of “liminality.” I draw from a variety of concepts within the social sciences 
such as social psychologist Henri Tajfel’s social identity theory, and Max Weber’s 
sociological theory of charisma to add breadth and give further dimension to the matter in 
question.   
 Approaching Wagner from the concept of liminality provides a compelling means for 
both historical and social understanding. It is a perspective that is able to integrate the 
formerly mentioned viewpoints, allow for dynamism in identity formation, and embrace the 
power of potential within historical change. Wagner is an incredibly polarizing figure; love 
and hate for him can manifest in a single mind. This leaves a large prospect for bias in many 
interpretive works on the subject. My literature review focuses on Wagner scholarship that is 
in dialogue with my own specific interests, as well as major works that exemplify both sides 
of bias, supporters of Wagner as well as detractors.  
 Having a background in anthropology and philosophy, I came to the present research 
familiar with the works of Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Weber, and Nietzsche, and with a 
desire to incorporate them into my narrative centered on Wagner. As such I was greatly 
                                                
4 I will be focusing at this juncture primarily on previously translated critical and analytic texts. 
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inspired by the works of three authors who also contemplated the composer from philosophic 
and culturally analytic stances: Bryan Magee, Roger Scruton, and Eric Chafe.   
 In The Tristan Chord: Wagner and Philosophy, Bryan Magee chronicles Wagner’s 
relationship with philosophy throughout the entirety of his career.5 Magee begins with 
Wagner’s early life under the influence of a Proudhon-inspired Young German movement, 
his dabbling into Hegel, and his engagement with the work of Feuerbach. Magee takes us 
chronologically through Wagner’s experience, the historical circumstances and political 
situations he encountered, and the philosophies that accompanied them. The author explains 
the influence these factors had on Wagner’s writing, musical works, personhood, and 
presents the importance of Wagner’s discovery of the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer 
with expertise. He details how the influence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy brought about “a 
turn” with regard to Wagner’s previously optimistic viewpoint. Further Magee gives an 
account as to how Wagner’s intoxication with this philosophy eventually led to his cessation 
of work on The Ring and served as the main philosophical vehicle behind his creation of 
Tristan and Isolde. Wagner’s devotion to Schopenhauerian philosophy would later reach its 
culmination in his adaptation of the grail myth, Parsifal. Magee has written various other 
texts on these subjects including a book specifically focusing on the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer,6 a two-part article on Schopenhauer and Wagner,7 the short but masterful 
book Aspects of Wagner,8 and an article entitled, “The Secret of Tristan and Isolde.”9 As 
                                                
5 Bryan Magee, The Tristan Chord, Wagner and Philosophy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000). 
6 Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
7 Bryan Magee, “Schopenhauer and Wagner, I-II,” The Opera Quarterly 1 (1983): 148-71. 
8 Bryan Magee, Aspects of Wagner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).   
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such, Magee demonstrates mastery and ease in describing both Schopenhauer’s philosophy a 
well as the take on Kant that Schopenhauer put forth. Magee has a deep appreciation of 
Wagner that might lead to a slightly biased view. Although there is a lack of musical 
analysis, Magee’s astute understanding of philosophy contributes to a rich interpretation of 
Wagner’s motivations as a human being, not just as an historical figure.  
Roger Scruton’s Death-Devoted Heart: Sex and the Sacred in Wagner’s Tristan and 
Isolde is similar in philosophical substance to Magee, as Scruton provides a philosophical 
outline from Kant to Schopenhauer. However Scruton supplies a more in-depth musical 
analysis of the work itself than what Magee offers.10 Further still, Scruton discusses the 
literary origin of the Tristan poem and examines Wagner’s treatment of the original text by 
Gottfried von Strassburg at great length. As the title implies, Scruton’s work hinges on the 
essential relationship between sex and the sacred; Tristan embodies the quasi-religious idea 
that redemption is paid for with sacrifice. Scruton maintains that the continuing importance 
of Wagner’s art is that it may have the power to endow our everyday modern life with a 
sense of the sacred. For Scruton, as for Wagner, the greater capability of music drama is in 
upholding and reinvigorating the purpose of ritual and religion in our modern time period. 
The sacrifice Tristan and Isolde make serves to re-establish our faith in the potential of 
humanity and reinvigorate our will-to-live (which in this understanding is a good thing). The 
death of the lovers signifies the renewal of the community in life. Wagner, as well as 
Scruton, constructed this viewpoint from a combination of what they believed to be the ritual 
                                                                                                                                                  
9 Bryan Magee, “The Secret of Tristan and Isolde,” Philosophy 82 (2007): 339-46. 
10 Roger Scruton, Death-Devoted Heart: Sex and the Sacred in Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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purpose of Greek tragedy, and the ritual meaning behind Christian and religious 
symbolism.11 The erotic presents a challenge to the inevitability of death, as a symbol of a 
union of individuals, and of the continuation of life. Beyond this overt symbolism, one could 
say that the higher purpose of art is to provide a brief glimpse of the possibilities beyond the 
current reality: to uncover the deeper connective tissue of humanity when it remains hidden 
by the muscle of societal structures. Conceptualizing the rejuvenation of community as 
coming from an experience of communitas, rather than through a truth of human nature or an 
experience of the divine, would sidestep philosophical debate over Scruton’s use of such 
loaded terms. Scruton comes to the conclusion that Tristan und Isolde is essentially a 
modernist endeavor at its core. It serves to bring the magic and mysticism of life back to the 
disillusioned. However, Scruton does not explain what this magic is or where it lies. As such, 
terms such liminality and communitas would aptly describe such a relational situation, in 
which the magic lies in potential.  
In The Tragic and the Ecstatic: The Musical Revolution of Wagner’s Tristan and 
Isolde, Eric Chafe discusses the work’s threefold path to redemption through an intense and 
precise examination of Wagner’s philosophical influences, his personal adaptions to those 
influences, and a close analysis of the interplay of these forces on the workings of his 
musical style.12 Chafe illustrates the Schopenhauerian overlay that Wagner placed on von 
Strassburg’s poem as well as illuminating the major point with which Wagner disagreed with 
                                                
 11 A similar outlook on the significance of Greek tragedy was put forth in Nietzsche’s The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music. 
 
12 Eric Chafe, The Tragic and the Ecstatic: The Musical Revolution of Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Schopenhauer on: the question of the metaphysics of sexual love. In a letter begun but never 
finished by Wagner, the composer attempts to describe why erotic love is not just a delusion 
of the will-to-live exerting in its blind driving force over us, but a path by which the 
individual may come to be conscious of a whole greater than themselves through the unity 
with another. This in turn will lead one to the true meaning of love, the metaphysical 
transcendence of this world and a unity with all. Chafe sites three stages that Wagner weaves 
symbolically into the work. The first is the growth from individual consciousness, where love 
merely represents the Will’s blind force of desire, bewusst (consciously), the second, erotic 
love or the merging of two individual consciousness’s into one, einbewusst (in-consciously), 
and finally beyond this phenomenal life to unconsciousness and death where all is one, 
unbewusst (un-consciously).  
Chafe considers a dual perspective essential in understanding what he calls the 
“Tristan style.” Wagner simultaneously dealt with love as a torment of desire, signifying the 
power that the Schopenhauerian will-to-live holds over us, yet at the same time as a way out 
of this world of illusions, revealing the path to redemption. Both points of view intermingle 
and proceed through Tristan, as the music holds both tonal and atonal elements, leading the 
work to be conceptualized as both a work of late romanticism and at the same juncture 
heralding the entrance of musical modernism. He details Wagner’s engagement throughout 
Tristan with the numerous metaphors that pertain to his readings of Schopenhauer, for 
example there is discussion of dreams, and dream-like states as reflecting the path between 
unconscious reality, consciousness, and the symbolic contrast of sleep with the illusion of 
waking reality. Chafe covers these and more notions, all of which could be restated with 
terms relevant to the liminal. The real moment of power, which gives sexual love and 
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sacrifice metaphysical awareness, is gained from the experience of a state of transition, 
between sleep and waking, between sex and death, thus the in-between, the liminal is the 
sight of realization, it is the position of potential. In such terms the path to redemption is only 
endowed with metaphysical meaning through its passing through a liminal stage where one 
gains conscious awareness of a whole greater than the self through the experience of 
communitas.  
In the book Wagner Androgyne, Jean-Jacques Nattiez wished to go beyond the 
limitations of various critical theories, such as Marxism, feminism, and structuralism. To 
accomplish this, Nattiez’s centers his work on the concept of androgyny.13 For Nattiez the 
lore of the androgynous has the power to render visible an image of wholeness yet 
simultaneously denounces the actual existence of that state of being. There are spaces 
inherent in Wagner’s music that are capable of presenting an image of wholeness, as well as 
allowing one to view multiple possibilities. However, these may be considered ambiguous 
spaces more representative of liminality rather than androgyny per se. The concept of 
communitas explains a temporary feeling of completeness, which cannot necessarily be 
pinned down or said to definitively exist. That being said, Nattiez’s use of the term 
androgynous could be interchangeable with the term ambiguous. 
 John Louis DiGaetani believes that Wagner consciously chose ambiguity. In his book 
Richard Wagner: New Light on a Musical Life, he contends that, “Wagner was shrewd 
enough to realize that to be ambiguous is best so that most of the audience would be 
                                                
13 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Wagner Androgyne, trans. Stewart Spencer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
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fascinated.”14 DiGaetani goes on to reason that Wagner realized that if audience members 
could already understand everything about a work of art, they would become bored, but if the 
work was consciously ambiguous the audience members could never quite understand what 
was being proposed thus they would be endlessly intrigued by it.15 Wagner did indeed 
consciously choose to be ambiguous, however, his motivation for creating and using 
ambiguous spaces would be better understood through the concept of strategic liminality, 
further witnessed in his desire to create circumstances that would replicate the experience of 
spontaneous communitas. Liminal space is one of power. It often gives individuals who are 
outside of the normal status structures a strategic position within which they can exert 
influence and gain in stature. This is why being in a liminal space was beneficial to Wagner, 
as it is a position of potentials and endless possibilities. In his earlier book Wagner and 
Suicide,16 DiGaetani described the often emotional, extreme behaviors of Wagner the man, as 
characteristic of bipolar disorder.17 This psychological viewpoint can be beneficially 
integrated into liminal theory. Liminal positions can allow for a loosening of normative 
social and moral behavior, thus extreme behaviors may occur, status or gender roles may be 
flipped, there may be increased sexual behavior, or complete sexual cessation, physical 
brutality, or excessive indulgence.  
                                                
14 John Louis DiGaetani, Richard Wagner: New Light on a Musical Life (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 
2013), 198. 
15 Ibid. 
16 John Louis DiGaetani, Wagner and Suicide (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003). 
17 Daniel John Carroll, a graduate student in musicology at Boston University, has written a paper 
suggesting that Wagner may also have suffered from borderline personality disorder in addition to bipolar 
disorder. Consult the following link: http://www.the-wagnerian.com/2012/08/the-psychopathology-of-richard-
wagner.html  
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Wagner’s psychological motivations toward the erotic, and how such compulsions 
were mitigated within societal structure, are some of the concepts explored by Laurence 
Dreyfus in his book Wagner and the Erotic Impulse.18 Dreyfus contends that Wagner’s works 
demanded erotic dialogue be brought into the discourse of music criticism. He argues that 
during the first half of the nineteenth century critics were not able to discuss musical devices 
that conjured up erotic imagery in overt terms. However, Wagner’s works required the use of 
these terms thus forcing them into public debate. Dreyfus used a wide variety of source 
materials. He discusses Wagner’s musico-dramatic works, erotic obsessions, friends, and 
sought to reveal his creative intentions. Dreyfus discussed Wagner’s philosophical 
influences, however relegated Wagner’s use of these philosophies as merely a means toward 
the satisfaction of his own erotic nature. Nevertheless, Wagner’s philosophical and political 
wanderings cannot be relegated to merely justification for erotic compulsions. It was his use 
of liminal positions as a dynamic form of strategic social identity building that allowed him 
the freedom to express erotic notions yet maintain a position of stature and increased 
behavioral potential outside of normative social roles.  
Wagner’s philosophical wanderings and especially his engagement with the writings 
of Arthur Schopenhauer served to launch a friendship with the young Friedrich Nietzsche. 
However, as Nietzsche’s own unique philosophical beliefs were forged, Wagner’s continued 
devotion to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy became a point of contention between the 
two. As such, Nietzsche produced written works of lasting interest both for and against 
Wagner. The former is exemplified in first book The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of 
                                                
18 Laurence Dreyfus, Wagner and the Erotic Impulse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2010). 
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Music,19 and even to an extent in the last of his Untimely Meditations “Richard Wagner at 
Bayreuth.”20 The latter is exemplified in essays such as “The Case of Wagner” and 
“Nietzsche Contra Wagner.”21 These works reveal a unique perspective of Wagner the man, 
derived from an interesting, if short-lived, friendship between these two monumental figures 
of modern Western philosophy. However, any reading of these works by Nietzsche should be 
tempered by considering the historical circumstances motivating their creation. Nietzsche, 
although trained to an extent in music, was not extraordinarily competent in the area of 
analysis. Furthermore, there were some personal offenses that had occurred between 
Nietzsche and Wagner that resulted in an unresolved bitterness, which tainted the comments 
of both. Therefore Nietzsche never quite considered Wagner’s works in themselves, but 
mostly as a means to express ideology. As Nietzsche’s own convictions split with both 
Schopenhauer and Wagner, his opinion and criticisms of Wagner works likewise changed, 
thus it is by reading between the lines that one may gain the most from Nietzsche’s later 
writings on Wagner. Nietzsche’s concept of the interaction between the characteristics of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian are utilized greatly by scholars and appear in narratives which 
characterize Wagner as a modernist, at the nexus of oppositional characteristics, 
continuity/discontinuity, solidity/fluidity, conflict/agreement.22 Indeed this kind of 
                                                
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music, ed. Raymond Geuss, trans. 
Ronald Speirs (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: and Other Writings, ed. 
Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
22 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. 
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ambiguous characterization of Wagner, as well as many examples of ambivalence towards 
both the man and his work, can be found beyond Nietzsche.  
In his essay “The Sorrows and Grandeur of Richard Wagner,” Thomas Mann also 
seemed to blend a politicized modernist view of Wagner into his analysis of musical works, 
typifying Wagner as part of a middle-class Germany that went from a failed revolution to 
disillusion then finally a pessimistic turning inward and acceptance of the state.23 Beyond 
Wagner himself, Mann regarded his compositions not as music in the genuine sense, nor did 
Mann deem his dramatic text or verse literature in a true sense, rather it was an amalgamation 
of myth, symbolism, psychology, and some would say nationalism.24 This ambiguity, I 
would argue, is what makes Wagner’s works so enduring.  
Theodore Adorno’s In Search of Wagner came from a definite materialist bent, which 
makes it difficult to regard some of the critical commentary as balanced. Some of Adorno’s 
contentions about Wagner and his bourgeois traits are rather exaggerated. 25 In his 1963 essay 
“Wagner’s Relevance for Today,” Adorno reveals that his preoccupation with Wagner was 
perhaps fueled by his ambivalent feelings toward the man himself.26 In this work Adorno 
discusses the essentially modernist characteristic that colors Wagner’s compositions: 
uncertainty. He goes on to say that this uncertainty is what is so exhilarating and captivating 
about Wagner’s music. Such a situation of uncertainty is not just representative of a trait 
                                                
23 Thomas Mann, Pro and Contra Wagner (London: Faber and Faber, 1985). 
24 Thomas Mann, Past Masters and Other Papers, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf Inc., 1933).   
25 Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: New Left Books, 1981). 
26 Theodor Adorno, “Wagner’s Relevance for Today,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert, trans., 
Susan H. Gillespie (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 584-602. 
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loosely categorized under the term modernism but of what I will term as a liminal position. 
An explanation utilizing the perspective of liminality provides a fuller interpretation of such 
traits and their later repercussions. 
Lydia Goehr explored the idea of aesthetic autonomy and its association to music 
drama, as discussed by Adorno, in an essay comparing Tristan and Isolde and Don 
Giovanni.27 Her book The Quest for Voice: On Music Politics, and the Limits of 
Philosophy,28 also examines issues of autonomy and formalism, as well as aspects of 
performance and points of response. Goehr utilizes Wagner and his canon to concentrate on 
standard themes found in German romantic criticism.  
Wagner’s musico-dramatic works fluctuate between moments of stability and 
instability of form, which may both serve to reify or undermine basic tonality. Attempts to 
explain or justify Wagner’s harmonic creativity have been divided. Some of the earliest 
attempts occurred before the notion of a disintegration of tonality had been imagined. Indeed 
Wagner’s innovation was simply regarded as enhancing of the tonal system through 
chromaticism. In his 1881 essay “Die Harmonik Richard Wagner’s an den Leitmotiven aus 
Tristan und Isolde,”29 Karl Mayrberger, inspired by his teacher Simon Sechter’s system, 
sought to accredit the special characteristic of the so-called Tristan chord to its obscure tonal 
function and atypical intervallic construction. Wagner’s use of the half-diminished seventh 
                                                
27 Lydia Goehr, “The Curse and Promise of the Absolutely Musical: Tristan und Isolde and Don 
Giovanni,” in The Don Giovanni Moment: Essays on the Legacy of an Opera, ed. Daniel Alan Herwitz, Lydia 
Goehr (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
28 Lydia Goehr, The Quest for Voice: On Music Politics, and the Limits of Philosophy (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998). 
29 Karl Mayrberger “Die Harmonik Richard Wagner’s an den Leitmotiven aus Tristan und Isolde,” in 
Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century I: Fugue, form, and style, ed. Ian Bent (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 221. 
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chord to develop a sense of tonal ambiguity at moments of unpredictability and dramatic 
suspense has been a point of continuous discussion for theorists. One can easily discover this 
by examining the writings of early twentieth-century theorists such as Arnold Schoenberg, or 
Ernst Kurth. Kurth uses the label of romanticism when viewing Wagner’s exploitation of 
ambiguity with regards to the Tristan chord. In his work “Romantic Harmony and its Crisis 
in Wagner’s Tristan,”30 Kurth stated that one of the characteristics that romanticism exploits 
is the ability to portray singular phenomena in a multivariate of ways, pointing out that 
romanticism thrives on both the attribute of concurrence and indeterminateness. Indeed the 
amorphous nature of the Tristan chord has allowed some theorists to label it as the starting 
point of the breakdown of tonality of which Wagner was often perceived at the threshold of. 
Such theorists fully regarded the tonally disruptive potential of the Tristan chord when 
viewed as a post-tonal or atonal entity, and explored the consequences of the disintegration 
of tonal order and the formal structures that relied on it.  
In Free Composition, theorist Heinrich Schenker rallied against what he saw as the 
self-indulgence of Schoenberg and the Second Viennese School and placed the blame firmly 
on Wagner. 31 Schenker rejected the structural vitality of Wagnerian music drama in which 
everything within music should be in service of the drama, thus expression was to be the 
guiding principle of the musical structure. Schenker believed this opened the door to what he 
saw as the overtly exaggerated expression of Schoenberg and his pupils.  
                                                
30 Ernst Kurth, Ernst Kurth: Selected Writings, trans. and ed. Lee Allen Rothfarb 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
31 Heinrich Schenker, Free Composition, ed., trans, Ernst Oster, (New York: 1935, 1979). 
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On the other side of the debate Alfred Lorenz defended the structural viability of 
Wagner’s music dramas. Lorenz considered Wagner’s work as reasonable, predictable formal 
musical structures that were loosely based on ideas presented in “Opera and Drama” about 
the poetic musical period.32 Lorenz maintained that Wagner created a network based on a 
few structures, the ABA and AAB (bar) forms. Lorenz did tend to impose boundaries on 
Wagner, which are potentially arbitrary, attempting to fit his musical structures into a system 
that had been reached ad hoc. Despite the problematic nature of Lorenz-imposed boundaries, 
he does leave room within those boundaries for variance, adding to the debate between those 
who regard Wagner as a tonal anarchist versus those who see him as a progressive more 
noteworthy for his reshaping of already exiting compositional techniques than his destruction 
or rejection of them.  
Carl Dahlhaus was extremely skeptical of Lorenz’s ideas. Dahlhaus was greatly 
influenced by the perspective of Theodore Adorno, and like Adorno brought the political 
experience of the era to bear on his opinion of Lorenz’s work. Dahlhaus saw Lorenz as a 
Nazi-supporter attempting to portray a hierarchical regimen onto Wagner’s forms. Richard 
Wagner’s Music Dramas indicates Dahlhaus’s preference for focusing on small sections of 
the works rather than impose large formal structures.33 He was more partial to an interpretive 
method rather than what he saw as a somewhat arbitrary formalist scheme. This approach 
allowed Dahlhaus to demonstrate the ambiguities and subtleties inherent in Wagner’s work, 
often characterized as modernist qualities.  
                                                
32 Stephen McClatchie, Analyzing Wagner’s Operas: Alfred Lorenz and German Nationalist Ideology. 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester, 1998). 
33 Carl Dahlhaus, Richard Wagner's Music Dramas, trans., Mary Whittall (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
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Warren Darcy’s Wagner’s Das Rheingold, is an analysis of the work in its entirety 
utilizing the principles of voice leading.34 Darcy believed that Dahlhaus denied larger scale 
formal architectural elements in Wagner’s music, however he also realized that paying 
attention to formal structural elements should not come at the cost of devaluing issues of 
cultural and dramatic content as well as textual meaning. Darcy builds on the work of Robert 
Bailey, who regarded Wagner’s use of tonality as an almost Monteverdian form of second 
practice. Darcy uses Bailey’s concept of “expressive tonality” (the coupling of keys a semi-
tone apart), much like the post-Schoenberg concept of extended tonality continuing to 
corroborate the value of diatonic principles in the work. 35 Darcy suggests that each note of a 
chromatic scale is permeated with semantic meaning; likewise each key, concurrently, is 
utilized for both linear and harmonic functions. Darcy reprises Bailey’s concept of 
“associative tonality” (double-tonic complex), following the basic postulation that large-scale 
musico-dramatic forms are organized by not only motivic restatements but tonal reiterations 
as well.   
In agreement with Darcy, Anthony Newcomb’s Nietzsche-inspired title “The Birth of 
Music Out of the Spirit of Drama,” supports his view that Wagner should be discussed as a 
composer who worked within the tradition of tonality and was capable of organizing large 
portions of musical time and space.36 Newcomb recommends that analyses of Wagner should 
balance both large structures and the smallest subtleties that are often read as modernist 
                                                
34 Warren Darcy, Wagner’s Das Rheingold (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
35 Robert Bailey, “The Method of Composition,” in The Wagner companion, eds., Peter Burbidge and 
Richard Sutton (London: Faber and Faber, 1979). 
36 Anthony Newcomb, “The Birth of Music out of the Spirit of Drama: An Essay in Wagnerian Formal 
Analysis,” 19th-Century Music 5, no. 1 (1981): 38-66.  
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concepts. Case in point, Newcomb suggests that the most essential aspect of Wagner’s form 
is its ambiguity.  
John Daverio’s Nineteenth-Century Music and the German Romantic Ideology37 
offers an analysis of a few sections of Parsifal where he furthers the portrayal of its 
fragmentary nature. Daverio suggests that it is a series of musical fragments that are what 
Wagner termed “rhetorical dialectics.” Such fragments are spared from disassociation 
through what Wagner terms “the art of transition.” The art of transition thrives on 
interruptions yet allows for continuation, both are intermingled, and generative. As Daverio 
proposes, romantic works strive for an intrinsic unity, but are contradicted by a general 
skepticism characteristic of the modern era of actually obtaining that ideal.  
In opposition to an analysis of Wagner’s works using formal models, Carolyn Abbate 
argued in her book Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth 
Century38 that harmonic improvisation was one of the essential elements in Wotan’s speech 
from Act II of Die Walküre, and that the various cadential structures were actually separate 
from, rather than constituting the overarching structure. Abbate calls to attention the 
unstructured elements and ambiguities that are a part of music drama.  
Lawrence Kramer also expressed the significance of ambiguity in any tonal or 
harmonic analysis of Wagner’s work. He like Darcy advocated the work of Bailey in 
examining the lack of exact formal boundaries. For Kramer, this concept coupled with 
Wagner’s use of aggregation to reach termination was associated with the fulfillment of 
                                                
37 John Daverio Nineteenth-Century Music and the German Romantic Ideology (New York: Schirmer 
Books, 1993). 
38 Carolyn Abbate, Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
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libidinal desire. As such the interpretation in his book Music as Cultural Practice used 
Freudian concepts, alternating between musical and psychological perspectives.39 Kramer 
proposes that Wagner’s work is both progressive in its use of musical methodology but also 
in its portrayal of sexual ideology.  
Thomas Grey utilizes an interpretive strategy that begins from a direct examination of 
the interface between Wagner’s prose writing and his composition. In his book Wagner’s 
Musical Prose: Texts and Context, Grey considers the relationship between words and music, 
deciding that there is a contradistinction of inquiries and responses, where the dramatic and 
musical dimensions recurrently switch positions.40 Grey also considers important technical 
concepts found in Wagner such as the difficult notion of the poetic-musical period as well as 
the often-addressed idea’s of “endless melody,” and leitmotif. Despite focusing on small-
scale matters, Grey does not neglect how small and larger structural components interact. 
In sum, while building on the works of these authors, my study further incorporates 
perspectives drawn from anthropology, as well as social theory, and social psychology to the 
historical interpretation of Wagner’s identity construction. The anthropological constituent 
considers the appearance of ambiguity in various aspects of Wagner’s selfhood, writings, and 
musical works through the concept of liminality.   
 Methodologically speaking, I aim to add a distinct social dimension to Wagner 
studies. My study will center on issues of liminality as developed by anthropologist Victor 
Turner, however will also employ other concepts drawn from the social sciences such as the 
                                                
39 Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
40 Thomas Grey, Wagner’s Musical Prose: Texts and Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
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notion of social identity theory initiated by social psychologist Henri Tajfel, and sociologist 
Max Weber’s concept of charisma. My study takes as point of departure a few theoretical 
assumptions: that there is a social element to identity, meaning that a segment of one’s self-
concept is acquired from recognized membership in a pertinent social group.41 That social 
influence occurs through referent informational influences, i.e. as one’s social identity 
becomes evident, there is a tendency to adhere to the normative beliefs and behaviors of the 
perceived in-group, while rejecting the beliefs and behaviors of the out-group. Subjective 
ambivalence occurs when one recognizes differences between themselves and a fellow in-
group member. In most cases this results in an attempt to adjust one’s behavior, to mimic the 
individual(s) exhibiting the most typical examples of in-group behavior. If this is not 
rewarded sufficiently through either acceptance or the desired prestige, then an individual 
may chose to purposefully reject the behaviors of the so-called in-group. This can result in 
negative associations usually accompanying out-group status or it may result in an entirely 
new classification. It is in the definition this new classification of out-group or outsider status 
that I will be assisted by Turner’s conceptualization of liminality.  
Liminality is a space between definitive structures or groups. Turner describes it as 
anti-structure, which is  
the liberation of human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc., from 
the normative constraints incumbent upon occupying a sequence of social statuses, 
enacting a multiplicity of social roles, and being acutely conscious of membership in 
some corporate group such as a family, lineage, clan, tribe, or nation, or of affiliation 
with some pervasive social category such as a class, caste, sex- or age-division.42   
                                                
41 Henri Tajfel, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in Intergroup Relations: Essential 
Readings, ed. Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams (New York: Psychology Press, 2001), 94-109. 
42 Victor Turner, “Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative 
Symbology,” Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 75.   
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In such a space the human is free to experience the wholeness of being without external 
constraints. In these moments there can occur a spontaneous feeling of understanding and 
oneness with others in this position outside normative roles, when the only linking force is 
the connection of a deeper human commonality. These spontaneous moments of communitas 
occur during periods of liminality, outside the fixed structures of society.   
Consequently, Turner realized that liminal space was important not only for its 
marking periods of anti-structural/out-group time but also for understanding the ways in 
which individuals reacted to periods of time outside of normative structures as members of 
an out-group. Thus periods of disorder, out-group status, and liminal states are not confined 
to negative connotations; in essence these states may serve to bring human agency to the 
forefront, and endow those groups/individuals within these positions with powers and 
capacities of behavior that are beyond their usual social roles or societally imposed place in 
the status hierarchy. Thus a liminal outsider/out-group position may symbolize a form of 
social marginalization indexing both danger and power.43  
Drawing from both social identity theory and liminal theory, I ask: in what ways did 
Wagner attempt to use the typical channels provided by social structure to gain prestige and 
respect? How did his failures lead to an eventual rejection of these structural means? How 
did Wagner use what I term liminal spaces to gain prestige and navigate structure? Did he in 
fact consciously use liminal positions strategically to navigate the status hierarchies and 
financial systems that limited his creative vision? Did he envision Bayreuth as what could be 
termed a permanent liminal space to house his art and ensure its enduring notoriety? In 
                                                
43 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (New York: Routledge Classics, 1960, 2002), 117. 
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answering these questions, I engage in careful study and close scrutiny of the specific 
historical conditions, philosophical and political influences, and social circumstances that 
shaped Wagner’s environment and, in turn, his choices in identity construction. To achieve 
this I rely heavily on comparative research.  
Realizing the potential bias in all sources, I engage in comparative study with a wide 
variety of historical documents, juxtaposing these materials with one another. I begin with 
primary sources such as Wagner’s own words expressed though personal diary entries, 
letters, writings, prose works, autobiography, and musical works. Further primary sources 
include letters, writings, and diary entries of those cohorts in direct as well as indirect 
communication with Wagner. Beyond primary sources immediately connected to Wagner I 
examine philosophical and historical works that may have either directly or indirectly 
influenced him in some way. I also utilize notable secondary sources, such as biographies, 
analyses, and interpretive writings on Wagner from scholars both contemporary and bygone 
across multiple disciplines, philosophical, sociological, musicological, and anthropological.  
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Chapter One: 
Social and Material Factors in the Development of Richard Wagner’s Liminal Identity 
 
Introduction 
 
 In reference to Richard Wagner, notable biographer Ernst Newman stated that, “no 
great artist was ever so enormously affected in his views of the cosmos by the circumstances 
of his own life.”1 Examining Wagner under the lens of social influence allows for the 
experience and the interpretation of Wagner as an adaptable human being and as a dynamic 
historical figure within the context of greater society. There has been research in a variety of 
areas of interest regarding the early life of the composer. Many accounts have attempted to 
analyze various aspects of Wagner’s life and his behaviors through psychoanalytic 
frameworks. Aside from examining such internal motivations that shape individual behavior, 
focusing on a social component will add another layer. In this chapter I discuss the idea of 
“social identity” formation as defined by Henri Tajfel to examine Wagner’s development. I 
will also employ the concept of liminality and consider the notion of ritual as a public 
method of identity marking and status recognition. The two anthropological figures that 
developed the latter two concepts were Arnold Van Gennep and Victor Turner respectively. 
Van Gennep initially created the trifold stages of the ritual process, separation, transition, and 
reintegration, after which Turner expanded upon the transitional or “liminal” phase. By 
examining Wagner’s life chronologically I aim to contextualize the history and influences 
that surrounded him during his development, and briefly examine a few instances where 
                                                
 1 Ernest Newman, The Music of the Masters: Wagner (London: John Lane Co.1912), 3. 
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social influences and situations may have notably influenced his identity formation. I argue 
that social facts beyond Wagner’s control placed him in what could be regarded as positions 
of inferiority and marginality, which in turn led to his use of philosophies that correspond to 
characteristics of the liminal and finally his use and creation of liminal spaces as an adaptive 
strategy to overcome such constraints. 2 
 
Social Identity Theory, Social Ritual, and the Anthropological Development of the 
Concept of Liminal Theory 
  
 The self-concept or image an individual has of themself is infinitely more complex 
than the concept of “social identity” presented here.3 As Tajfel stated, “the assumption is 
made that, however rich and complex may be an individual’s view of himself or herself in 
relation to the surrounding world, social and physical, some aspects of that view are 
contributed to by the membership of certain social groups or categories.”4 In other words, 
social identity as discussed in this study will pertain to that segment of Wagner’s self-
concept/image that was attained from his awareness of his membership of a social group(s) 
combined with the value and emotional significance he linked to that membership. “Seen 
                                                
2 Emile Durkheim defined social fact as a category of facts that “consist of manners of acting, thinking 
and feeling external to the individual, that are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise 
control over him.” Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its 
Method, ed. Steven Lukes, trans., W. D. Halls (New York: Free Press, 1982), 52. 
 3 Philosophical questions regarding what “is” identity, or psychological theories of identity 
development per se are not going to be addressed in the present study. 
 
4 Henri Tajfel, “Social Categorization, Social Identity, and Social Comparison,” in Differentiation 
between Social Groups, ed., Henri Tajfel (London: Academic Press, 1978), 63. 
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from the intergroup perspective of social identity, social categorization can therefore be 
considered as a system of orientation which helps to create and define the individuals place 
in society.”5 Each society has a unique set of roles/identities that is understood by its 
members, thus the individual members comprehend their identities in socially defined terms. 
Society defines as well as creates the categories of its members in a dialectical relationship. 
An individual’s recognized identity depends not just the self but also society, thus changes in 
identity, social position, or role must in some way be recognized and validated by the 
society; in many cultures this is done through ritual. Ritual may allow a society to 
symbolically mark the transition or movement of an individual or a group from one socially 
recognized role to another. This transitional period in itself can simultaneously be both an 
advantageous and disadvantageous, as such the possibilities and strategies used in navigating 
the experience of such a position can serve to shape and guide an individual’s identity as well 
as the actions one is willing and able to take. Hence, it is useful to understand the origin and 
significance of the concept of this transitional, “liminal” period, which I will be using to 
frame my examination of Wagner. 
 Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anthropologist and folklorist Arnold van 
Gennep’s study of ritual within small-scale societies led to his most notable work, Rites of 
Passage.6 Here Van Gennep discussed rituals that occur with a change in individual social 
status,7 cohort group, and the society as a whole. Almost all rites from the individual to the 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Arnold van Gennep, Rites of Passage, eds., trans. Monkia B. Vizedom, Gabrielle L. Caffee (London: 
Routledge &Kegan Paul 1960). 
7 Van Gennep’s work is primarily connected with individual life-crisis rituals.  
 30 
society as a whole involve some form of “passage,” a symbolic movement or transition from 
one status position or role to another.8 Van Gennep went on to clarify the three distinct 
phases that occur within a rite of passage. The first phase, separation, clearly draws the line 
between sacred space and time, and secular space and time. This is beyond just the act of 
entering a space denoted as holy, it also changes the quality of time; in a way it involves the 
construction of a cultural realm, which feels beyond or outside of the temporal space that 
measures normal secular processes. The next phase, transition, represents a space of 
ambiguity, a limbo that seems to lack the attributes of either the preceding phase or the 
subsequent phase. Van Gennep referred to this phase as a liminal period.9 Van Gennep labels 
the third and final phase, incorporation. The symbolic phenomena that accompany 
incorporation would be representative of the subject(s) returning to a new, stable, clearly 
defined position status or place within the whole society.10 Van Gennep’s studies primarily 
involved what could be termed as pre-industrial or ‘traditional’ social groups. However, in 
post-industrial societies some examples of symbolic rites of passage that are still commonly 
celebrated are marriages, funerals, graduations and, in some cultures, the transition from 
parental dependence to independent financial status.11 All publically mark a transition from 
one state to another. Each position serves to define a social role complete with its own 
distinct set of rights and responsibilities. In many modern societies, a young adult’s identity 
is marked by an increasing set of both economic and personal freedoms outside of a familial 
                                                
8 Van Gennep, Rites of Passage, 2-3.  
 9 This is the phase, which anthropologist Victor Turner, as well as I will be most concerned with and 
will return to in depth. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
 11 In numerous societies this is an extremely important piece of male identity construction specifically. 
 31 
setting. This transition however may be extended or interrupted by a myriad of factors aside 
from the personal and/or psychological. Socio-economic, political, and structural factors may 
inhibit this identity transition for prolonged periods of time or permanently. This concept of 
an extended or permanent period of transition is connected to the work of anthropologist and 
folklorist Victor Turner. Turner focused on the particular qualities that characterize the 
participant’s experience of this transitional/liminal phase. He observed that during the liminal 
phase there is a blurring of any lines of distinction as the subject(s) undergo a process of 
equalization or leveling. Defining factors such as gender or status roles that existed in the 
pre-liminal phase are erased; the subjects are forced toward structural invisibility, uniformity, 
and anonymity However there is a form of compensation for these losses, as subjects gain a 
special type of freedom and power that they may exert despite their weakened position. As 
Turner noted, “the novices are, in fact, temporarily undefined, beyond the normative social 
structure. This weakens them, since they have no rights over others. But it also liberates them 
from structural obligations. It places them too in a close connection with asocial powers of 
life and death.”12 Thus there is a power beyond structure yet also a vulnerability dependent 
on that same structure. In liminality, the normal structural or moral order, rights, and 
obligations are suspended, and may even seem to be reversed, therefore “liminality . . . may 
also include subversive and ludic events.”13 Liminality is a space between structure; it can be 
described as anti-structure, a moment of liberation of the 
human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc., from the normative 
constraints incumbent upon occupying a sequence of social statuses, enacting a 
                                                
12 Victor Turner, “Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative 
Symbology,” Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 59.   
13 Ibid., 59.   
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multiplicity of social roles, and being acutely conscious of membership in some 
corporate group such as a family, lineage, clan, tribe, or nation, or of affiliation with 
some pervasive social category such as a class, caste, sex- or age-division.14   
 
In such a space the human is free to experience the wholeness of being without abstract 
external constraints. In these moments there can occur a spontaneous feeling of 
understanding and oneness with others in this space, outside of normative roles where the 
only linking force is the connection of a deeper human commonality, the experience of 
communitas. However, Turner goes on to state that “there is a dialectic here as the 
immediacy of communitas gives way to the mediacy of structure, while, in rites de passage, 
men are released from structure into communitas only to return to structure revitalized by 
their experience of communitas.”15 Turner is “certain” that, beyond the individual on the 
larger scale, “no society can function adequately without this dialectic” as well.16 If social 
structures become too ridged or repressive there may be a revolutionary impulse toward 
communitas. Nevertheless extended periods of communitas or a lack of stable societally 
acknowledged status positions, will once again lead society back to structure. However, 
completion of the full rite of passage may be stalled, as various structural or personal 
circumstances may prevent an individual or groups a return to a clearly defined societal 
position or status. Therefore the liminal phase itself may become institutionalized. 
Nevertheless this might be regarded in some ways beneficial, and the strategic use of a 
liminal position may give those previously in a marginal position a coping strategy to allow 
                                                
14 Ibid., 75. 
15 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 
1969), 129. 
16 Ibid. 
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them to reside between two worlds inclusively rather than be excluded from both. Sociologist 
and anthropologist Reuven Kahane suggests that, “because the individuals are 
simultaneously outsiders to and insiders of the existing order . . . they can behave freely and 
experimentally. Postmodern liminality, then, gives individuals institutional space to live with 
the strains and tensions that are inherent in the social complexity and rapid change of 
postmodern society.”17 
 I argue that the use of such a strategy can be extended to Wagner and his cohorts, as 
the rapid political, economic, and cultural changes that took place during the post-Napoleonic 
era in Europe created similar conditions and left a generation of youth in an economically 
marginal position. The structural restrictions and lack of social mobility that Wagner and his 
generation faced delayed or inhibited the usual completion of the symbolic rite of passage; an 
arrival at adulthood through movement and eventual reintegration into a higher status. Thus 
Wagner struggled to develop an identity that could reconcile his lack of financial success 
with his artistic ambitions. Recourse toward aesthetic differentiation and away from the 
typical material markings of status hierarchy often occurs when structures become too 
repressive and rigid. This stifling of individual identity creates a dialectical shift from 
structure back to the need for the free expression and deeper human connection of 
communitas. This need can manifest itself in revolutionary movements, such as the numerous 
uprisings across Europe, including Dresden, or it can occur within the individual, as it did 
with Wagner and many of his cohorts, resulting in alternative strategies of identity and value 
construction.  
                                                
17 Reuven Kahane and Tamar Rapoport, “Institutionalization of Liminality,” in The Origins of 
Postmodern Youth: Informal Youth Movements in a Comparative Perspective, eds, Reuven Kahane and Tamar 
Rapoport (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 31. 
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Wagner as a Liminal Figure: Youth, Economic Marginality, and the Benefits of a 
Liminal Status 
  
 A liminal phase can be institutionalized for various reasons. Interestingly, for Turner, 
liminality is a condition that is temporary and its implication means that there will be a 
resolution or movement back to either a recognized or reconfigured position within society. 
He explains: “Thus, for me, liminality represents the midpoint of a transition in a status-
sequence between two positions.”18 Therefore, in the liminal there is always the insinuation, 
belief, or hope that there will be movement at some point. Turner viewed liminal as distinct 
from other positions that are either permanently on the exterior of social structure (outsiders), 
or that can simultaneously identify and shift between multiple structural groups (marginal), 
or are structurally labeled by the society as inferior. For the anthropologist, outsiderhood then 
referred to the “condition of being either permanently and by ascription set outside the 
structural arrangements of a given social system.”19 Thus, unlike the liminar who is moving 
from one socially defined position to another, the outsider is removed from positions that are 
recognized within the social structure. They are removed from the status positions, roles, and 
normative behaviors of that society; the removal may be temporary or permanent, it may be 
voluntarily, or situational.20 “Such outsiders would include, in various cultures, shamans, 
                                                
18 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 237. 
19 Ibid., 233. 
 20 This outsider position will be exemplified and further discussed in chapter 3 in regards to Wagner’s 
self endowed position of poet-priest. 
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diviners, mediums, priests, those in monastic seclusion, hippies, hoboes, and gypsies.”21 
Turner then goes on to discuss why the outsider should be distinguished from the “marginal;” 
it is this latter categorization that I will first relate to Wagner, as well as many of his social 
cohorts. Further, this position of marginality is where the nexus of in-group/out-group 
interaction for social identity development occurred as Wagner moved between groups of 
different status.22 Turner stated that marginals are “simultaneously members (by ascription, 
optation, self-definition, or achievement) of two or more groups whose social definitions and 
cultural norms are distinct from, and often even opposed to, one another.”23 The 
anthropologist suggested that this category would include “migrant foreigners . . . persons of 
mixed ethnic origin, parvenus (upwardly mobile marginals), the declasses (downwardly 
mobile marginals), migrants from country to city, and women in a changed, nontraditional 
role.” He further made the observation that marginal often rely on their group of origin, 
whom would be considered the inferior group, to experience communitas, however the more 
prestigious group in which they mainly live to “aspire to higher status as their structural 
reference group.” Turner also noted that, “sometimes they become radical critics of structure 
from the perspective of communitas,” yet the same individuals may also at times deny “the 
affectually warmer and more egalitarian bond of communitas.”24 There is an overlap between 
all of these three categories. They are not solid divisions but to some extent fluid and 
                                                
 21 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 233. 
 
22 It is important to note that I will specifically be using Turner’s conception of the term “marginal” in 
this paper.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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continually shifting as are both societal conditions and personal identities. As we will shortly 
see, Wagner exemplifies such fluidity.  
 Wagner, along with many of his university friends, was a member of the lower 
middle class, not from aristocracy and without ties to merchant wealth. This was much the 
same cohort group represented by his later friends in the Young German movement, a 
loosely associated group of literary radicals that spoke for democratic ideals and rallied 
against the political and social conditions of the time. Although he initially aspired to the 
lifestyle of the elite, he experienced equality and a deeper bond with his group of origin, the 
lower middle class. Wagner, and those in this age/class position, developed an ideologically 
validated aesthetic form of cultural prestige, one that was eventually merged into a 
burgeoning nationalism. In the 1820s, a newfound belief in social mobility filled the German 
universities with hopeful students. As the actual prospect of social mobility declined towards 
the 1840s the youth that had no ties to either the old aristocracy or the new merchant wealth 
found themselves in a socio-economically marginal position, lacking in opportunities for the 
usual career-related, or financial means towards adult identity. This led to an extended 
liminal period for those attempting to complete the passage to adulthood.  
As mentioned previously, institutionalized liminality may allow those that were 
previously marginalized and excluded from full participation in either status position the 
ability to live “freely and experimentally” between both positions, affording imagination and 
requiring creativity towards the design of new markers of, and paths toward, a positive social 
identity. Wagner and those in this position attempted to utilize cultural ties and aesthetic 
values to gain positive identity distinction. Further they attempted to shape a new kind of 
citizenship and forge their own societal space as German nationalism grew, questioning the 
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legitimacy of the hierarchical structure. This added to the doubt cast upon the validity of the 
position of those at the top. The lack of any clear and ascribed difference between those at 
the top and those at the bottom would come to result in revolution. Wagner’s experience of 
marginality led to a certain freedom, level of creativity, and viewpoints not available to those 
still living within the role-playing of a particular society.25 Wagner’s experience of economic 
marginality, and extended liminality, furthered by his time as an outsider living in exile 
allowed him to bring together the numerous social factors, philosophical influences, and the 
experiences he, along with his social cohorts, had endured into some of his most significant 
writings on the state of music, opera, and art.  
 As an artist Wagner’s single-minded devotion to his aesthetic goals led him to shirk 
various normative behaviors, roles, and endure a great deal of humiliation. His structurally 
imposed economic marginality and utilized liminal status allowed him to feel that he could 
override his moral and financial obligations. Wagner simultaneously strove for a higher-class 
group, which he deemed more culturally elite, while at the same time identifying with a 
lower class economic group. Wagner as well as others of his economic/age cohort group 
were waiting for a utopian future when they could (or would) be incorporated back into the 
society to take a better position, a society in which their actions would be considered the 
norm. Thus they could be considered as living in a kind of extended liminal position.  
Wagner did not regard himself as being fully removed from the structures of his 
society or as completely rejecting them but as trying to renegotiate and elevate the status of a 
position/role that he sought to create and then fulfill. However in Wagner, as well as in the 
                                                
25 In regards to marginals Turner observed that, “they are highly conscious and self-conscious people 
and may produce from their ranks a disproportionately high number of writers, artists, and philosophers.” Ibid. 
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minds of many of the economically-marginalized class of Young Germans, the conditions of 
society at the time did not allow financial stability, status elevation, or the free creation of 
such lofty artistic and utopian goals. Wagner’s experience of economic marginalization 
forced his single-minded devotion toward aesthetic goals as a method of status equalization 
and prestige, when economic or positional gains were not an available method to gain access 
to an elevated status. These early experiences of structural marginalization and liminality 
introduced Wagner not only to the challenges but also the benefits of such a position. During 
his early years Wagner was without substantial agency in dictating the circumstances of his 
identity or of his life, his situation was shaped by the material economic, political, and 
cultural changes rapidly occurring within his society. As an individual agent he continued to 
navigate the margins and adapt to his situation. He would come to learn over time how to 
strategically take advantage of the freedoms and assets that come with such a position.  
 
Wagner’s Early History: The Liminal Power of Narrative in Identity Formation 
  
 It would be advantageous to briefly examine aspects of Wagner’s individual history 
where material constraints and personal difficulties may have resulted in the need for him to 
demonstrate flexible, adaptable, and ultimately creative strategies towards his identity 
formation. Wilhelm Richard Wagner was born in Leipzig, Germany on May 22, 1813, a year 
before Napoleon Bonaparte’s surrender in April of 1814. The ninth child of his father (on 
record), Carl Friedrich Wagner, a police actuary, and his mother Johanna (thought to have 
been the mistress of Prince Constantine), Wagner spent the first years of his life surrounded 
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by some of the most severe battles to take place in the war of liberation against Napoleon.26 
Carl Friedrich died from typhus in November of 1813 and the actor-painter Ludwig Geyer 
became his adoptive father. Wagner himself speculated that he was in fact his real father, and 
indeed it is not completely know whether or not Johanna had engaged in relations with the 
actor prior to Carl Friedrich’s death. It is often a matter of conjecture that this lingering 
suspicion and doubt, including the fact that Geyer had been thought to have Jewish ancestry 
(which is actually false), would manifest in later psychological issues and identity concerns 
that Wagner held. Ludwig and Johanna were married in 1814, thus Geyer raised Richard as 
his own and as a child he went by the name of Richard Geyer until he was fourteen. Wagner 
was a sickly child and had been said to have a rather skinny, small-frame body with an 
unusually large head. As a child he developed a love of theater, perhaps inheriting this 
passion from his family, not just Geyer, as three of his older sisters had also been stage 
actors. Such a career was not particularly lucrative and his sisters struggled financially, as did 
his parents. This could be sighted as the reason why Johanna decided not to encourage 
Richard in the arts, as well as Geyer’s wish that young Richard achieve greater success than 
his parents. Wagner did however chronicle an episode in his autobiography My Life, when he 
was supposedly called to Geyer’s deathbed and asked to play a few tunes on the piano, to 
which Geyer responded with, “could it be that he has a talent for music?”27 There is no other 
record of this happening outside of Wagner’s own account so it may very well be a fabricated 
event, providing a good example of Wagner’s conscious creation of his own narrative. He 
                                                
26 Eric Dorn Brose, “Patriotism, Nationalism, and the Liberation of Germany,” in German History 
1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich (New York: Berghahn Books 2013). 
27 Richard Wagner, My Life, ed. Mary Whittall, trans. Andrew Gray (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963), 6. 
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carefully shaped his own backstory to provide evidence of his genius, guided not by the 
normal structures of education but by the hand of destiny. Wagner would later attempt to 
strategically position himself as Beethoven’s rightful successor and a continuer of the 
greatness of Germanic music. In this way one could consider Wagner as exhibiting 
characteristics associated with the liminal figure of the ‘trickster,’ as being both a narrative 
figure and a narrative force, the generator of his own myth.28 It is important to keep in mind 
that his autobiography My Life was written numerous years after most of the events occurred. 
Evidence referred to outside of Wagner’s own self-imagined myth in some instances 
contradicts, or alters the narrative he created and may portray a somewhat different picture.   
 Various external situational instabilities, as well as personal physiological 
disadvantages may have mitigated young Richard’s identity development. A myriad of 
factors such as his family’s lack of a secure financial situation, the close proximity of war 
that marked his early infant and childhood years, the infidelities of his parents, or the general 
problems associated with raising a large family on meager economic resources could have 
created significant tensions. Further, these problems may have drained his mother both 
financially and emotionally, leading to a weak maternal attachment with Richard. Despite 
professing a deep love and genuine tenderness for his mother in letters and in My Life, 
Wagner does hint his mother’s lack of outward affection. Beyond these situational stresses 
Wagner had been a sickly child, and was said to be rather awkward and physically frail. He 
suffered from recurrent bouts of depression and irritability that began at a young age. 
Throughout his life he also experienced maladies and symptoms that in modern times could 
                                                
28 Paul Radin, The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology (New York: Schocken Books, 
1978), xxiii.  
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perhaps be regarded as psychosomatic in cause. All of these factors could manifest in 
numerous psychological issues. To compensate for these personal disadvantages young 
Richard needed to display adaptability, and through that need developed a productive 
imagination. He learned to protect himself and fit in with his peers through over 
compensation in other areas. As a child he was known to have a quick wit and sharp tongue, 
which would often lead to arguments, however he was just as adept at getting out of a fight 
with diplomacy. Whatever he lacked in pure physical strength he made up for in agility, and 
creative play.  
 Richard began his schooling at the Dresden Kreuzschule in 1822, however he focused 
less on his studies, disliking the rules and formalities they implied and more on his 
imaginative stories and poems, perhaps hoping that his abundant creativity would cover what 
he was lacking in other areas. He preferred reading the mythic tales of Greek gods and heroes 
to the boring task of learning the grammatical rules of the Greek language. In 1827 he visited 
his uncle Adolf Wagner, who was to have a lasting influence on him. Adolf, a learned man, 
spent time with Richard reading Greek tragedies, and discussing of matters of philosophy. 
This in turn renewed young Wagner’s interest in academics, after which he became partial to 
the attitudes and fashion of university students. He moved back to Leipzig with two of his 
sisters and his mother and in 1828 began the Nicolaischule. Much like his first attempt, he 
neglected his studies almost immediately, instead spending time writing his own tragic tales 
and trying his hand at musical composition inspired by the music of Beethoven and Carl 
Maria von Weber. His family was initially quite disturbed upon discovering what pursuits 
were actually taking time away from his schooling, as they did not fancy another poor artist 
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in the family. Undeterred, Wagner continued to struggle at teaching himself harmony.29 
Music provided a focus for Wagner’s mental activities and in spite of his family’s wishes he 
began taking lessons in harmony from a local musician, Christian Gottlieb Muller.30 At first 
he did this covertly, when his mother and sisters were out of the house. These lessons lasted 
for three years and provided a solid background in harmony. Wagner disliked the boring 
academic style exercises, and downplayed the utility of these lessons in his autobiography. 
However, this seemed to be yet another attempt at furthering the legend of his self-made 
genius, or naturally endowed gift. This early education including the discovery and 
subsequent reverence of Beethoven is to be seen in his early works. He would come to deny 
that his music education was useful, and despite attempting to make his own piano 
transcriptions of the works of the masters (especially Beethoven), he would reject the idea of 
becoming a pianist.  
As I mentioned, instruction in music availed me nothing, I went on with the process 
of arbitrary self-education by copying the scores of the masters I loved . . . [A]s far as 
I know, my transcriptions of the C minor and Ninth Symphony have been preserved 
to this day as souvenirs. The Ninth Symphony became the mystical lodestar of all my 
fantastic musical thoughts and aspirations.31   
 
                                                
29 To continued this endeavor Wagner oddly enough borrowed a book from the lending library of 
family friend, Friedrich Wieck, father of Clara (née Wieck) Schumann. Wagner believed he would be able to 
pay for the loan cost of the book over time with his pocket money. After failing to do so, and after months of 
gentile reminders from Wieck, the lender sent a bill for the entire price of the book to Wagner, who 
embarrassed and desperate, had to go to his mother for the payment. Needless to say neither his mother nor 
Wieck were happy with this, and so began a debt problem and perhaps a reputation that continued to plague 
Wagner throughout his life. His single-minded pursuit of his musical endeavors caused him to neglect his 
financial responsibility and he usually relied on another person to bail him out. Ernest Newman, The Life Of 
Richard Wagner, vol. 1, 1813-1848 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933), 63.  
30 Just prior to this Wagner, had become distracted by a crush he had on the daughter of a Jewish 
banker, she dumped him for another suitor. This was to be a rather difficult blow for Wagner’s self esteem and 
perhaps manifested itself in some of the resentments he felt later in life. 
31 Wagner, My Life, 35. 
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 In his autobiography reality intermingles with fantasy, and provides a liminal 
indeterminate narrative space, one that can be directed by Wagner in accordance to his own 
representative desires. One such example in reality turns out to be the combining of two 
separate events under an imaginative gloss. In My Life, Wagner claims that an especially 
enthralling performance of Beethoven’s Fidelio sung by the notable, and at the time young 
soprano, Wilhelmine Schroder-Devrient was a formative experience and the impetus for his 
entrance into the world of art. When discussing her performance he states, “whoever can 
remember this wonderful woman at that period of her life will certainly confirm in some 
fashion the almost demonic fire irresistibly kindled in them by the profoundly human and 
ecstatic performance of this incomparable artist.”32 However, there are no other records of 
Wagner attending a performance by the singer of Fidelio, only those coming from Cosima’s 
diaries of Wagner attending her performances of Bellini’s Romeo.33 Thus Wagner has 
embellished the memories in such ways as to emphasize a linkage to Beethoven in order to 
situate himself as his heir. There are other instances of strategic embellishment throughout 
Wagner’s autobiography. He attaches the inspiration for most of his early endeavors to 
renowned figures of the western canon, the Greeks, Shakespeare, Goethe, and Beethoven, or 
in some cases mystical entities. He follows a very standard historicist formula by discussing 
why these past figures are so monumental, and explaining how they reveal a path that 
humanity has since left, the correct path, that will lead the way from the current forest of 
problems into a better future. In this way, Wagner soundly places himself retroactively in the 
timeline of those events as the prophetical savior. That is the liminal power of narrative, it 
                                                
32 Ibid., 37.  
33 Cosima Wagner, Monday January 16, 1871, Cosima Wagner’s Diaries, eds., Martin Gregor-Dellin 
and Dietrich Mack, vol. 1, 1869-1877 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1976), 322.  
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resides somewhere between reality and fantasy, in a nebulous position out of time but 
remaining and continuously renewed in the imagination, and Wagner had a very fertile 
imagination indeed.  
 By 1830 Wagner was still not progressing in school and left the Nicolaischule. At that 
time his growing appreciation of history was fostered more by his imagination, than by his 
schoolteachers or lessons. He blamed his loss of love for his philological studies on his 
teachers, and on the embarrassment and frustration he felt at being dropped down to a lower 
rank that he had previously been at the Dresden school. Wagner obviously felt that he had the 
ability to proceed at a higher level despite what his teachers believed. Their loss of faith in 
his abilities led to his complete rejection of them as authority figures. This incident reveals a 
pattern in Wagner’s life: while he seemed to thrive on positive social reinforcement, he was 
deeply insulted when someone lacked belief in his abilities.34 Wagner became stubborn and 
unwilling to cooperate in his education at the school: “I henceforth comported myself in such 
a manner as never to win the friendship of a teacher at this school.”35 Through this incident 
one can see how certain social factors were shaping Wagner’s identity formation. As 
historian Ernest Newman observes, “All his life Wagner was quick to take offense at 
anything that hurt his self-esteem.”36 Wagner’s response was reactionary, he outright rejected 
or became oppositional to the forces he experienced then pursued an alternative path to 
whatever status group he chose.  
                                                
34 Later in Wagner’s life (discussed in Chapter 2) this type of indignity will, at least in his mind, be 
perpetrated by opera composer Giacomo Meyerbeer, resulting in an outpouring of personal bitterness and 
general of the cuff bigotry entitled Judaism in Music (Das Judenthum in der Musik). 
35 Wagner, My Life, 22. 
36 Newman, The Life Of Richard Wagner, 58.  
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Wagner, the Liminality of Adolescence, and the Need for Aesthetics-Based Identity 
  
 Young Wagner was experiencing a myriad of political and economic changes as the 
July Revolution in Paris (1830) had created a wave of backlash that spread across Europe in 
various manifestations. There was some fighting and agitation that spewed forth in Leipzig; 
university students marched and some buildings were ransacked. Wagner himself recalls 
taking part in these early outbursts: “This youthful madness was attributed to righteous 
indignation at really serious scandals, and I was able to own up to my part in these excesses 
without diffidence.”37 The nature and direction of these initial student activities however, was 
to change when property or financial matters were as stake. The “really serious scandals” 
Wagner mentions make reference to the origin of the revolutions, the suffering and 
exasperations of the working classes. It was they, the working classes, who experienced first 
hand the injustices and exploitation of the industrial employers, and now it was they who 
rose up and had a stake in the events taking place.  
The majority of university students that joined in were from the privileged classes, 
and their lack of a true stake in these uprisings was to become evident. Leipzig was without 
an armed militia, which led to students being recruited to protect the city. In reality this 
meant protection for upper classes that feared the actual repercussions of a revolt, most 
significantly the loss of their property. Wagner was excited by the prospect and wanted to be 
one of the student recruits. However as he well stated, “not yet a student myself, I anticipated 
the delights of academic status by half-impudent, half obsequious importuning of those 
                                                
37 Wagner, My Life, 41. 
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leaders of the student body I admired most.”38 This is the kind of behavior and mindset that 
would characterize Wagner’s strategies at early identity formation and attempts at status 
elevation. His words and actions seem to reveal his desire to be a student based more on the 
perceived status and the privilege he associated with it, than on the actual educational benefit 
in itself. Further, he was not opposed to prostrating himself to those peers he saw as 
representing most clearly the characteristic that defined the desired in-group status.  
At this point in his educational path it seemed apparent that the usual normative 
channels of achievement were not the way in which Wagner was going to experience 
success. The routes he chose toward achieving his status goals could be viewed as 
simultaneously bearing both negative societal connotations, such as shame, supplication, and 
ultimately failure, as well as positive social associations such as resourcefulness, creativity, 
and diligence. When given a situation such as the duty to “protect” the city with a group of 
individuals that Wagner wished to have as peers, he stayed the course till the very end, 
disposing his “duty” and enjoying the benefits of the endeavor. At this period Wagner was 
living a rather rough life as far as adolescent adventures go, with some rowdy types, many of 
which had been expelled from their university for various reason or had debts. However, he 
wrote, “thanks to the exceptional circumstances, they had found refuge in Leipzig, where 
they had been at first received with open arms.”39 In some ways Wagner fit in perfectly with 
this disgraced and motely crew both in air and ambition. Many of them, like him wished to 
regain their utility and honor through their dutiful protection of the city in hopes of earning 
back their admittance as a student.  
                                                
38 Ibid., 42. 
39 Ibid. 
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Wagner at the time still needed to finish secondary school to realize his desires of 
joining the ranks of the university students. Later that year (1830) he entered the 
Thomasschule, so that he could matriculate with the least attendance possible. His teachers 
were not impressed by his work or his actual interest in education, thus the only option left 
open to him was to register under studiosus musicae. As a music student there were less 
matriculation requirements yet Wagner was allowed to wear the cap and colors of whichever 
club he chose. This seemed to be the best solution to both of his desires. As he stated, 
“straight from the interview with the rector, I ran as if shot from a gun to the fencing club, to 
present myself for admission to the Saxon club flashing my registration card. I attained my 
object: I could wear the colors of Saxonia, which were highly fashionable owing to the many 
congenial members in the clubs ranks.”40 The other members of the club he chose were for 
the most part from either aristocratic families or from wealthy distinguished families from 
Saxony and particularly the capital Dresden. Wagner aspired to the higher status of these 
groups but this was difficult if not impossible to emulate through the channels at his disposal. 
He was not born into aristocracy, or the merchant class. He needed to create his own space. 
At first it was only to mimic outward appearances; it would eventually become an aesthetic 
space, with which he could feel like he fit in and was of equal value to his peers.  
 Even though he was not a member of either the nobility or the nouveau riche, Wagner 
aspired to their elevated status positions. The German Confederation of the 1820s and early 
1830s saw an increased hope in the prospect of social mobility as the aristocracy was 
becoming of less importance and there were opportunities for industrial entrepreneurship. 
Wagner, like his Young German cohorts, was part of this larger social drama of rebellion, 
                                                
40 Ibid., 44. 
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attempting to procure status and distinguish himself through scholarly and aesthetic means. 
He was by no means alone in this position among his student peers either, as other members 
of the Saxon group were likewise not vacationing at home with their wealthy families. 
Wagner found camaraderie among these “most desperate and young reprobates” left 
wandering the streets of Leipzig over school break. He experienced an oscillation between 
wealthy, aristocratic, “dandified members of the student body,” and these “hooligans” who 
had “struck his fancy,” he himself did not fit into either category. 41 However at both ends of 
the spectrum he gravitated towards the members of these groups that displayed the strongest 
characteristics. Wagner described himself as a “diminutive person,” thus it is easy to 
understand why he was in his own words “dazzled” by one of the “hooligans” he later 
befriended, a “heroic figure that towered head and shoulders above his companions,” with 
“incomparable good looks and strength.”42 It seems that Wagner often glorified those in 
possession of the characteristics he did not have but found desirable. In this regard the looks, 
strength, and general boisterousness of this group compensated for insufficient wealth or 
prestige. Wagner’s participation allowed him to make up for his lack of other opportunities 
for status building.   
At only seventeen, Wagner, like many teens, engaged in a plethora of risky behaviors. 
German fraternities and student groups had a history of condoning dueling, fighting, 
gambling, and general roughneck conduct. For Wagner, this seemed to represent one route 
towards respect at this point in his life; he narrowly managed to escape injury or death, 
despite engaging in these behaviors. He was taking part in the relatively common social 
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experiences of various student associations such as fraternities, artistic circles, and 
intellectual debate societies that traditionally provided a venue for the transition from familial 
dependence to work/career personal independence. Historian Konrad H. Jarausch noted that 
such groups served to “socialize the future elite towards adult roles and form a safety valve 
for sporadic outbursts of violence, sexual license, etc.”43 By briefly examining the historical 
formation of the German Burschenschaft pre-1848 revolution I aim to explain some of the 
common issues surrounding the student movement that Wagner participated in, and to 
provide a better understanding of the motivations that led to his participation in it.  
 
Wagner as German Student/Citizen: Socio-economic Marginalization and New Routes 
Toward Status Elevation 
  
 Early nineteenth-century Germany was neither unified nor in possession of any 
participatory political structure. It remained a largely traditional society, with only the very 
beginnings of industrialization taking place. Following the downfall of the Holy Roman 
Empire and Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia, reformers, the bureaucratic intelligentsia, seized 
the opportunity to modernize the state, economy, army, and the overall social structure 
through an importation of liberal ideas. As Jarausch observed these reformers made possible 
the “emergence of a self-conscious Bildungsbürgertum, striving for equality with the 
noblesse of birth through education.”44 The old enlightenment ideals that dictated the shape 
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of education were replaced with the new ethos of Bildung (cultivation) and Wissenschaft 
(research). There was a change from merely educating a new group of public officials or 
bureaucrats to a neo-Hellenistic idealism. Philosophers such as Schelling and Fichte gave the 
intellectual a new sense of obligation, that through knowledge the scholar should refine the 
state. Thus modernization coupled with the rise of the intellectual bourgeois class, and a 
reformed consciousness of educational duty, created some of the first patches of student 
unrest.  
 This first wave of students during the post-Napoleonic period (1815-1817) clashed 
with their elders who were attempting to regain postwar stability; these students instead 
enjoyed the values of modernization that the reformers had brought. This was also a time 
when German nationalism was being propagated. The allgemeine deutsche Burschenschaft, a 
national organization created in 1818, “called for reform by [an] individual change of 
consciousness through the Christian-Germanic training of all spiritual and physical talents for 
the service of the nation.”45 Prior to this, German student groups such as the 
landsmannschaften (ancient regional fraternities) had been characterized by exposing 
negative aspects of adolescent life drinking, dueling, gambling, and womanizing. However 
counter to these elitist and licentious fraternities the burschenschaften was a new model type 
of student group “rejecting whoring, fighting, and running up debts as immature.”46 This 
group sought to reestablish the morality of student life through honorable alternatives such as 
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fencing, gymnastics, and debate, to emancipate “the student from schoolboy to citizen of the 
academic community.”47  
The new groups sought to accept all students that upheld these honorable values 
regardless of regional origin or social distinction, reflecting the model for the new German 
state over all. Despite their efforts to depart from the brutish Landsmannschaftler past, many 
of the founding members of the new Burschenschaft were from the former era, thus, “a 
sectarian Teutonic, anti-Semitic romanticism colored their life style.”48 This initial period 
proved to be more rhetorical than action based, as these groups still regained a somewhat 
liminal transitional nature. The members were reluctant to jeopardize future bureaucratic 
careers through active participation in dissent. At this time the majority of the members of 
these groups were comprised of aristocracy and wealthy middle class, the lower middle 
classed were underrepresented. It was also a time when there was still a great promise of 
social mobility, which would begin to fade as the universities became saturated with 
students.   
 Wagner was participating in what would be considered the second wave of students, 
characterized by on-the-ground political action and intellectual unrest. At this time holdovers 
from the first wave still remained, however they combined with the new action based 
mindset. The unfiltered egalitarianism of the old groups was beginning to diminish and was 
being replaced by structural division of an inner circle, and a larger following. Wagner strove 
to be a part of the inner circle. His behaviors represent an attempt to gain the benefits of 
participation in structures of adolescent transition to adulthood through engaging in conduct 
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that would otherwise be considered anti-normative. Through luck, he, for lack of a better 
term, got away with numerous instances of anti-normative behaviors considered usual for a 
teenager especially considering typical activities of the student groups at the time. However, 
Wagner continued to partake in these exploits (for instance, infidelity, running up debts) 
throughout his life, while at the same time striving for respect and prestige. Wagner, like his 
peers, was experiencing what Turner termed a liminal period, in this case it was the 
transitional phase between childhood and adulthood. Student groups allowed Wagner and his 
peers to overcome their marginal status and take part in both realms (adult/child). Because 
the students were simultaneously both outsiders and insiders to the existing social order they 
were able to behave freely and engage in experimentation not open to those in a stable 
recognized status position. This freedom of behavior and experimentation would become 
integrated into Wagner’s identity beyond a transitional phase. 
 Wagner’s early efforts to make it on his own were always a struggle and he would 
continue in some form or another to rely on patronage from more stable individuals 
throughout his career—an attitude akin to the adolescent depending on parental support. 
Interestingly, the term patron in definition comes from the Latin patronus meaning a 
“protector or defender,” from the genitive patris, “father.” In many ways Wagner cultivated a 
liminal mindset during his early adolescent/young adult years that allowed him to function in 
a society itself going through a crisis of identity and self-definition. This perpetually liminal 
state enabled Wagner to freely engage in both, normative and anti-normative behaviors 
within social boundaries, with the hope that in the future he would be reintegrated into his 
rightful adult position as an artist/composer. Unfortunately he never fully arrived at a state of 
stable maturity when it came to his finances.  
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The dreams of youth for Wagner continued to be held long after many peers would 
have let them go. He was determined to keep them until they could become reality. Perhaps it 
was a result of this perpetual liminal mindset, a form of vestigial adolescence, that Wagner 
was able to continue on past the time most adults would quit and fold under the structural 
tensions and pressures of society. Throughout his life he would engage in extraordinarily 
humbling behaviors to gain the finances required to keep his artistic ambitions (and himself) 
alive. In a larger sense Wagner’s perpetual liminal mindset allowed him the space to live 
within the strains of a rapidly changing society. Institutionalized liminality is a state, as 
mentioned previously, that is often relegated as a phenomenon of postmodern society. 
However it can also be considered a useful strategy for any individual during rapidly 
changing circumstances in which they cannot maintain or move to a stable position, and for 
Wagner the liminal aided him in many ways.  
 
Spinning Humiliation in Love and Music: Young Germany’s Revolutionary Strivings 
Towards Aesthetics-based Identities 
  
 Wagner’s musical aspirations did not start out particularly well. He had difficulty 
finding his own unique identity as a composer and endured several failures and 
embarrassments from the beginning that would be transformed into accusations of 
dilettantism till the end. An example of an early humiliation was the debut of his Overture in 
B-flat major. Wagner wanted to write the score in three different colors of ink, albeit he 
ended up with only two. It still proved gimmicky enough to catch the eye of the 
Kapellmeister of the Leipzig Court Theatre and he scheduled a performance of it as the 
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opening for a special charity concert. Wagner had used a further contrivance to increase the 
piece’s uniqueness: after every four bars he inserted a fifth bar consisting of a loud timpani 
strike on the second beat. Wagner went to the performance incognito; only the doorman 
knew he was there. The audience’s response to the piece was somewhere between hilarity, 
and confusion. Needless to say after the piece ended Wagner slunk from the theater, tail 
between his legs, humiliated. As he recalled, “To get up and sidle through the rows of seats 
to the exit was awful. But nothing approached the agony in which I now came face-to-face 
once again with the door keeper: the singular look he gave me made an ineradicable 
impression, and for a long time thereafter I avoided the parterre of the Leipzig theater.”49  
 Humiliation was to continue for Wagner on the romantic front. He developed feelings 
for the daughter of Count Pachta, Jenny. However she did not return his love and made him 
shamefully publically well aware of that. Wagner’s imagination would often idealize the 
objects of his affection turning them into images that could not exist on their own terms in 
reality, and he would recreate them in his own likeness. Jenny’s other sister playfully flirted 
with Wagner as well, but purposefully also flirted with other aristocratic admirers in front of 
him much to his chagrin. This proved to be a substantial blow to Wagner’s self esteem. 
However much like his feeling of rejection from his teachers earlier in his life, Wagner 
would come to deem those love affairs, which did not come to a desired ending, not worthy 
of his love in the first place.50 
 In 1833 Wagner left Leipzig and moved to Würzburg to stay with his brother Albert. 
Albert had an appointment at the theatre there and acquired the job of chorus master for his 
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little brother. Thus Wagner gained his first professional job as a theatre choirmaster through 
a family connection. His duties began immediately and he was responsible for rehearsing the 
choir in a repertory that included operas by Weber, Cherubini, Rossini, and Beethoven. 
While he was becoming better familiarized with the work of these composers he began work 
on his first complete opera, Die Feen (The Fairies, 1834). It was a period of adult firsts for 
Wagner in many respects. It was at this time that he says he had his first love affair with one 
of the sopranos from the chorus—he, however, ducted out of the affair when the question of 
marriage occurred. Following this affair Wagner engaged in an illicit liaison with Friederike 
Galvani, stealing her from another man, her oboist fiancé. This conquest greatly boosted 
Wagner’s self esteem and made him feel that he was accepted and had value. “That her 
fiancé, noticing all this, reacted with good grace and accepted his position with a touch of 
sadness but without any attempt to interfere aroused a certain self satisfaction in me for the 
first time in my life.”51 Wagner goes on to mention that he had never thought he was capable 
of making a good impression on girls before this. This instance reflects Wagner’s ability to 
disregard normative behaviors for his own gratification and self-esteem. He left Würzburg to 
return to Leipzig and lost contact with Friederike, leaving her free to return to the arms of her 
fiancé.  
Wagner engaged in similar affairs throughout his life, showing a disregard of 
normative moral constraints and a lack of empathy towards the situation of the other 
individuals involved. Although it may also be possible to characterize him as hypersexual, I 
would argue that there were life-sustaining needs being fulfilled other than just the 
gratification of purely instinctual carnal desires. Wagner relied on woman for financial 
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support, emotional reassurance, and personal validation. All of these factors in turn had a 
place in how he was able to situate himself with regard to his peer group, and within the 
society at large. Thus the life instinct involves more than pure sexual drives, it becomes 
coupled with the fulfillment of other needs shaped by life within a society. How one is 
allowed to positively mediate these instinctual desires is determined by societal norms and 
morals. An individual’s choice to disregard certain normative rules to gain access to personal 
needs regulates how such an individual develops and is placed within society. If navigated 
through non-normative actions the result could be negative placement. Other factors, 
however, may come into play, those in a liminal position such as an adolescent, or those in a 
marginal, or outsider position may have the power to disregard certain normative rules and 
not gain negative connotations.  
 Wagner returned to Leipzig at the beginning of 1834 and, as his earnings from his 
former position were gone, another woman needed to provide for his artistic endeavors, in 
this case, his sister Rosalie. He continued to have difficulty mitigating the role women had in 
his life, both as a man and as an artist. Women played an array of parts in Wagner’s life: 
protectors, patrons, performers, muses, and lovers. While the need for a woman’s help in his 
financial life may have been perceived as emasculating, Wagner also required women to 
fulfill his physical desires. Problems aside, it was through a woman, his sister Rosalie, that 
Wagner first became acquainted with a man that was not only to be a close friend but an 
influential presence, Heinrich Laube.   
 Laube was one of the leaders of the Young German movement. The members of this 
group wished to free themselves of the constraints of ridged classical forms, and to exalt 
passion and irrationality over reason and repression. Thus previously idolized figures such as 
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Mozart and Goethe were brought down from their pedestals, as they were regarded as 
representations of these more reserved forms. The Young Germans were also critical of 
romantic figures such as such as E.T.A. Hoffman and Weber for their sentimentality. This 
group included various well-known literary figures such as Heinrich Heine, and Ludwig 
Börne. The increasing sense of a national consciousness at the time corresponded to 
uncertainty among artists. The position of the artist was still yet to be decided within the 
changing economic structures and increased sense of mobility that characterized the period. 
The question of what would come to characterize a quintessentially German art form swirled 
around. With regard to opera it was thought that German art must not be consumed by, but 
open to appropriating ideas from the French and the Italians. Wagner’s first published article 
“On German Music,” from 1834,52 and later critiques which appeared in Laube’s paper 
Zeitung für die elegante Welt, discussed these concepts as well as the beauty of the Italian bel 
canto style above the overly academic tendencies of German composers.   
 Despite the somewhat liberal viewpoints of the Young Germans, Wagner included, 
there was a hint of authoritarianism that was derived from Saint-Simon’s utopian form of 
socialism, in which society would be restructured into three classes, owners, workers, and the 
learned, who rule society in a form of benevolent totalitarianism. As Estelle Morgan states, 
“The Young Germans and Heine in particular were strongly influenced by the Saint-
Simonists, who wanted to regenerate mankind by emphasizing the claims of matter and the 
senses.”53 The Saint-Simonists concept of an organic society followed the aggrandizement of 
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the element of the irrational as both an artistic and a political principle; individuals were to 
devote themselves unconditionally to the interests of the society at large. This utopian 
concept of a society of equals, where the individual’s duty is always beyond his own rational 
interest, is a concept that will prove to be influential in Wagner’s philosophical beliefs.  
 Turner believed that societies were maintained through a dialectic situation, 
oscillating between these utopic moments of equality felt through experience of communitas, 
and the organizational hierarchies needed to maintain the stability of a large-scale societal 
structure. As he stated, the “maximization of communitas provokes maximization of 
structure, which in its turn produces revolutionary strivings for renewed communitas. The 
history of any great society provided evidence at the political level for this oscillation.”54 
Wagner and the Young German’s “revolutionary strivings for renewed communitas,” 
stemmed from their disappointment over the political and economic outcomes of the previous 
revolution. They believed that industrialization had merely changed who the dominant social 
group was, as the hierarchical structure itself had remained the same. As Laube stated, “the 
development of the revolution has become different from what we anticipated,” for often “the 
new had become worse than the old, the merchant with his purse in hand more disgusting 
than the old aristocrat with his genealogical tree.”55   
 Wagner had much in common with the other members of the Young German group, 
most, like him, were from lower middle-class backgrounds. They lambasted writers from the 
previous generation for ignoring peasant misery at the hand of an abusive aristocracy through 
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an overt romanticization of folk stories, or through escape into a glorification of ancient 
Greek culture. Figures like Ludwig Börne criticized formerly revered icons as being aloof to 
the problems of reality. In discussing Goethe Börne rebukes: “you had a great sword, but 
were always your own guardian.”56 Wagner like his Young German cohorts was left without 
a means of establishing substantial financial or social status. Social mobility was believed 
possible in imagination, but began to decrease in reality as the 1830s moved forward. Many 
of Wagner’s generation were not born into aristocracy, were too young or had missed an 
opportunity at the initial grabs for owing a piece of industry. Their only recourse for status 
was through artistic and cultural endeavors; they sought to define what Germany was to 
become, and in essence, their place within it. Wagner’s imagination, like his fellow Young 
Germans conceived of a time in the future after revolution when they would gain the place 
and status they deemed worthy as artists and as Germans. Therefore the present was to be 
seen as a temporary or liminal situation, one that must structurally change for them to return 
to their proper roles, and status positions within society. 
 
Cultural Capital Versus Capital, Wagner in Paris: Economic, and National Experiences 
of Marginality 
  
 As an adolescent Wagner seemed to embrace his economic and young adult 
marginality as he circulated between conflicting groups. He had friends who were like him, 
from the lower middle-class strata, who had not been able or willing to succeed through the 
traditional system of education, exemplary of the roughneck members of the Saxon club 
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whom he befriended and later endowed with a positive almost mythic heroism. He also 
sought out friends that were well-to-do aristocrats, or those moneyed members of the parvenu 
class moving in the cultural circles he wished to be a part of. One such well-to-do friend was 
Theodor Apel. Apel was the son of a Leipzig councilman, who had become friends with 
Wagner when they both attended the Nicolaischule. Apel like many of his peers had an 
interest in artistic endeavors and aspired to be a poet, but pragmatically ended up studying 
law while at the University of Leipzig.  
In the spring of 1834 Wagner and Apel took a trip to Bohemia, where they indulged 
in a hedonistic romp that included several luxuries, fine food, wines, and accommodations. 
They also engaged in spirited intellectual discussions and debates. Wagner had been given a 
taste of the finer things in life, so-to-speak, and he seemed to never forget it. His tendencies 
to live the life he thought he deserved, instead of the life he could actually afford, continued 
to cause him numerous problems throughout his life. Wagner held a marginal position 
between those of the upper classes with an amateur interest in the arts and culture and those 
like him of the lower classes—the suffering artists. Wagner’s bountiful possession of cultural 
capital gave him entrance and some form of equality with these artistically interested upper 
class individuals, yet his lack of actual capital kept him economically lower middle class. 
Living in this margin would prove a very significant path to tread, a path that would shape 
Wagner’s outlook.  
 When Wagner returned from his Bohemian adventure with Apel, he found that he had 
been offered a job as the musical director of Heinrich Bethmann’s theater company. Wagner 
initially had decided to decline the job, due to the run-down conditions of the company. 
However, prior to his exit he was offered a place to reside in the same building as the 
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theater’s leading actress Christine Wilhelmine (Minna) Planer, and upon introduction, he was 
thoroughly taken with her. “I would thereby have the pleasure of living with the prettiest and 
nicest girl to be found at the time in Lauschstadt: this was the leading lady of the troupe, 
Fraulein Minna Planer.”57 Thus, Wagner took the job of musical director with the company 
inspired by the prospect of getting better acquainted with a woman. He married Minna in 
1836 despite their relationship being rather unstable; indeed she left him for another man 
within months. However, a particular quote from Wagner seems to best characterize their 
long relationship.  
I remained on continually good terms with Minna. I do not believe she ever felt any 
sort of passion or genuine love for me . . . [I] can only describe her feelings for me as, 
kind of heart, the sincerest desire for my success and prosperity . . . good-natured 
delight in characteristics of mine . . . all of which blended into a constant comfortable 
habit of mine.58  
 
 Despite the tempestuous side of their relationship, the bond between them proved 
very strong. When Wagner took a job as the musical director of the theater of Riga, Latvia, 
he lived there with Minna and her sister, also a singer. At this time he worked on some comic 
operas as well as completing his five-act grand opera Rienzi in 1838. He was allowed little 
authority or room to be creative in the position at Riga and was rather miserable in general 
due to cramped living conditions with Minna and her illegitimate daughter, Natalie.59 By 
1839 Wagner had become mentally stifled with both German provincial musical life, and 
small town life itself. As Ernest Newman noted, “he saw, too, that there was no hope for him 
of the fortune that sometimes comes along with fame if he continued to pursue the ordinary 
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path of the German opera composer.”60 Wagner came to believe, like many other hopeful 
artists and composers at the time, that what he needed was a success in Paris that would 
assure notoriety and increase his status as well as the respect that would come with it. Further 
it would aid him in getting the German theaters to support his endeavors, and give him added 
authority and control over his creative ideas. As Newman states, “The German theaters took 
their cue from Italy or Paris; only by a resounding success there could he win for himself a 
strategic position from which he could dictate terms to the German directors.”61 Wagner was 
in a great deal of debt at the time and was constantly hassled by creditors. He realized that in 
Paris he would be legally out of the reach of his German consignees.62 However, due to his 
large debts, getting there was not going to be simple, as both he and Minna’s passports had 
been impounded. As such they were forced to escape at night, crossing the border under a 
ditch to avoid guards, to finally be smuggled aboard a ship bound for London. Later in life 
Wagner stated that parts of this adventure had helped to inspire Der fliegende Holländer.63  
 Paris, with its history of Grand Opera, drew many composers to make both a name 
for themselves and hopefully a fortune in this famous arena. Whereas German theaters 
bought an opera for a singular small payment, in Paris the composer could draw royalties for 
each performance, which would substantially increase the earning power. Although initially 
Wagner held those aspirations, the two years he spent in Paris were miserable. Paris at the 
time was under the liberal constitution monarchy of Louis Philippe I, otherwise known as the 
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July Monarchy (1830-1848). French society was divided into a bourgeois elite holding most 
of the wealth and power and a bourgeois middle class that shared the rest with the working 
class and the peasant class. By far the most problematic factor was the lack of any social 
mobility, making it almost impossible to gain opportunity without prior connections or 
wealth. Wagner shared the resentment and anger felt by many of the lower classes, and 
experienced first hand the feeling of marginality both economically, and culturally. This was 
an experience similar to what he had economically been exposed to in his home country, and 
migrating to find opportunity was also a fairly common if not encouraged situation.  
 In Germany those who did not have ties to the Wirtschaftsbürgertum (economic 
citizenry) or the Bildungsbürgertum (educated citizenry) were actually encouraged to 
migrate. Cultural nationalists saw it as a way to get rid of those marginals who drew from 
already insufficient resources and as a way of spreading German cultural and national 
influence. Further it was believed that the poor as well as debtors and prisoners, might 
improve their lot through immigration.64 Wagner was economically and status-wise in that 
marginal position. Like his financially marginalized cohorts, he was left to define himself 
through aesthetic, and later, nationalized cultural stereotypes.  
At the time the image of a good German citizen was somewhat up for grabs. The 
recourse for emigration rather than integration was usually reserved for the rural colonial 
enterprises in the Americas, or other territories. Not the expensive city of Paris. Indeed many 
of Wagner’s friends including his own brother-in-law questioned the sanity of his decision to 
move to Paris in the first place. Indeed it proved incredibly difficult for Wagner. With few 
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connections he struggled to even get a simple hearing, or find a singer willing to work with 
him. This led Wagner himself to express the daydream of emigration to a far away colony as 
a solution to his financially and culturally marginalized position. “I used to fantasize for my 
poor wife about free countries in South America, where we could be entirely removed form 
these disconcerting apparitions, where people knew nothing of opera and music, and where 
we could easily earn a decent living through diligent labor.”65 A somewhat idyllic wish, but it 
does make the point that Wagner, as well as many at this time of political, economic, and 
social re-structuring, fell between the cracks of the political and industrial agenda.  
 Despite the problems in Germany, Wagner began to openly critique the negative 
aspects of French society in particular. He described French opera as being in just as a 
detestable state as the rest of the bourgeois society, relegating art to a commodity merely 
produced for profit or fame. As a learning opportunity, his time in Paris did serve to 
enlighten Wagner to the harsh realities of the theater process, the cynicism, and problems 
with undertaking the grand artistic ideas he had entertained. However it also piled on more 
financial debt and led him to be even more desensitized to such matters. As Newman stated, 
Wagner came to the recognition that “an artistic ideal of the theater . . . can be realized, if at 
all, only through very imperfect and often unwilling human instruments.”66 Even before he 
left Riga, Wagner assumed that he had the support of the prominent opera composer 
Giacomo (Jakob) Meyerbeer. However after moving to Paris Wagner’s faith in his assumed 
support system dwindled and he began to feel that Meyerbeer might be just playing lip 
service and perhaps not doing all he could to help him. This sense of betrayal coupled with 
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his failure to succeed in the Parisian arena spurred resentment.67 Further, he had shamelessly 
thrown himself at Meyerbeer’s feet for help in a number of letters he wrote. These 
humiliations could not have been a comfortable situation to face with regard to the 
maintenance of a positive self-identity.  
 
Away from the Margin, Imagining the Other: The Creative Shaping of Wagner’s Social 
Identity  
  
 Wagner’s experience of economic marginality forced him to find a way to redefine 
his identity through alternative means due to the negative connotations of his lack of success 
and financial indebtedness. His failure in Paris both finically and in achieving any form of 
status elevation was turned around and given a positive spin. As Tajfel assumed, “people 
strive to define themselves positively,” therefore “to maintain the self-esteem of their 
members, social groups must preserve a positive value distinctiveness.” He further noted 
that, “under some conditions a negative social identity will result in an enhanced search for 
positive group distinctiveness.”68 Tajfel listed a few strategies that an individual may employ 
to gain positive valued distinctiveness, the first is through individual mobility, where “the 
individual may leave or dissociate himself from his erstwhile group.”69 In Wagner’s case, as 
well as many other Young Germans at the time, upward mobility to a higher status group was 
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not a real possibility with the economic structures as they were, and he was not able to get 
any breaks as an opera composer in Paris. The second route Tajfel discussed is through social 
creativity, where “the group members may achieve positive value distinctiveness through 
altering or redefining the elements of the comparative situation.”70 This can be done in a few 
ways, the in-group can be compared to the out-group on some new dimension, or an 
individual can change one’s values so that previously negative comparisons are perceived as 
positive, or one can change the out-group with which the in-group is compared. Wagner used 
all of these strategies to forge a positive identity for himself as specifically German artist.  
 Rather than accept the negative characteristics of his low status position, failure, and 
poverty, Wagner would appropriate formerly negative characteristics, his failures, struggles, 
and lack of material wealth into a noble endeavor to create art for art’s sake, instead of the 
reward of material wealth. The humiliations and suffering he experienced would turn into 
martyrdom for a greater cause. He would need to reevaluate the French and German music 
scene with new aesthetic and moral dimensions. His first impulses toward moving to Paris 
were for a greater chance for fame and economic success. However, Wagner’s inability to 
achieve these dimensions left him in a negative identity position with regards to the old 
rubric. He had to alter the dimensions, changing what angles reflected favorably to account 
for his lack of accomplishment in former markers of success. Thus Wagner began to apply a 
new comparative structure, and attempted to cast the blame of his situation on the state of 
society as a whole, more specifically on what he took to be the unsavory aspects of a 
specifically French national identity.  
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 In discussing possible reasons for the manifestation of prejudice and discrimination, 
Tajfel observed that some individuals “need prejudice in order to deal with their individual 
emotional problems or aggressions.”71 Tajfel stated that individuals like this may have a 
particular way of structuring their social world: “they need a clear, separate and distinct 
outgroup which can be sharply dichotomized from the group that they themselves, in their 
view, represent.”72 In My Life one can observe Wagner’s creation of the French other in 
opposition to the German. His acquaintance with the music of French composer Hector 
Berlioz would result in borrowing ideas from the other yet not quite giving him credit, 
neither as original creator, nor as an inspiration. This achieves two goals; it facilitates 
Wagner’s narrative myth of himself as the true German artist, and, through a dichotomization 
and essentialization of the French versus German identities, it allows Wagner to re-
appropriate Berlioz’s ideas and place his own claims of authenticity on them.  
In My Life Wagner discusses his oppositional feelings of admiration and uncertainty 
for Berlioz, characterizing him as a “unique and incomparable artist,” yet not able to “shake 
off an odd, profound and serious feeling of oppression provoked by his work as a whole.”73 
This “odd” feeling is Wagner’s imagined recognition of foreignness: “There remained in me 
a residue of reserve, as if toward a foreign element with which I could never become entirely 
familiar,” this is why he could “be so carried away by one of Berlioz’s longer works and yet 
at times so undeniably repelled or even bored by it.”74 In the other Wagner can firmly place 
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all of what he finds to be the negative excesses of opera at the time, as well as the reasons for 
his own underserved failure. He can easily borrow the features he enjoys but at the same time 
explain why his use of these devices would be different, and in his mind perhaps more 
authentic. Wagner’s text-based works were more akin to the French and the Italians who at 
the time dominated that genre, than to German instrumental music. The Romantic generation 
had claimed that German instrumental music had a universal appeal. Thus, as Nicholas 
Vazsonyi noted, Wagner’s “proximity to cultural rivals required an alternative account for 
the continued superiority and universality of German music and musicians.”75 Wagner 
wished to portray himself as the quintessential German artist, not interested in material gain, 
only in producing art for art’s sake, willing to endure poverty, humiliation, and misery to 
fulfill his creative aspirations.  
 
A Martyr in Paris: Wagner Returns to Germany a True German Artist 
  
 Despite being a bit more destitute, Wagner was fundamentally in the same economic 
category in Paris as he was in Germany, however the added dimension of nationality became 
both the cause, and in the end, the solution to his struggles. Wagner never managed to get 
any of his works performed in Paris, and had to eek out a living writing hack opera 
arrangements and musical criticism. It was at this time that Wagner began to reframe the 
financial poverty of his marginal situation as one of chosen financial disinterest. Like this, 
several other tropes would be combined to form a positive identity and help shape a desirable 
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in-group for Wagner. In My Life Wagner would provide ample examples of the suffering and 
indignities that he faced while struggling in Paris (and beyond) while at the same time adding 
links that cemented his lineage to Beethoven as the next great German composer.  
 The concept of the artist as martyr, uncompromising, living only to see the 
completion of their creative vision, undeterred by the lack of financial gain became unified 
with the formation of a German nationalism and identity. Vazsonyi elaborates: “In this tale, 
to be German was to be poor, to be honest, genuine, to do things for their own sake, and not 
to be interested in success or commercial gain. To be a German artist was to be willing to 
suffer for that art, to martyr oneself for it.”76 Thus Wagner could strategically take control of 
his marginal situation and turn his failures, financial hardships and suffering into a noble 
position defined through a nationalist trope. Moreover, Vazsonyi noted that, “Wagner 
projects his experience of failure and misery onto the experience of being German per se in 
Paris.”77 This appropriation of the German identity by Wagner turned the poverty of his 
economic marginalization into a positive attribute of the society he lived it. He and his 
Young German cohorts rather than accept the negative aspects of their out-group position, 
reframed themselves as exhibiting the true aspects of the German cultural identity. “[T]he 
reasoning is circular: Germans are honest, therefore they are poor: their poverty proof of their 
honesty. Germans in Paris are also victims, persecuted by modern commercialism, which 
smothers good old-fashioned values.”78  
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 Wagner was in Paris at a peak time for the publication of revolutionary works of 
political interest. As such he met many like-minded individuals who would have an effect on 
his philosophical outlook and provide some inspiration for his later works. Samuel Lehrs was 
a philologist friend that would acquaint him with the backstories that would be used to create 
Tannhäuser and Lohengrin. More importantly, Lehrs would introduce the concepts discussed 
in two influential works of the time, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s Qu’est-ce que la propriété? 
Recherche sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement (What is Property? An Inquiry Into 
the Principle of Right and Government) first published in Paris in 1840, and Ludwig Andreas 
von Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity) published in 
1841.79 Wagner became actively involved in discussions about the main tenants of each 
work.80 Finally, in 1842, his last year in Paris, Reinzi was accepted by the Dresden 
Hoftheater (partially through Meyerbeer’s influence), and preparations were made for the 
premier. It was a success perhaps owing to the fact that the storyline captured the spirit of the 
times, so-to-speak. Reinzi ends the rule of a corrupt aristocracy and becomes a tribune of the 
people, however he becomes a victim of his own ambition and a conspiracy against him. 
Likewise, the German middle class at the time was calling for participation in political 
decision-making, freedom of the press, constitutional reform, and national unity. Wagner’s 
premier of Der fliegende Holländer the following year (1843) did not meet with the same 
level of success, as audiences did not readily connect with its pensive quality.  
 In March of that year, with some reluctance, the composer took the post of 
Kapellmeister at the King of Saxony’s court at Dresden. From the beginning Wagner made it 
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clear that he needed full administrative authority to make changes he deemed necessary for 
his post. He plunged into his duties and conducted notable works such as Gluck’s Armide, 
wrote choral music for court occasions, and completed the verses for Tannhäuser (1843). 
Despite his rising reputation, Wagner was still struggling financially. To compensate for 
practical woes, as discussed previously, and give them a positive spin so-to-speak, Wagner 
began to accentuate his connections to great German musicians of the past, most notably 
Beethoven, and constructing for himself a direct lineage of German music. An example of 
this attitude was his petition to have Carl Maria von Weber’s remains moved from London 
back to Dresden, the composer’s hometown. Wagner prevailed and a ceremony took place 
that December. He presided over the memorial service in dramatic fashion, wrote the music 
for the funeral precession, and gave a stirring oration graveside ripe with nationalist 
overtones.  
 Aside from his continued professional struggles and precarious financial situation, 
this period of time saw Wagner’s home-life and marriage at its most stable. Minna managed 
their money, more reasonably than her husband, and enjoyed her status as a Kapellmeister’s 
wife. They did not have children, most likely due to an earlier miscarriage.81 Wagner’s 
library at Dresden held many of the tales that would later serve as inspiration, such as von 
Strassburg’s poem, Tristan, as well as editions of Parsifal and Lohengrin. This was a 
productive time creatively for Wagner as the subjects of the music dramas that came after 
The Ring were already churning in his imagination; he even finished the first prose draft of 
Die Meistersingers in 1845. After the completion of the music for, and first performance of 
Tannhäuser that same year (1845), Wagner took a few months out to draft a paper, 
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“Concerning the Royal Orchestra,” methodically outlining reforms and improvements that he 
thought crucial to keep Dresden relevant and competitive.82 Wagner believed them to be 
fairly reasonable requests, reflecting the changes sought within German society as a whole. 
The reforms included modifications regarding the hiring policies, raising the salaries of 
orchestral players, downsizing the workload to more manageable levels, having a series of 
winter orchestral concerts to enhance the reputation of the Dresden court, and improving the 
orchestra layout so that the players could see one another and the conductor with more ease. 
After waiting a year for the results, Wagner was told that the proposal had been rejected. This 
must have been quite a blow to his self-esteem and status. It would undermine his authority 
as a director, and push him further in line with the coming rebellion.  
 Despite failure at the institution of reforms Wagner would press on and attempt 
another route to gain respect and make his mark as a conductor. He had set his sights on a 
performance of the notoriously difficult Ninth Symphony by Beethoven. This was much to 
the dismay of the opera house trustees, who worried that it would be an expensive failure. 
However, it turned out to be a notable success, adding to Wagner’s reputation, and aiding in 
his linkage from Beethoven the greatest of German composers to himself. As a narrative it 
demonstrates his triumph over situational odds and the doubts of those around him, achieving 
his goal through a pure faith in his own abilities, creating a heroic trope as composer/genius 
touched by providence: “At last I managed to resume composition of the third act of 
Lohengrin after having been interrupted in the middle of the bridal scene, and finished it by 
the end of the winter. After I had refreshed myself with the repetition of the Ninth Symphony 
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at the Palm Sunday concert, put on by popular demand.”83 The “popular demand” that 
occurred was owed to the ingenious advertising that Wagner used to generate public interest 
in the performance; this was a success crafted from start to finish by Wagner himself.  
 The next year (1847) Wagner was occupied with a production of Christoph Willibald 
Gluck’s Iphigénie en Aulide. Wagner admired Gluck’s operas, and agreed with Gluck’s 
choice to rid his operas of arbitrary symmetrical melodic periods if they inhibited the 
dramatic current. His arrangement of the opera highlighted Gluck’s melodic ideas yet 
remedied what Wagner saw as the disconnected nature of the arias and choruses. He linked 
them with preludes, postludes, and transitions, the art of which was to become a major 
stylistic source of pride for Wagner later on. He also wanted to eliminate predictability and 
sentimentality from the work, and did so by creating a new character, and getting rid of the 
predictable marriage of Achilles and Iphigenia at the end. Many traits and ideas to be found 
in Wagner’s later works were inaugurated in the activities he was engaging in at this point. 
That same year, he was busy working on Lohengrin, and engaged in studying Aeschylus (the 
Oresteia trilogy), Aristophanes, as well as numerous other Greek authors in German 
translation. The particular translation he read included commentary by Johan Gustav 
Droysen, who in the spirit of his own age interpreted Aeschylus as commemorating Greek 
nationhood and freedom. The similarities and message of nationalism was not lost on 
Wagner, and may have been influential in his interpretation and later usage as well.84  
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 The year 1848 was one of intense happenings and transformations for Wagner. It 
began on a solemn note as the composer’s mother passed away in January. Wagner stated 
that he felt as though he was breaking the last connection with his family, as his brothers and 
sisters had all moved on and had families of there own: “On the short trip back to Dresden 
the realization of my complete loneliness came over me for the first time with full clarity.”85 
At this point his family ties seemed severed; he felt a growing sense of futility in his position 
at Dresden, and was continually frustrated by conventional musical tastes and forms. 
Wagner, paralleling Germany’s situation, was ready for a social change.   
 
Unemployed Intellectuals: Student Surplus, Social Mobility in 1840s Germany 
  
 Wagner was not the only one at the time feeling stifled and without means to 
advance. Numerous professionals and students were also weary of the rigidity of the class 
structure and uncertainty of the monetary situation. Historian Konrad H. Jarausch noted that, 
“the unsettled economic prospects and insecure social status of journalists, barristers, and 
technical professionals added another element of frustration to the career expectations of 
students.”86 Through most of the 1820s and into the 1830s there was enhanced expectation 
for social mobility, however, “opportunities for upward mobility into the educated elite were 
drastically contracting in the 1840s.” The Post-Napoleonic war created a lack of skilled 
workers that resulted in a huge influx of young Germans into the university system in hopes 
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of obtaining a position. 1830 saw enrollment in German universities reach a peak creating a 
surplus of qualified academics a decade later. Every year from then the surplus of 
dissatisfied, educated, but unemployed or underemployed candidates grew. This became an 
especially difficult situation for those who were from lower middle origins, such as Wagner 
and many of his cohorts in the Young German group. Wagner at the time was employed but 
felt the futility of bureaucracy in attempting to make changes within his position. Though he 
was from the previous generation of students these issues resonated with him as well as many 
of his colleagues, whom as Jarausch suggested “felt themselves to be part of a restive 
academic proletariat blocked in its economic and political aspirations,” as a result it was they 
who “formed the potential leadership of a popular revolt.”87 The belief in the possibility of 
social mobility is important in understanding why an individual such as Wagner, who seemed 
to have a stable position, would take part in an uprising that would jeopardize both his 
position at the time as well as his German citizenship.  
 Tajfel defined social mobility as “an individual’s perception (most often shared with 
many others) that he can improve in important ways his position in a social situation, or more 
generally move from one social position to another.”88 Thus the individual must have the 
basic assumption that the structure of his social system is permeable and that as an 
individual, he has the ability to leave his group and move to any other group he feels suits 
him better. At the time Wagner’s experience of failure in creating the changes he wished to 
see within his post as Kapellmeister, coupled with his persistent financial difficulties, must 
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have led him to feel a sense of futility in ever reaching the status he felt he deserved. 
Therefore he, along with his fellow Young Germans, sought social change, to remedy their 
situation. Tajfel noted that the catalyst for social change was an individual’s belief that 
he/she is stuck within a particular social group and cannot leave this group or join another 
either to improve or change the position or conditions of life. Thus, the only way for the 
individual to “change these conditions [or, for that matter, to resist the change of these 
conditions if he/she happens to be satisfied with them] is together with his/her group as a 
whole.”89 Tajfel also mentioned some mitigating components that may also factor in a groups 
effort at social change, such as whether or not the ruling or in-groups position is perceived as 
legitimate by the out-group.  
In the case of Wagner’s situation, as well as the political and economic conditions of 
Germany as whole, these elements all came together to create the perfect storm. The 
perceived lack of individual social mobility brought economically marginalized groups 
together; a perceived lack of legitimacy of the ruling bodies created a situation ripe for 
revolution. The uprising that was to occur erupted from what Turner would aptly say was the 
“cumulative experience of whole peoples whose deepest material and spiritual needs and 
wants have long been denied any legitimate expression.”90 Turner would characterize such a 
conflict as arising from primary processes, “deep human needs for more direct and 
egalitarian ways of knowing and experiencing relationships, needs that have been frustrated 
or perverted by those secondary processes which constitute homeostatic functioning of 
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institutionalized social structure.”91 Indeed the philosophies that were circulating amongst 
Wagner and his cohorts seemed to convey utopic ideologies of egalitarianism and human 
connectivity beyond the hierarchical and materialistic structures in place. These ideologies 
captured the hope of perpetuating an environment that would allow them to gain the elevated 
status and financial security that would in turn take care of their all of their needs.  
 
“To the Barricades!”92 The Revolution Begins for Wagner and His Friends 
  
 In 1848 the storm landed and outbreaks of civil unrest began first in Paris and Vienna, 
then sweeping across the German Confederation. Early in the 1840s Germany was beginning 
to experience the structural growing pains that accompany the shedding of an old socio-
economic order. Industrialization had brought with it novel political and social problems. The 
number of bourgeoisie increased at the same time as the proletariat class emerged. For over a 
generation the population had been growing with nothing to mitigate the resulting increase in 
poverty. Unbalanced agrarian reforms that provided opportunity for some yet left others out, 
coupled with industrial legislations that had similar effect on already struggling artisans, and 
craftsman who had to fight to maintain guilds, all served to increase the overall societal 
tensions. Germans were tired of their ruler’s indifference to the plight of the working class. 
After recent scandals the people did not have the same respect for their monarchs as they 
once did. Further, the torrent of civil unrest created a sense of ennui and resignation in the 
monarchs themselves. As historian Eric Dorn Brose noted “the eroding legitimacy of 
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Germany’s leaders, together with their paralyzing resignation to the coming deluge, 
translated into hesitation and weakness in March 1848. From one end of the confederation to 
the other, the aggrieved mass sensed this, were emboldened by it, and quickly prevailed.”93 
Violence and mass hysteria spread through the Confederation. Artisans rose up against the 
merchant manufactures, peasants and small landholders engaged in violence and protest 
against institutions that only benefited the rich, and in the royal forests, “a small army of cat 
musicians felled trees, burned the forester’s home, and chased away Prussian soldiers.”94 
This was truly a revolution to which Wagner belonged. It involved his cohort group, artists, 
musicians, and the lower middle classes who freely engaged in the protests and acts of 
violence against the regime.  
 A pinnacle event occurred in Vienna, on March 13 (1848), when University students, 
and workers began to gather in increasing numbers outside the Diet building. Troops arrived 
to contain the masses but inexperienced leadership led to shots being fired into the crowd 
injuring many and killing four. This incited the mob to even more violence. They eventually 
gained control of the streets and marched on the palace to make their demands, which 
included a call for the resignation of Prince Metternich by a deadline of nightfall or more 
violence would ensue. The embattled rulers caved, Metternich resigned and fled the country, 
the troops were pulled out, censorship abolished, a civic guard was formed, and with a bit 
more pressure the rulers agreed to a constitution. On March 18 another large crowd gathered 
to hear the proclamation guaranteeing the former promises, the leaders, however, had 
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become to be wary of such a large crowd the square and ordered it cleared. In the chaos, two 
shots from an unknown source rang out. No one was killed, but the crowds lost faith in the 
promises that had been made. The people ran back to their neighborhoods and put up 
barricades. By the morning nearly three hundred soldiers and civilians had been killed in the 
disorder that ensued.  
 Barricades were also set up in Dresden, the capital of Saxony, where a small group 
mounted an unsuccessful revolution. Wagner was amongst the group of polemical journalist, 
anarchists, artists and idealists. Despite the somewhat utopic wishes of the group, Wagner 
may have been motivated by a desire for practical results that would serve to benefit him, 
securing a future that would grant him the status, and finances he desired. Wagner proposed 
the formation of a German National Theatre, complete with an elected director and a self-
managed orchestra. Although Wagner had been in the stable position of royal Kapellmeister 
since 1843, he was not making enough money to get by. Wagner relayed an interesting 
moment in My Life, which may serve to convey his feelings about his position. In the midst 
of the uprising he ran across the first oboist of the Royal Orchestra who had joined the 
communal guard, the oboist proceeded to ask Wagner to intervene in the activities of his 
friend and assistant conductor Karl August Röckel, who had been going house to house to 
gain support and weapons for the revolutionaries. When Wagner openly expressed his 
sympathies for Röckel’s activities, the oboist responded in shock asking, “Herr 
Kapellmeister, aren’t you thinking of your position, and all you may lose by risking yourself 
in this way” to which Wagner “burst into laughter,” and told him “my position wasn’t worth 
much anyway.”95  
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Wagner had lost any regard for the status of his position and was frustrated by the 
general lack of control in his working conditions. As an artist working within German society 
he lacked the status, and financial gains he thought he deserved. Wagner was dismayed at the 
rejection of his ideas to improve the conditions he himself oversaw in his own theatre. His 
inability to gain in either the wealth or stature from his position compounded his feelings of 
futility. These factors led him to conclude, along with many of his contemporaries, that the 
only possible way to elevate their status was to attempt to change the political conditions and 
thereafter the social structure itself.96 
 Wagner’s assistant conductor at the time, as mentioned, was his friend Karl August 
Röckel—a position that Wagner helped him to obtain. Röckel had experienced the July 
Revolution in Paris and as such his political views had greatly been shaped by these events. 
Like Wagner, he had also been exposed to economic marginalization and experienced the 
same anger and frustration at the lack of status artists had. By the time he arrived in Dresden 
in 1843 he had already become politically active. Röckel was fairly well-read with regard to 
the favored texts among the young leftists of the day and became the channel through which 
most of the political ideologies that became influential to Wagner passed. The two would 
often take long walks together and it is no doubt that the conversations between them 
swerved toward the utopianism and revolutionary impulses of the time period. Wagner 
recalled: “During our walks together he had for some years past been entertaining me almost 
exclusively with the fruits of his readings in books on political economy, whose teachings he 
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zealously applied to the improvement of his own shattered finances.”97 Röckel’s intense 
study of these subjects and his zeal seems to have been a byproduct of the futility and 
hopelessness he felt toward his own financial situation. This was a shared feeling by all those 
of his and Wagner’s cohort group, which had experienced a stagnant class status and 
economic marginalization. In Wagner’s words,  
things were really going rather badly for the poor fellow. He had long since 
abandoned all hope of earning a decent living from his musical career; his job as 
music director had become pure drudgery for him, and it paid so little that he could 
not possibly support his family . . . he had to plug along miserably, getting 
increasingly into debt, and for a long time had seen no alternative way to improve his 
situation as the breadwinner of a large family other than emigration to America.98   
 
 Wagner may as well have been commenting on his own life at the time, as he was 
also experiencing a feeling of futility in his position. He was unable to meet with support in 
his plans to lead the Dresden Opera, and German opera as a whole into a place of greater 
prestige. Despite his stable position he continued to struggle financially, and still had debt to 
deal with. This feeling of futility in these individuals’ ability to change their fortune or status 
was pushing Wagner and his friends toward the desire for social change. The fact that 
Wagner’s library at Dresden did not contain political works until he had met Röckel leads us 
to believe that he was introduced to the work of Proudhon and Feuerbach through 
secondhand conversations as well.99  
 Röckel introduced Wagner to Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian anarchist directly 
associated with Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Wagner describes Bakunin as “a 
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remarkable man” with the “purest humanitarian idealism” yet “combined with a savagery 
utterly inimical to all culture.” Wagner portrays his relationship to Bakunin as fluctuating 
between, “instinctive horror and irresistible attraction.”100 Such a battle would often rage in 
Wagner’s own mind between an instinct towards annihilation and the need to build and 
create. Though neither the works of Marx or Engel were found in Wagner’s Dresden Library 
it can be surmised that through Bakunin he was at least familiarized with their works. Due to 
Wagner’s participation in the insurrection at Dresden he was forced to leave the city in 1849. 
He took refuge first in Weimar with Franz Liszt, then using a false passport went to 
Switzerland.101 The uprising was put down that same year. Though the revolution itself was 
not successful for Wagner and his friends in regards to their material ambitions, it was, as 
Turner would say, a “success in establishing a new myth containing a new set of paradigms, 
goals, and incentives”102 for Wagner’s status as an artist. He had developed a means of 
dealing with his financial and status related problems living on the economic and cultural 
margins of German society. For his cohorts the last resort had been social revolution, and 
they had attempted to gain a foothold in the new national identity but had failed to actually 
change their material conditions.  
After the uprising some of Wagner’s friends found themselves removed from the 
society they wished to change and imprisoned. Wagner himself was to be exiled, however the 
situation proved in some ways advantageous. As scholar Rüdiger Krohn appropriately noted, 
Wagner’s involvement with the uprising did not end with its failure but, “continued to make 
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itself felt in his writings on art, and not only in his Zurich essays.”103 The composer gained a 
fresh perspective and was freed from the constraints of his former position in society. 
Through his own narration he was about to create a liminal space, where his actions would be 
justified and his art would be sacred. The present would not matter as it was wrong, only the 
future, as he imagined it, would save society and consequently art.  
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Chapter Two: 
From Exiled Outsider to Artist of the Future: 
The Creation of a Liminal Present Through an Imagined Future 
 
Introduction 
  
 By May 9, 1849 the insurgents of the Dresden uprising were in retreat and Richard 
Wagner was on the run, narrowly missing arrest. He managed to flee from his homeland to 
become a political exile, a banishment that would last for eleven long years. Exile is a liminal 
position; it is a place of both vulnerability and power, of displacement yet also liberation. For 
Wagner it was to be a punishment, however it was this very distance or ‘disengagement’ 
from social structure that gave him the freedom to evaluate modern society, and create his 
own mythic narrative. The condition of exile is deeply affective; it results in numerous 
emotions, attitudes, and moods. Historian Paul Tiyambe Zeleza described this state in his 
writings on notable exile Edward Said. Zeleza maintains that exile can be regarded, “as an 
existential and epistemological condition, as a spatial and temporal state of being, belonging, 
and becoming, and in its material and metaphorical contexts,” it may “loom large,” in one’s 
“personal, professional, and political life.”1 The “material and metaphorical” conditions of 
Wagner’s experience of exile without a doubt “loomed large” in his life both personally and 
professionally. His position as an exile produced conditions and possibilities that were not 
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completely visible or even imaginable to him prior, and the after effects of his liminal 
experience continued to shape his art and identity. Zeleza in his description further observed 
that the condition of exile is multifaceted, involving “spatial, ontological, and temporal 
displacements and entails alienation from homeland, family, language, and the continuities of 
self.”2  
Wagner experienced all of these forms of “displacement.” He attempted to counter 
“alienation from his homeland” through his creation of the persona of the true German artist. 
He accepted the loss of his previous identity by manufacturing a new identity as a heroic 
political refugee. In his Zurich writings he way able to put a positive spin on any 
“continuities of self” that may not be particularly flattering through endowing himself as a 
genius. He admonished the modern era and imagined a future where art reflected a society 
free of materialism and egotism, a brotherhood of man. While in exile, a static place of 
outsiderhood, Wagner was forced to rethink his position individually. Yet his writings argued 
for a “universal fellowship of all mankind.”3 As anthropologist Victor Turner stated, “quite 
often this retreat from social structure may appear to take an individualistic form—as in the 
case of many post-Renaissance artists, writers, and philosophers. But if one looks closely at 
their productions, one often sees in them at least a plea for communitas.”4 Such a “plea” can 
be found in Wagner’s Zurich writings.  
                                                
2 Ibid., 3. 
3 Richard Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, vol. 1 of Richard Wagner’s Prose Works, ed. Ashton 
W. Ellis (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & CO., Ltd., 1895), 166.  
4 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 260.  
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The narrative of Wagner’s writings served to transform his static outsider position 
into a dynamic liminal period, a temporary place of waiting. Living as an exile removed 
many structural constraints and allowed Wagner to form his own explanatory narrative 
crafted from various philosophical and political sources. He and his Young German cohorts 
were waiting for a social revolution that would lead them to a future where they would be 
reintegrated back into society to take their rightful status and position as the artists of the 
future. Many of the figures that were so influential to Wagner’s writings during his exile, 
especially Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Ludwig Feuerbach, also plead for communitas, 
espousing utopic ideologies that shunned the possession of individual property, materialism, 
and rationalism, instead upholding egalitarianism, aesthetic ideals, and liberating the 
irrational, properties all representative of communitas. Wagner finally returned to his 
homeland on August 12, 1860. A fortunate consequence of his banishment was that Wagner, 
unlike his fellows who had not known exile, was reintegrated into the social structure free 
from the normal repressions to creativity. Using Turner’s image of the “novelistic hero,” we 
can regard the composer as representative, to use Turner’s description, of one who was also 
eventually  
reintroduced into the structural domain, [but] for the ‘twice born’ (or converted) the 
sting of that domain—its ambitions, envies, and power struggles—has been removed . 
. . though remaining outwardly indistinguishable from others in this order of social 
structure is henceforth inwardly free from its despotic authority, is an autonomous 
source of creative behavior.5  
 
Wagner had to ultimately accept the very structures he rallied against and downplay his role 
in the rebellion to keep things level with his future royal patron, King Ludwig II of Bavaria.  
A pattern that Turner further recognized,  
                                                
5 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 260.  
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This acceptance or forgiveness . . . of structure in a movement of return from a 
liminal situation is a process that recurs again and again in Western literature, and 
indeed in the actual lives of many writers, artists, and political folk heroes from Dante 
and Lenin to Nehru and the African political exiles who become leaders.6  
 
Wagner could be regarded as an example of this trope. Despite his eventual “acceptance” of 
royal patronage his liminal experience of exile gave him the freedom to imagine the future, 
and choose philosophies and political ideals that served to excuse some of his more 
questionable behaviors.  
 
The Repercussions of a Failed Revolution: Freedom, Distance, and Destruction 
  
 The events leading up to Wagner’s exile began shortly after the Dresden uprising was 
thwarted as trained Prussian troops regained control of the city. The rebels were in retreat and 
some of Wagner’s friends and leading insurgents, August Röckel and Mikhail Bakunin, were 
arrested. Wagner was supposed to be residing with the two when authorities seized them, but 
was late to arrive, thereby escaping arrest by the narrowest of margins. Röckel and Bakunin 
both initially received death sentences for treason, but these sentences were eventually 
commuted to prison terms. At first Wagner did not realize the depth of the trouble he was in 
and considered going back to Dresden. Instead, his brother-in-law moved him quickly to 
Weimar under the care of his friend Franz Liszt. In a letter written to his wife Minna while at 
Weimar, just days after the failure of the revolution, Wagner attempted to make his wife 
understand why he chose to give up his stable position at Dresden and in favor of his political 
                                                
6 Ibid., 260-61. 
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ideology. Needless to say Minna was not happy with her husband’s choices. In laying out his 
reasons (discussed in the previous chapter) for joining the uprising, he noted: 
Thus in a state of extreme discontent with my position and almost with my art, 
groaning under a burden which, unfortunately, you were not willing to understand, 
deep in debt, so much that my usual earnings would have satisfied my creditors only 
in the course of many years and under shameful deprivations, I was at variance with 
this world, I ceased to be an artist, I frittered away my creative powers and became a 
mere revolutionary (if not in deeds then, at least in conviction); that is, I was seeking 
in a wholly transformed world the ground for some new art creations of my spirit.7  
 
 The time spent with his friend Liszt in Weimar seemed to have refreshed Wagner’s 
artistic spirit both emotionally and financially.8 He wrote to Minna of his renewed love for 
his art and dreams of satisfying her and more practically paying off his creditors though 
musical success: “This has given strength to my heart, and at one stroke I have become an 
entire artist again, I love my art again.”9 When Wagner spoke of becoming an “entire artist 
again” he was referring to the true German artist who creates for the sake of art in-itself 
rather than to make material gains. However noble this idea was at the time, practical needs 
always seemed to intrude and it was this intersection of the practical and the ideological that 
created problems for Wagner at the behavioral level. His attempts at maintaining both of 
these needs, ideological, and material caused fluctuations in Wagner’s identity as well as his 
statements. His outsider position as an exile gained him distance and freedom, both in reality 
and metaphorically from his situation of debt, and status immobility. This coupled with the 
                                                
7 Richard Wagner to Minna, 14 May 1849, Letters of Richard Wagner, ed. John N. Burk (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1950), 227.  
8 Liszt promised to try and secure commissions for Wagner in Paris and London. 
9 Richard Wagner to Minna, 14 May 1849, Letters of Richard Wagner, 228.  
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philosophical influence of his Young German cohorts, gave him many routes to seek 
justification as well as explanation of his anti-normative behavior and continued struggle.  
 Wagner deferred responsibility of his failures to a corrupt and unnatural social 
system. Only when the present system was replaced by one that recognized the power of art, 
would he take, what he believed to be, his rightful place as a true artist, and all his failures 
and past struggles would be no more. Wagner’s imagination and description of this future 
served as a vehicle to extricate him from the weight and consequences of the present. His 
Zurich essays would place him firmly in a liminal position, a temporary space removed from 
the current society, awaiting the establishment of a new one. 
 Despite the political seriousness of Wagner’s exile, it was also liberating. He enjoyed 
his time at Weimar, engaged in lively intellectual debates, shared his ideas, and spent ample 
time discussing his compositions. However, while he was enjoying a break, so-to-speak, 
from his job and debts, his wife Minna had realized the actual gravity of her husband’s 
situation.10 She frantically wrote to him in Weimar imploring him to leave the country 
entirely. Despite an initial ignorance of the situation, Wagner had become all too aware of 
the actual price of revolution. The troops of Prussians had not been gentle to say the least in 
their effort of extinguishing the insurrectionists, and there were numerous reports of 
atrocities committed at the hands of the soldiers. The composer and his fellows were not men 
of violence per se, and perhaps did not realize that revolution was more a bodily matter on 
the ground than a lofty ideological matter of the mind.  
                                                
10 She had been at home when the police came with a warrant for Wagner’s arrest and he had been 
charged with treason, an offense punishable with death. 
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Wagner considered the perfect revolutionary as someone with nothing to lose, 
someone from a lower class than he and his friends. Wagner had some possessions and 
responsibilities, a wife, and a sense of moral obligation to them, thus he exhibited some 
characteristics of a middle-class morality. At the same time materially, however, he faced 
crushing debt, and, degradation at the hand of a system, which refused him social mobility. 
This left him in a position where he could participate in the revolt but only in so much as he 
did not have to get his hands dirty or completely lose the positive moral qualities often 
associated with his societal status. This mindset reveals the liminal position of the lower 
middle class in the revolutionary process. As he stated in the same letter to Minna, 
Now the Dresden revolution and its whole result have taught me that I am not a real 
revolutionary by any means, and I have seen from the evil outcome of the revolt that 
a real and vicious revolutionary must proceed completely without scruple—he must 
not think of his wife and children, nor of his house and home—his only goal is: 
destruction . . . men of our type are not destined for this horrible task: we are 
revolutionaries only in order to be able to construct something on fresh ground; it is 
not destruction which attracts us, but the formation of something new, and that is why 
we are not the kind of men whom Destiny needs—these will arise from the lowest 
dregs of the people; we and our hearts cannot have anything in common with them . . 
. Thus I AM PARTING with the revolution.11 
 
Perhaps some of the bravado found in Wagner’s claims was to demonstrate to an annoyed 
wife that his days as a revolutionary were over. More importantly however, his statements 
also served to characterize him as an artist, a visionary creator of structure, as opposed to a 
member of the lower classes, whom he regarded as merely blind destroyers of structure. This 
rejection of a mindset of destruction was also cited in chapter 1 as a reason why, even before 
the uprising had actually occurred, Wagner could not fully connect with his friend Mikhail 
Bakunin. Likewise, for Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, one of Wagner’s primary influences during 
                                                
11 Richard Wagner to Minna, 14 May 1849, Letters of Richard Wagner, 227 (emphasis in original).  
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this period, it was also “impossible to accept an explanation of progress based on the violent 
destruction of opposing forces.”12 Proudhon did not believe, unlike his younger 
contemporary Karl Marx, that progress could be gained through destruction.  
 From the moment Wagner left Dresden, he entered a liminal position, not knowing 
where he was going, if he could ever return, or what his future held. He had developed a 
fertile imagination from a young age. It was this imaginative space that allowed the 
composer to dream of a future that provided him with a revered status and a stable financial 
situation. The liminal space of exile released Wagner from the status incumbencies and role 
responsibilities of his former place in social structure, leaving him free to imagine himself re-
entering society in a future where he would have such an elevated position. This imagined 
future, a space that only existed in Wagner’s mind, was invigorated by the potential of 
success. Early on in his exile, he continued to believe in a future when he would be 
reintegrated back into society at a new status position.  
In such a transitional liminal space, ideas and renewed relationships can be tested for 
their generative capacity and viability, and new realities can be imagined. Wagner’s freedom 
from his previous position in his home country was symbolic in that it gave him time and 
space to imagine such a place of hope, and a future that assured the success he desired. He 
stated in that same post-revolution letter to Minna that Liszt wished to help lead his “talent 
out of the miserable situation in Germany and into the world’s broader path.” Wagner 
continued, “they say that here in Germany I would perish and that my art in the end would 
disgust even myself,” that they “must keep my creative powers fresh and joyous for the 
                                                
12 Mary B. Allen, “P.J. Proudhon in the Revolution of 1848,” The Journal of Modern History 24 
(1952): 3.  
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world.”13 Wagner saw the impact of post-industrial social structures in the Germanic states 
and elsewhere as setting limitations on both himself as a human being, and as an artist. As 
Turner observed, “it might be well to see structure as a limit rather than as a theoretical point 
of departure.”14 It was the boundlessness of anti-structure that the liminal position of exile 
released for Wagner. This is precisely why Wagner’s imagination was so important; it 
allowed him to fill the gaps between the known and the unknown. Creative imagination can 
narrate the past and give hope to the present through faith in a better, if yet unknown, future.  
Wagner’s liminality gave him the space to imagine without limit, to picture himself 
where he wanted to be and to foresee his creative vision. His imagination of the future, 
gained through the freedom of a transitional liminal position, was to become a notoriously 
misunderstood element of his myth. Part of this freedom was a method of justification in 
itself. In a letter to his friend about the prospect of deciding between “genuine offers of help 
from Paris” and his own “inner revulsion,” Wagner wrote: 
I want to be happy, and man can be happy only when he is free: but only that man is 
free who is what he can be and therefore what he must be. The man, therefore, who 
satisfies the inner necessity of his being is free, since he feels at one with himself, 
because everything he does is at one with his nature and his true needs: but the man 
who follows not his inner but some outer necessity obeys a coercive force—he is 
unfree, a slave, unhappy.15   
 
This passage allowed Wagner to deny responsibility for his own failures, particularly in 
Paris, by connecting his unhappiness with the notion of freedom or lack thereof. He believed 
                                                
13 Richard Wagner to Minna, 14 May 1849, Letters of Richard Wagner, 227. “They,” in this sentence, 
referred to Liszt, his lover, Princess Carolyne zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, and his patron, the Grand Duchess Maria 
Pavlovna of Russia. 
14 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 51.  
15 Richard Wagner to Theodor Uhlig, 16 September 1849, Selected Letters of Richard Wagner, eds. 
Stewart Spencer and Barry Millington (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), 177. 
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that the only way to succeed in the Parisian arena was through obeying the “coercive force” 
of money. However, the true artist according to Wagner must be liberated beyond material 
and structural constraints, as every individual must follow his own set of needs and must be 
true to his nature. 
 
Proudhon and Wagner: Dream of a “Dawn of Universal Regeneration” 
  
 Wagner first read Proudhon just after the uprising, while newly exiled in Paris.16 As 
he wrote in My Life, “there was no news from Germany for some time, and I tried to busy 
myself as best I could with reading . . . occupying myself with Proudhon’s writings, 
particularly with his De La Propriété.” Wagner mentioned that it provided him a “singularly 
rich consolation for [his] position.”17 The ‘position’ to which Wagner alluded was two-fold 
as he referred to both the physical loss of his property, as well as his position of ideological 
agreement with Proudhon. He had given up his job as Kapellmeister, his home, furniture, 
country, and at the time, he even believed his wife had left him in anger about his choice.  
The institution of property was one of the most significant legacies of the Revolution. For 
Proudhon, as well as others in his generation, this was a serious situation representing both 
theoretical and practical concerns. Revolutionary confiscations, dispossessions, and debates 
over the 1825 Law of Indemnity as well as threats to private fortunes posed by the idea that 
public utility might sometime override private rights, all represented forms of political 
                                                
16 Despite the work’s initial publication occurring while he was in Paris the first fateful time, Wagner 
had not read De La Propriété? himself. He had, however, already been familiarized with the work to some 
extent by his friend Röckel. 
17 Richard Wagner, My Life, ed. Mary Whittall, trans. Andrew Gray (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963), 420. 
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seizure for Proudhon. Proudhon’s book held some very impassioned rhetoric. The passage 
below may serve to demonstrate why his thoughts may have been so attractive to Wagner. 
The old civilization has run its race; a new sun is rising, and will soon renew the face 
of the earth. Let the present generation perish . . . Young man, exasperated by the 
corruption of the age, and absorbed in your zeal for justice! —If your country is dear 
to you, and if you have interests of humanity at heart . . . [c]ast off your old 
selfishness, and plunge into the rising flood of popular equality! There your 
regenerate soul will acquire new life and vigor; your heart . . . will be rejuvenated! 
Everything will wear a different look to your illuminated vision; new sentiments will 
engender new ideas within you; religion, morality, poetry, art, and language will 
appear before you in nobler and fairer forms; and thenceforth, sure of your faith, and 
thoughtfully enthusiastic, you will hail the dawn of universal regeneration!18 
 
Proudhon’s language must have been extremely appealing to Wagner and gave credence to 
his belief at the time that aesthetic forms would be ennobled after society takes its proper 
form.19 Proudhon began What is Property? by first going through the difficulties inherent in 
the legal foundations of property, which he thought stemmed from the confusion between 
three classifications: property, possession, and prescription. Proudhon attempted to reveal the 
unreasonable nature of these legal distinctions. To Proudhon the fundamental cause of 
inequality was “naked” property, not possession. For him “possession” meant to actually 
make personal use of the item or land, however “naked property” merely meant you had legal 
power or right over the thing but did not necessarily make personal use of it. As Proudhon 
explained by example, “the tenant, the farmer, the commandite, the usufructuary, are 
possessors; the owners who lets and lends, or the heir who is to come into possession on the 
death of a usufructuary, are proprietors.”  
                                                
18 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What Is Property?: An Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of 
Government (Auckland: Floating Press, 1840), 323-24.  
19 Despite the works initial publication occurring while Wagner was in Paris the first fateful time, he 
had not read the work himself. He had, however, already been familiarized with the work to some extent by his 
friend Röckel. 
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Proudhon goes on to extend this idea to the institution of marriage: “If I may venture the 
comparison; a lover is a possessor, a husband a proprietor.”20 For Proudhon the use of 
something for one’s owns needs is a natural fact, whereas legal right to the products of a 
thing not through common use is ultimately unnatural. Likewise, the union of two humans is 
natural. However the contract of marriage is only obligatory. With regard to Wagner we can 
see an exploration of these concepts prior to his actual reading of Proudhon based on 
conversations he had with his friend and fellow Young German August Röckel.21 He had 
relayed to Wagner that Proudhon “wanted to do away completely with the institution of 
marriage as we knew it.”22 At first Wagner naively had asked his colleague if this would 
result in promiscuity, however Röckel responded that this would not be the case, as marriage 
was just a contractual institution and had little to do with the emotions holding individuals 
together. This fueled Wagner’s ideological stance and allowed him to engage in what would 
be considered anti-normative behavior while still being able to justify it and maintain claims 
to dignity. After reading Proudhon in Paris, Wagner adopted this concept of love in its so-
called purest form without jealousy or obligation, as seen in his 1850 affair with Jessie 
Laussot, the English wife of a wealthy wine merchant. Their relationship (as well as her 
patronage to Wagner of 3000 francs) soured after a failed rendezvous. Jessie perhaps did not 
see things from Wagner’s somewhat Proudhon-and Feuerbach-inspired perspective with 
regards to the outcome of their illicit relationship. Wagner however explained the situation 
with these very ideals, portraying bourgeois morals and forms of structural constraint as 
                                                
20 Proudhon, What Is Property?, 84. 
21 Wagner explored some of these concepts in his earliest opera Das Liebesverbot (The Ban on Love). 
22 Wagner, My Life, 373. 
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institutions that serve to repress the true nature of love. After all he had engaged in the affair 
with Jessie before actually being “legally separated by priests and lawyers” from his wife 
Minna.23 In a letter to Julie Ritter (another woman of means that would become a patron), 
Wagner elucidated his belief about Jessie: “Oh you must believe as I do that love dwells 
within her heart, and that I did not dream it: it lives . . . with all the unimpaired fullness of her 
truest nature! But her mortal foe continues to wield a terrible power: its agents are education, 
marriage, decorum, and business—and its mask is against love’s simple unaffectedness.”24  
 Wagner, like Proudhon and Feuerbach, denounced relationships based on obligation, 
they should instead be based on unrestricted love. One of his earliest operas, Das 
Liebesverbot (The Ban on Love), from 1836, was a light Mediterranean inspired romp that 
placed young lovers in a situation of conflict with constrictive social institutions, however 
Wagner allowed free unrestricted love to win out in the end.25 He would later use these ideals 
of unbounded love to justify his anti-normative behavior. All rhetoric aside, Wagner needed 
to balance the drudgery of making a living with his artistic vision, thus wooing a woman of 
means was a way to secure patronage. Such freedoms were especially open to Wagner while 
in the liminal position of exile. There he was free to look from outside normative social 
structures, cast judgment on bourgeoisie morals, and justify his behavior through chosen 
philosophical ideals.  
 Turner made similar observations as to the attitude of liminal groups on property and 
marriage. He explained that in “most societies differences in property correspond to major 
                                                
23 Richard Wagner to Julie Ritter, 26/27 June 1850, Selected Letters of Richard Wagner, 203.  
24 Ibid., 204-5. 
25 Based on William play Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. 
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differences in status.” Thus the need such groups feel to “‘liquidate’ property or ‘pool’ it 
together . . . is to erase the lines of structural cleavage that in ordinary life prevent men from 
entering into communitas.”26 As to marriage, “source of the family, a basic cell of social 
structure in many cultures,” Turner noted that it may, “come under attack . . . as some seek to 
replace it” with a “‘primitive promiscuity,’ or by various forms of ‘group marriage.’ 
Sometimes this is held to demonstrate the triumph of love over jealousy.”27 Interestingly, 
later in his career while under the somewhat difficult patronage of Ludwig II of Bavaria, 
Wagner put forth, upon surface appearance, a contrasting set of values with regard to sexual 
relations, as his final opera Parsifal exhibits the moral aesthetic of abstinence. This 
seemingly contradictory attitude is however just another method of removing status barriers 
to the “universal brotherhood” that Wagner had written of. As Turner observed, as opposed 
to promiscuity, “in other movements . . . celibacy becomes the rule and the relationship 
between sexes becomes a massive extension of the sibling bond.” Indeed “both attitudes 
towards sexuality are aimed at homogenizing the group by ‘liquidating’ its structural 
divisions.”28 For Turner eliminating structural division was a step toward facilitating 
communitas, removing the status positions created by political and other organizational 
structures.   
 Ultimately Proudhon and Wagner would both realized that what was needed was a 
social revolution, a change in mentality that could not be reached through surface political 
solutions or structures. Proudhon had observed that the individuals involved in politics were 
                                                
26 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 246.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 246. 
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just as concerned with gaining political position for themselves as for working for social 
good or creating a just system of commerce. Upon seeing the failure of the revolution in the 
replacing of one group of despots for another, Proudhon was not sure that the answer to 
society’s ills lay in a political cure. Rather, the people of the society must be led to choose 
the better path for themselves, one that balanced the needs of the individual ego and the 
society at large. This path would be guided by the discovery of what Proudhon believed was 
their own natural human needs as social beings.  
Early on in his exile Wagner would continue to have faith in a structural/political 
solution for society. He and his cohorts came to view ancient Greek culture as exemplifying 
the type of structure that held the natural needs of the individual in harmony with the needs 
of the greater society. Thus Wagner still held out hope for a systematic solution. Proudhon 
believed that the needs of the individual as a social being must be taken into account. He 
argued that, “man is born a sociable being,” but he also “loves independence and praise.” 
Proudhon believed that the “difficulty of satisfying these different needs at the same time is 
the primary cause of despotism of the will and the appropriation, which results from it . . . 
Thus the greatest evils of humanity arise from man’s misuse of his sociability.”29 He thought 
that the conflict between the needs of the society and the desires of the individual ego led to 
                                                
29 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What Is Property?: An Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of 
Government, eds., trans. Donald R. Kelly and Bonnie G. Smith. (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 192. 
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struggle and created systems that were unbalanced.30 For Proudhon this continuous struggle 
was a necessary irreducible part of obtaining stasis.31   
 Throughout his life, Wagner experienced this constant struggle between the needs of 
his own ego and the ideals he wished to portray. He was a social being yet needed to retain 
individuality and a positive identity distinction that he could not obtain from the society he 
was a part of. Despite his continued faith in structural resolution, it was his time outside of 
structure that allowed Wagner to create a positive identity and justify his anti-normative 
actions. His passage from lower to higher status depended on, to borrow a term from Turner, 
the “limbo of statuslessness,” that occurred between the two.32 While newly exiled from 
Germany, not knowing how long he would remain in that position, Wagner took it upon 
himself to write about a future and new form of art that would endow him with the elevated 
status and success he believed he deserved. Wagner had always been aware of the gap 
between his economic and socio-cultural statuses. He struggled financially to maintain his 
basic needs, was embarrassingly in debt, yet felt his art and wealth of cultural knowledge 
should garner him some self-respect.  
Prior to the revolution, conversations with Röckel about Proudhon’s ideas had fired 
Wagner’s imagination, and as he stated in My Life, he “took pleasure in developing 
                                                
30 Proudhon believed that the bump and grind between these forces was constant, necessary, 
irreducible, and would eventually result in a state of equilibrium. Not a permanent state, but only a temporary 
stasis of a continual process of struggle and change. Thus the forces themselves remain constant and would not 
be synthesized or reduced, the act of struggle itself was a necessity and would facilitate enough modification to 
eventually reach a state of stasis.   
31 Proudhon’s idea corresponds to Turner’s portrayal of human society as being comprised of both 
periods of normal structure punctuated by brief periods of anti-structure, communitas. Neither state destroys the 
other, the liminal period of anti-structure allows for free conceptualizing of different forms or modifications of 
structure, which may or may not be a result that becomes established once society returns to a normal period. 
32 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co, 
1969), 97. 
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conceptions of a possible form of human society which would correspond wholly, and indeed 
solely, to my highest artistic ideals.”33After the failure of the revolution in physically 
bringing about a society that corresponded to Wagner’s “artistic ideals,” the composer was 
forced to imagine and write about such a society. Inspired by Proudhon, Wagner and his 
friend Röckel dreamed of a society in which “everybody participated in the work at hand 
according to his powers and capacities,” where “work would cease to be a burden, and would 
become an occupation which would eventually assume an entirely artistic character.”34 This 
utopic ideology, a form of organic societal growth stemming from a group of interconnected 
individuals, displays a desire for communitas, yet an attempt to balance it with the need to 
build a larger structure.35 Turner, believed that such a commonwealth would  “never build 
itself up out of individuals, but only out of small and even smaller communities: a nation is a 
community to the degree that it is a community of communities.”36  
 For Turner, Proudhon, and Wagner, there was a conflict between the instinct towards 
individualism and our need to form larger social structures, however the solution to this 
discord remained slightly different for each. For Proudhon this conflict was necessary and 
neither good nor bad but just a part of life. As he stated “man, by his nature and his instinct, 
is predestined to society; but his personality, ever inconstant and multiform, is opposed to 
                                                
33 Wagner, My Life, 374. 
34 Ibid., 373-74. 
35 There is relevant reference from Turner’s work, as he quotes and then interprets the Jewish 
philosopher Martin Buber (who was greatly influenced by Feuerbach) as he discussed how to balance 
centralism and decentralization toward the possibility of an organic commonwealth. “Buber’s phraseology . . . 
belongs to the perennial speech of communitas, not rejecting the possibility of structure, but conceiving of it 
merely as an outgrowth of direct and immediate relations between integral individuals.” Turner, The Ritual 
Process, 143. 
36 Ibid., 142. 
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it.”37 Proudhon felt that conflict between the ego of the individual and society would 
eventually be reconciled through man’s recognition and continued acceptance of his natural 
social instinct: “Thus, man is social by instinct and is every day becoming social by 
reflection and choice.”38 Wagner would continue to struggle with the opposition between his 
egoistic desires as an individual and consciousness of a greater unity beyond himself, the 
place he believed true art stemmed from. After the continued failure of revolutionary means 
to change society, Wagner, like Proudhon before him, would eventually come to lose his 
faith in external socio-political solutions. However until that point reconciling this conflict 
would lead Wagner to create narratives that would strategically use liminal space.  
 
The Meyerbeer Incident: Paris and Its Mercenary Moneylenders 
  
 Despite some initial portrayals of hopeful enthusiasm for the prospects of rewards in 
Paris or London, Wagner clearly realized that success would not be easy or perhaps even 
possible at all. He also realized that German theaters, save perhaps in Weimar, would be 
closed to him for quite a while now due to his involvement in the rebellion. Therefore, he 
reluctantly went back to Paris for a brief time. While there, he attempted in vain to get a 
commission for one of his operas. Wagner was not the only one who had lost faith in the 
possibility of this as was demonstrated by an awkward run-in he had with Giacomo 
Meyerbeer. Wagner caught sight of him in a shop obviously trying to avoid a run in, he was 
then further embarrassed when a naïve clerk brought them together. After a brief and rather 
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unfriendly conversation about Wagner’s intentions in Paris, Meyerbeer said abruptly that he 
had some pressing proof sheets to do and brushed Wagner off. The incident was to be the 
final straw in the young composer’s already strained relations with his former backer. If 
Wagner had had any doubts left as to his suspicion that Meyerbeer was in fact disingenuous 
in his belief in, and support of his talent, it disappeared after that episode. Loss of money and 
lack of gained opportunity aside, it seemed that Meyerbeer had committed the cardinal sin 
with regard to Wagner’s ego: doubting his talents.  
Wagner needed others to believe in him to justify his sense of self-worth and to give 
him a positive identity distinction. He needed social approval above all else, especially the 
endorsement of those who were of a higher status with more economic resources than him. It 
was to be an unfortunate consequence that this anger, bitterness and feeling of betrayal would 
be carried far beyond Wagner’s dislike of Meyerbeer, the individual, to the Jewish people in 
general.39 Wagner had once called Paris “the plague-stricken capital of the world”—his 
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important to determine who would remain outside of those limits. Unfortunately this included not only the 
bordering French, but also the Jewish people within the border. Wagner had much to say about both groups. See 
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annoyance and disrespect for the French was plainly stated.40 However, despite the vigor of 
his purported distaste for the French, Wagner had found another target to blame for his 
failure in the Parisian arena. In a letter to his friend Ferdinand Heine he wrote: “Spare me 
from expatiating here in more detail on the revolting baseness of Parisian art tendencies, 
especially in opera.” Wagner continued on in the same letter to fulminate against Meyerbeer 
specifically: “In recent decades under the mercenary influence of Meyerbeer, the condition of 
opera in Paris has become so ruinously horrible that it is useless for an honest man to devote 
himself to it.”41  
From this letter we can infer some familiar tropes, yet also add another dimension. 
Wagner first exerts his distaste for the “baseness of Parisian (or French) art tendencies in 
general. This is an allusion that had been examined in chapter 1, as Wagner placed the blame 
of his failure on the systemic and political situation of the time, and specifically on the 
French characteristics as opposed to German traits. In the example above, Wagner 
appropriated honesty as a positive trait. The French/Parisian opera milieu was corrupt and 
based on course materialism rather than on art for it’s own sake. Thus those who succeed do 
so because they have money or connections not because of their raw talent or the inherent 
quality of their art. In contrast, a German, such as Wagner, is honest, with true talent, and 
engaged in creative pursuits for his own sake, rather than merely for the objective of financial 
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gain. Thus Wagner, the artist, would not soil his identity as a true artist or sully his art itself 
by participating in such a vulgar, French exhibition.  
 What Wagner expressed in this letter to Heine also incorporated another point of 
accusation, as Meyerbeer, and later the Jewish people as a whole, became exemplary of the 
negative traits that Wagner would blame for his inability to succeed. For the composer it was 
not the French national identity itself, nor the political situation that had evolved and led 
opera to its dreadful state, but the “mercenary influence of Meyerbeer” that caused “the 
condition of opera in Paris to become ruinously horrible.”42 Wagner’s choice of the term 
“mercenary” in his description of Meyerbeer is telling. A mercenary is generally defined as a 
person who is not a member of any particular nation or group involved in conflict but takes 
part in it motivated by the prospect of monetary gain. Wagner’s description placed 
Meyerbeer outside of either the French or German nationality; interestingly, he was located 
in the same outsider position that Wagner himself epitomized as an exile. Yet Wagner’s 
creation of the ideological other places himself in sharp contrast to Meyerbeer, relegating the 
latter to a homogenized representation of disloyalty and sheer materialism. Such an angle 
placed the responsibility for Wagner’s difficulties away from himself or the larger structural 
inequities that were at work and placed the blame on an already marginalized figure. As 
Wagner conceded,  
I am firmly convinced that I shall never succeeded in having an opera really 
performed at the Academy, at least not under present conditions, with its new ruling 
spirit and under the present regime. As things stand now Meyerbeer holds everything 
in his hand, that is, in his moneybag; and the morass of intrigue to be traversed is so 
big that fellows far more cunning than myself have long since given up the idea of 
waging a battle in which only money is decisive.43  
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 Wagner was not alone in his condemnation of the post-industrial economic system. 
By 1848 Karl Marx had published his famous pamphlet entitled “Manifest der 
Kommunistischen Partei” (later known as The Communist Manifesto). Marx’s predecessors, 
including Proudhon, discussed earlier in the chapter, and Feuerbach had all been intensely 
critical of the political and economic situation. These three and Wagner had a further and 
more detrimental commonality, their association with a secularization of anti-Semitic 
thought. Indeed, as previously mentioned, while Wagner was stuck in Paris, still fuming 
about his encounter with Meyerbeer, helplessly waiting for news from Germany, he read 
Proudhon. In Proudhon’s writing Wagner found the beginnings of an ideological and racial 
devaluation of the Jewish people. As Dieter Borchmeyer stated, “this mixture of religious 
and racial anti-Semitism against the background of socialism, such as may be found in 
Proudhon’s thinking, constitutes the specific content of Wagner’s remarks on the Jewish 
question from the 1860s on.”44 Interestingly, very few of the major nineteenth-century 
German writers were anti-Semitic, however many of the principle French writers were. This 
later led Friedrich Nietzsche to comment that Wagner did in fact belong in Paris in the 
company of the French decadents.45  
Wagner and many others at the time tied moral and nationalistic concepts to the use 
of wealth. An individual of means and status came to represent the gatekeeper toward either 
the utilization of wealth for the societal good or the creation of wealth for their own anti-
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social private use. This dichotomous characterization became charged with moral and 
political judgment; utilization of wealth for public good, associated positively, for personal 
gain, negatively. This concept became exemplified further with the increased economic 
importance of third party financiers. The third party financier/usurer could be regarded as 
either a generous patron or a mercenary with all the negative connotations of the term 
depending on their choice of spending. This position unfortunately became coupled with the 
stereotype of the greedy Jewish individual and, specifically of the Jewish moneylender.  
It will be in this regard that Wagner will later continue to characterize Meyerbeer in 
his narrative. Proudhon had discussed both the good and bad of such third party financiers. In 
his example “bankers” are labeled as “the greatest enemy of the landed and industrial 
aristocracy today, the incessant promoter of equality of fortunes . . . the most potent creator 
of wealth, and the main distributor of the products of art and Nature.”46 However Proudhon 
likewise stated, that “the banker is also the most relentless collector of profits, increase and 
usury ever inspired by the demon of property.”47 Unfortunately Wagner was to characterize 
Meyerbeer as the latter, a greedy and dishonest gatekeeper that would not let him into the 
Parisian arena. Thus with his hopes dashed yet again, Wagner continued on from France and 
settled down for the time being in Zurich where he was supported and befriended by various 
intellectuals.  
 
Wagner’s Narrative Illuminating the Creative Darkness of Liminality 
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 While in Zurich, Wagner moved in various cultural circles. Free from his former 
duties, in an atmosphere of relative fellowship, yet considered an “outlaw,” Wagner 
discussed some of the unrestricted behaviors which were resultant of his liminal situation: “I 
too, in the mood of irresponsibility and merriment born of my despair at that time, let myself 
go in dithyrambic outpourings that took the theories of art and life that were forming in me to 
their most extreme conclusions.”48 The freedom from structural commitments led Wagner to 
put down all the ideas that had been forming without reserve. He observed that the 
“extraordinary bird-like freedom” of his “outlaw existence” had the effect of making him 
“increasingly excitable.” He remarked: “I often became frightened myself at the excessive 
gusts of exaltation affecting my whole being, under the influence of which I was always 
ready to indulge the most singular eccentricities, no matter whom I might be with at the 
time.”49 Wagner’s statement seemed to reflect a sense of personal estrangement coupled with 
a feeling of ease and freedom to explore his ideas beyond their normative structural 
boundaries. He continued on, “immediately after my arrival in Zurich I began setting down 
on paper my views on the nature of things, as formed under the pressure of my artistic 
experience and of the political excitement of the era.”50  
Wagner wrote a series of articles that he attempted to get published in the notable 
French journal National; in this manner he wished to, in his words, “air” his “revolutionary 
ideas about modern art and its relationship to society.”51 He failed to get them published in 
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the journal but sent his first essay Die Kunst und die Revolution (Art and Revolution) off to 
Leipzig book dealer Otto Wigand, who did in fact publish it. At this point there is evidence 
that Wagner indeed thought to capitalize on his position as an outsider through some 
thoughtful promotion of this work. As he stated, “the provocative title Art and Revolution, as 
well as the tremendous notoriety surrounding a Royal Kapellmeister who had become a 
political refugee, had inspired this radically inclined publisher with the hope that the 
publication of my writing might give rise to a profitable scandal.”52 This self-promotion 
through a romanticization of his position as a “political refugee” worked and the essay was 
even given a second printing. Wagner stated in My Life that this was the first time he ever 
made money from his written works. Aware of the need to be adept at self-promotion, he 
seemed to be excited by the idea of the noble life of the laboring intellectual in exile—an 
exile in which the labor was rendered more difficult and poignant, marked, to use the words 
of Edward Said, by “a sense of dissonance engendered by estrangement, distance, dispersion, 
years of lostness and disorientation,” and thus requiring “an almost excessive deliberation, 
effort, expenditure of intellectual energy at restoration, reiteration, and affirmation that are 
undercut by doubt and irony.”53  
Wagner definitely experienced years of “lostness and disorientation” and perhaps 
more than that needed “affirmation” after his failures. Further, he expended a large amount of 
“intellectual energy” in the creation of his identity through the Zurich essays. In a letter to his 
friend Theodor Uhlig, Wagner deemed it “absolutely necessary for me to write these essays 
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and send them out into the world before I continue with my more immediate artistic 
creations: I myself and all who are interested in me as an artist must be forced once and for 
all to come to a precise understanding of the issues involved.”54  
 Wagner’s time in exile allowed him the liminal space outside of societal forms to 
combine the philosophical ideas he had encountered along with his first hand experience of 
revolution into a creative narrative work. Prior to continuing on as a composer, Wagner felt 
he needed to publically explain his situation. His ideas would come to negate any mundane 
explanation of failure. Wagner’s essays are a creative narration, drawing from the past, 
critiquing the present, and finding a way toward the future through a renewed form, all while 
attempting to explain away his own mistakes, and ensure a success for himself. As he stated 
in a letter to Ferdinand Heine, “I have poured out my heart to the world, i.e. to my friends, in 
my latest essay: the Art-work of the Future. From now on I shall cease to be a writer, and 
revert back to being an artist. Providing the outside world leaves me in peace, I shall create 
work upon work—for I am brimming over with subjects and artistic plans.”55  
 As a prelude to Wagner’s epic musico-dramatic works, these essays are extremely 
creative and imaginative in their own right. In the same way, Turner had argued that,  
creative imagination is far richer than imagery; it does not consist in the ability to 
evoke sense perception, and is not restricted to filling gaps in the map supplied by 
perception. It is called ‘creative’ because it is the ability to create concepts and 
conceptual systems that may correspond to nothing in the senses (even though they 
may correspond to something in reality), and also because it gives rise to 
unconventional ideas.56 
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The anthropologist was speaking of the ability of the creative imagination to fill in the dark 
spaces between the known and unknown to devise new hypotheses or ideas. “To be brought 
fully into the light is the work of another phase of liminality: that of imageless thought, 
conceptualization at various degrees of abstractness, deductions both formal and informal, 
and inductive generalization.”57 This “creative darkness of liminality” that Turner visualized 
was precisely the kind of thinking that Wagner engaged in to create his essays. These essays, 
in a way, extricate Wagner of any practical reasons for his failures or of any of the 
humiliations that had occurred regarding his own behavior; in another way they aided in the 
creation of a clear path toward future esteem and profitability as an artist. Wagner purported 
that “The Art-Work of the Future” “in fact contains an account of my entire history up to the 
present date.” In a letter to his friend Theodor Uhlig the composer admitted that he did not 
particularly care what critics thought of his essays, but as he stated, “there is only one thing 
that matters to me, and that is that they are read as widely as possible.”58 Creating and 
publically propagating his own positive identity and narrative path for the future seemed to 
be of the utmost concern to Wagner as a way to gain followers, in other words, believers, 
unlike Meyerbeer, who would serve to justify his actions and abilities.  
 
Feuerbach and Wagner: Thoughts on Death and Christianity 
  
 Despite the creativity that Wagner employed, most of the concepts he used in his 
essays were extrapolated from his understanding of the philosophical and political currents at 
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the time. In the case of his essay “The Art-work of the Future,” as scholar Eric Chafe 
remarked, “Wagner took over many of Feuerbach’s ideas wholesale.”59 Wagner’s title, “The 
Art-work of the Future,” was a play on the title of Ludwig Feuerbach’s book, Principles of 
the Philosophy of the Future. Wagner also dedicated the essay itself to Feuerbach. In 
Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach stated that the formation of a new 
philosophy for the modern era will depend on extracting the “necessity of a philosophy of 
man, that is, of anthropology,” from what was regarded as theology.60 Feuerbach disagreed 
with the direct association of being with objects of thought, which he found at the root of 
theological speculation from Neo-Platonism to its culmination in Hegel’s idealism. He 
argued that existing things differ decisively from thought and are known by sense perception 
and feeling. He asked his readers to think as real, whole men, not as abstracted intellects. 
Wagner himself had been first acquainted with these basic ideas of Feuerbach through 
discussions with his friends in the Young German movement. The first of Feuerbach’s works 
that he read for himself was Thoughts on Death and Immortality, after a friend in Zurich 
brought a copy to his house.61 As to his first impression upon reading it, Wagner conceded 
that the “very stimulating, lyrical style of the writer greatly fascinated” him “as a total 
layman.”62 He seemed to have been thoroughly taken by this first work, and it pleased him 
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greatly, “as much for its tragic implications as for its social radicalism.”63 However, Wagner 
considered it “a bit more difficult” to maintain his interest in The Essence of Christianity. 
Wagner found its large breadth of explanation in what he took to be the “the simple basic 
idea, the interpretation of religion from a purely psychological standpoint,” to be “sprawling, 
and willy-nilly.” Wagner was more engrossed with Thoughts on Death and Immortality, and 
he even recommend it to Karl Ritter, suggesting that in becoming more acquainted with 
Feuerbach, “you should probably have begun with his essay on death and immortality.”64  
In Thoughts on Death and Immortality, Feuerbach argued a point that seemed to 
oppose his viewpoint in The Essence of Christianity in which he maintained that the primary 
anxiety at the base of religion is a fear of death, specifically of the death of the individual, 
creating the need for an individualized soul in the afterlife.65 However, in his earlier work, 
Thoughts on Death and Immortality, Feuerbach argued “that the classical civilizations of 
Greece and Rome had no conception of the immortality of the individual soul because they 
placed no stress on the concept of the individual. These civilizations saw the individual as a 
part of the human community which was already (comparatively, in relation to the 
individual) eternal.”66 This concept serves to validate Wagner’s line of argument that the 
ancient Greeks represented an ideal form of communal society as opposed to egoistic form of 
modern society. Thoughts on Death and Immortality was first published anonymously in 
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1830 and set forth the issues with which young Feuerbach was to be concerned for the rest of 
his life. Its thesis is an outright denial of any personal immortality and a call to recognize, 
that which is truly infinite in the only life that man has. It must have been Wagner’s 
agreement and interest in the aforementioned idea that gave him preference for this work, as 
the thesis may be frank but the language is also quite verbose. Feuerbach often repeats 
himself albeit in different styles, from the most delicate prose to vulgar satire to get his point 
across. Wagner must have gleaned some things from Feuerbach’s writing style, as there are 
similarities between their overly verbose, “sprawling” and “willy-nilly” manners. 
 In The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach claimed that rather than man being created 
by God, it is man who created his gods, leading to the belief that all theology is in fact 
anthropology. Feuerbach developed this by showing how the primary aspects of Christian 
doctrine such as incarnation, the Trinity, God’s justice, love, and the like, are projections of 
man’s nature and thus disclose characteristics of the nature of man not of God. Feuerbach 
revealed that all theology or “religious experience” begins with man’s ideal and needs, and 
cannot ever get beyond the merely human, thus ultimately can tell us only about man. 
Feuerbach described religion as being primarily “practical rather than theoretical: it is an ‘art 
of life.’ In religion man recognizes his helplessness, his dependence, and he seeks to 
overcome it by calling in the aid of the imagination.”67 Likewise, Wagner was quite 
accomplished at this “art of life,” from a young age he, as shown in chapter 1, recognized his 
helplessness and dependence, and with his imagination overcame his situation, 
philosophically and with strategic actions.  
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Love as Community, Communitas as Love, Wagner’s Communism 
  
 Feuerbach as well as Proudhon recognized that much of human conflict is a result of 
the friction between the individual ego and the needs of the larger social group. Wagner 
appropriated this concept and incorporated it into his own writings. Feuerbach believed that a 
way to solve the aforementioned divergence would be for humans to recognize the fact that 
they are naturally “species-beings,” part of a greater whole. He termed this relationship 
between the individual and his species-being, “I-Thou.”68 There are several important points 
that Feuerbach outlined in order to reach the concept of I-Thou thinking. These will all 
become important to Wagner in different manifestations in his life, work, and writings. 
Feuerbach began with a deliberation on man’s creation of monotheism. According to the 
philosopher, in monotheism man made himself the center and unifying force of nature, the 
direct object of worship, as opposed to polytheism where man was worshiped indirectly 
through the humanization of nature. In polytheistic religions, like those of the ancient Greeks, 
the individual was recognized as part of the species, whereas in monotheism, there is a 
unification of the species as an individual, “it personifies mankind into man, whom it calls 
God.”69  
 According to Feuerbach the first stage of monotheism was Judaism. In the Old 
Testament Jehovah was specifically the God of the Jews, thus a representation of Israelite 
national consciousness. So there was a personification of man as a national rather than a 
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universal being. “Thus, in the Old Testament nature, providence and miracles are all 
represented as servants of Israel, as a means to the satisfaction of man’s practical, egoistic 
needs.”70 Feuerbach believed that Christianity from its beginning unified man with God.71 
“The God of Christianity,” Feuerbach argued, “is essentially but universally man—man 
stripped of his individual limitations, man as species-being, man as an expression of the 
essentially human.”72 For Feuerbach the essential human traits are not individual, but always 
universal “they are properties of the species and connect men with each other instead of 
dividing them.”73 However, in religion, all of man’s powers and essential characteristics are 
projected onto God thus taken away from man, essentially alienating man from his own 
worth. This form of alienation is in reality only a twisted representation of the relation 
between the individual and his species. “The antithesis of the divine and human is altogether 
illusory . . . it is nothing else than the antithesis between human nature in general and the 
human individual.”74  
This notion of religion as a reflection of man’s species-being is in itself a thought-
provoking concept; Feuerbach explains using the phrase that man is both and I and Thou.75 
He states, “the single man for himself possesses the essence of man neither in himself as a 
moral being nor in himself as a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only in the 
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community and unity of man with man; it is a unity, however, which rests on the reality of 
the distinction between I and thou.” To complete the train of thought Feuerbach continued, 
“Solitude is finiteness and limitation; community is freedom and infinity. Man for himself is 
man (in the ordinary sense); man with man—the unity of I and thou—is God.”76  
For Feuerbach, the complete true human, I and thou, was a universal being, not just 
an egoistic individual: “Man’s being went beyond his individual self and could not be 
understood without going beyond it.”77 So the true essence of man, which is externalized in 
the form of God, is the unity of men together into community. Certain characteristics are 
essential to man, yet have the ability to transcend the individual. They are characteristic of 
the species and as such they direct man’s attention past his individual self. Love is one such 
characteristic, however it is not the love we recognize in the colloquial sense. To be moral 
man must recognize himself as a species-being and not just as an individual. For Feuerbach, 
“the highest expression of man and his unity with man is love.”78 Thus Feuerbach’s concept 
of love is synonymous with community. He continued on about this idea of love in a 
description that places it in a liminal position, one that is synonymous with the idea of 
communitas:  
Love is the middle term, the substantial bond, the principle of reconciliation between 
the perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and sinful being, the universal and the 
individual, the divine and the human. Love is God himself apart from it there is no 
God. Love makes man God, and God man. Love strengthens the weak, and weakens 
the strong, abases the high and raises the lowly, idealizes matter and materializes 
spirit. Love is the true unity of God and man, of spirit and nature. In love common 
nature is spirit, and the pre-eminent spirit is nature, Love is materialism; immaterial 
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love is a chimera. In the longing of love after the distant object, the abstract idealist 
involuntarily confirms the truth of sensuousness. But love is also the idealism of 
nature; love is also spirit, espirit. Love alone makes the nightingale a songstress; love 
alone gives the plant its corolla. And what wonders does not love work in our social 
life! What faith, creed, opinion separates, love unites.79 
 
The first line referring to love as a “middle term,” places love as a representation of 
community, or to use Turner’s expression, communitas, which is a liminal phenomenon. 
Turner preferred the term communitas as it recognized the unstructured, spontaneous concept 
of direct connection between human beings, not tied to the spatial, temporal or categorical 
notions that the common vernacular of the term community implies. Normative behaviors and 
status roles often become ambiguous during such liminal periods, love/communitas is the 
space between the “perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and sinful being.” Feuerbach placed 
community/communitas, as a space between the “universal and the individual,” that 
“strengthens the weak, and weakens the strong, abases the high and raises the lowly.” 
Likewise, according to Turner, periods of liminality may involve status or role elevation or 
reversal, both symbolic and actual. “There may be status elevation where the subject is 
conveyed irreversibly from a lower to a higher position,”80 or status reversal in which 
superiors must accept ritual degradation the authority of those of low status. As Turner noted, 
“the strong are made weaker; the weak act as though they were strong.”81 Wagner’s view of 
this concept of love as what could be deemed communitas was demonstrated outright in his 
1850 essay Art and Climate, he wrote, “There exists no higher Power than Man’s 
Community; there is naught so worthy Love as the Brotherhood of Man. But only through the 
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highest power of love can we attain perfect Freedom; for there exists no genuine Freedom but 
that in which each Man hath share.”82  
Wagner, like Feuerbach, recognized the liminal power of love/communitas. The 
composer continued on characterizing it as such, “the mediator between Power and Freedom, 
the redeemer without whom Power remains but violence, and Freedom but caprice, is 
therefore—Love.”83 Other themes that Wagner will utilize are to be found in this statement, 
for example, redemption through love as a deeper connection to all, communitas. His 
conception of love/communitas as redemptive would become somewhat muddled upon the 
composer’s reading of Schopenhauer. Feuerbach’s notion that love was material as, 
“immaterial love is a chimera,”84 would conflict with Schopenhauer’s idealism. Wagner 
already regarded death, or non-existence as the ultimate communitas so-to-speak. As he 
stated in “The Art-Work of the Future,” “the last completest renunciation of his personal 
egoism, the demonstration of his full ascension into universalism, a man can only show us by 
his death.”85 Wagner was not speaking of any death, say by accident, but specifically of death 
that was in some sense a conscious sacrifice of the self to a greater entity, in reality or 
metaphorically.  
The composer, however, continued to struggle with exactly what the relevance of 
love in the erotic sense was in regards to his newly embraced Schopenhauerian inspired 
beliefs. Prior to this, Wagner was firmly under the influence of Feuerbach. Wagner clarified 
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in his essay Art and Climate that he was referring to the “love which issues from the Power 
of true and undistorted human nature,” and not as “that revelation from above, imposed on us 
by precept and command, and therefore never realized—like the Christians.”86 He was 
referencing Feuerbach’s view that Christians love each other because it is a command from 
God that they must obey. Thus they obey it for egotistical reasons, to save their own 
individual souls, not through a spontaneous and natural recognition of their species-being as 
was the case with the bond of communitas/love that is coterminous with the essence of 
humanity. Feuerbach goes further, stating that the extreme alienation of religion is expressed 
in the fact that “in Christianity man is reduced to the individual, to a single person (God) 
each has aspects, but contains no distinction of sex. Christianity therefore does not recognize 
sexual distinction and sexual union as part of the human essence, does not see that two sexes 
make up man. It therefore robs man of sex” and “puts celibacy at the center of the Christian 
conception of life.”87 Feuerbach argued that, “the Christian . . . in his excessive, 
transcendental subjectivity, conceived that he is, by himself, a perfect being. But sexual 
instinct runs counter to this view; it is in contradiction with his ideal: the Christian must 
therefore deny this instinct.” Thus in Christianity marriage is regarded as having only a moral 
but not a religious significance. “The Christian immediately identifies the species with the 
individual; hence he strips off the difference of sex as a burdensome, accidental adjunct.”88 
Feuerbach maintained that,  
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man and women together first constitute the true man; man and woman together are 
the existence of the race, for their union is the source of multiplicity, the source of 
other men. Hence the man, who does not deny his manhood, is conscious that he is 
only a part of a being, which needs another part for the making up of the whole of 
true humanity.89  
 
He believed that engaging in a sexual relation was a means towards being conscious of one’s 
species-being, of connecting to the entire whole beyond the individual self, thus a path 
towards understanding the greater love of humanity. Wagner continued on Feuerbach’s train 
of thought and created a continuum of natural love, love in the carnal sense, and 
love/communitas, where all were ordered into a logical progression. In the composer’s 
words, “Love, which in its origin is nothing other than the liveliest utterance of nature, that 
proclaims itself in pure delight at physical existence,” begins with “marital love, strides 
forward through love for children, friends, and brothers, right on to love for Universal 
Man.”90  
 Wagner explored this progression of love, beginning with sexual love between man 
and woman followed by paternal, filial, and finally universal love, in various manifestations. 
For the composer each “love” led to a realization or awareness of something greater than the 
individual self until a final consciousness of the ultimate love/unity communitas occurred. As 
previously discussed, Wagner’s derivation of these stages of consciousness toward 
communitas was to cause problems in reconciliation with his later Schopenhauerian-inspired 
philosophical views.91 For Wagner “this love” that I will liken to an experience of 
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communitas, was “the wellspring of all true Art.”92 In his 1849 essay “The Art-Work of the 
Future,” Wagner directly utilized Feuerbach’s language, and relegated the individual’s 
coming to consciousness of species-being to a political evolution: “The exclusive, sole, and 
egoistic, can only take and never give: it can only let itself be born, but cannot bear; for 
bearing there is need of I and Thou, the passing over of Egoism into Communism.”93 This 
statement appears to be an inkling of Marxist influence, however Wagner’s notion of 
communism was not Marxist per say, a socio-economic system based on common ownership, 
but as the antithesis to egoism, more akin to the concept of communitas, a recognition of a 
unity greater than the individual self. 94  
 
Cultural Manifestations of Liminality 
  
 Beyond the Feuerbachian conception of love as instance of Turner’s communitas, 
which was akin to Wagner’s notion of love, Turner further stated that liminality was “not the 
only cultural manifestation of communitas.” Love/communitas was often symbolically 
represented by “the powers of the weak.” Turner mentioned that “characters such as beggars, 
simpletons, prostitutes, and jesters” were often characterized as having “magico-religious” or 
dangerous “polluting” properties, yet these figures would also embody “common humanity 
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and morality.”95 This concept was exemplified in Wagner’s characterization of Parsifal as a 
holy fool.96 Turner continued, “all these mythic types are structurally inferior or ‘marginal,’ 
and in structured societies it is the ‘marginal’, or ‘inferior’ person or the ‘outsider’ who 
comes to symbolize . . . the sentient for humanity.”97 Wagner himself, as previously 
mentioned, exemplified this position; as an outsider in exile, he held the powers of the weak, 
so-to-speak, which led him to an increased consciousness of the structural constraints and 
hierarchy he was formerly a part of.  
Turner stated that these status-reversals experienced by the weak or through 
love/communitas, remind us that society is made up of “concrete idiosyncratic individuals, 
who, though differing in physical and mental endowment, are nevertheless regarded as equal 
in terms of shared humanity.”98 Yet these reversals can also serve to reaffirm the “order of 
structure,” of the contrasting social model from communitas, “society as a structure of jural, 
political, and economic positions, offices, statuses, and roles, in which the individual is only 
ambiguously grasped behind the social persona.”99 For Wagner this was precisely the 
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97 Turner, The Ritual Process, 111. 
98 Ibid., 177. 
99 Ibid. 
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situation, the structural oppression of the individual human being, which Feuerbach aided 
him in dealing with. Wagner stated that he was “greatly indebted to him,” as Feuerbach 
became for him, “the proponent of the ruthlessly radical liberation of the individual from the 
bondage of conceptions associated with belief in traditional authority, and the initiated 
will.”100  
When Wagner discussed the “radical liberation of the individual” he was referring to 
individuals who have chosen to remove themselves from nature and enter society. Society 
eventually develops a normative structure that becomes institutionalized in the State. Wagner 
argued that, “the real man will therefore never be forthcoming, until true Human Nature, not 
the arbitrary statutes of the State, shall model and ordain his Life.”101 State structures, such as 
laws are static by comparison to art, which is dynamic and based on a continuous 
reaffirmation of humanity’s deeper connectivity. This staticism eventually leads to a gulf 
between the role of the state and the individual human’s true needs. Thus the actual needs of 
the individual and traditional state systems of authority are in conflict. The state however is a 
different group entity from that of communitas. As Turner explained, communitas, or the 
“open society,” differs from structure, or the “closed society,” in that “it is potentially or 
ideally extensible to the limits of humanity.”102 The closed boundaries of state structures are 
not coterminous with those of the human species, thus such structures do not allow for the 
“direct, immediate, and total confrontation of human identities.”103 Static institutionalized 
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structures such as laws, religious entities, and ethical norms, are unchanging and impose 
what essentially become arbitrary restrictions and patterns. Turner maintained that “relations 
between total beings are generative of symbols and metaphors and comparisons; art and 
religion are their products rather than legal and political structures.”104 These generative 
symbols are brought about by the experience of communitas, which is what Wagner meant 
when he argued that true art would never flourish in arbitrary and restrictive state systems: 
“Art will never live, until its embodiments need to be subject only to the Laws of Nature.”105 
Wagner, like Turner discussed the opposition between arbitrary, constrictive 
institutionalized structural forms and the inner, natural, liberated form of art. Like many of 
his cohorts, Wagner considered modern life to be filled with all sorts of “errors, perversities, 
and unnatural distortions,” that come about while we are not truly living, our “mere 
existence, dictated by the maxims of this or that Religion, Nationality, or State.”106 Beyond 
these fixed structures lay the true potential of mankind. Turner observed that, “prophets and 
artists tend to be liminal and marginal people, ‘edgemen,’ who strive with a passionate 
sincerity to rid themselves of the clichés associated with status incumbency and role-playing 
and to enter into vital relations with other men in fact or imagination.” The anthropologist 
continued “in their productions we may catch glimpses of that unused evolutionary potential 
in mankind which has not yet been externalized in fixed structure.” In the words and writings 
of prophets and great artists there is often the creation of an “open morality,” itself an 
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expression of this evolutionary potential, or “life-force.”107 Wagner is quite exemplary of this 
concept, his strategic use of liminality through his economic marginalization, followed by his 
period of exile, allowed him to engage in various non-normative behaviors both as a survival 
tactic, and as a series of strategic maneuvers toward success in the establishment of his 
artistic ideals. It was Wagner’s recognition of this human potential and his imagination at 
reconciling the gulf between his reality and a future he wanted that endowed his writings 
with such significance.  
While in exile, Wagner creatively merged his experiences and philosophical 
influences into a plan for a future society that endowed him and his art a respectable place. It 
also placed him in a soundly in a liminal position. Turner discussed the distinction between 
the concepts of an “outsider” as opposed to a truly “liminal” being. The outsider is removed 
from the structures of society and does not expect to return. Wagner was never sure if and 
when he could return to Germany, however his Zurich essays created a narrative that devised 
a future place when he would not only return to society, but to the elevated status he desired, 
as the society itself had been reinvigorated. This then is demonstrative of a liminal position. 
Until then while living in the present, his anti-normative behavior, his failures, and his lower 
status were all temporary, not because of any fault of his own. While in this liminal position, 
waiting for the future, he was able to shirk the responsibilities and the normative rules of 
those living in the present.  
 
Wagner’s Exiled World: An Imagined Future and Idealized Past 
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 Wagner referenced an idealized past to give shape to his utopian future by outlining 
the contrasts between modern society and ancient Greek civilization. This was a common 
historicist tactic, characteristic of the German idealist position, in which ancient Greek 
culture was seen as both the political and social ideal. It was believed that in the Athenian 
polis, public and private interests were in a state of equilibrium, balance had been achieved 
between the needs of the individual and society. Wagner contrasted this ideal to the condition 
of modern society where these factors are instead in constant conflict or opposition. Wagner 
had hoped that the revolution would put and end to the conflict between these forces and 
bring back a balance between the needs of the individual and those of the greater society. 
Wagner did not however, completely romanticize the Greeks and did not wish to return to 
such a civilization despite the idyllic perspective. He believed that the system of slavery upon 
which the Greek economy was founded was the reason for the downfall of their civilization. 
Likewise, Wagner believed that the system of wage slavery within bourgeois society was to 
be the downfall of modern civilization. After the bourgeois emancipation everyone had 
become a slave to capital.108 Thus for Wagner, in opposition to the “public art of the Greeks,” 
the “true essence” of modern art was “industry; its ethical aim, the gaining of gold; its 
aesthetic purpose, the entertainment of those whose time hangs heavily on their hands.”109 He 
elevated the status of Greek drama, specifically tragedy, as a pinnacle of art from which there 
is a subsequent decline.  
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Art for the ancient Greeks was not merely for consumption, profit, or entertainment 
as part of a capitalist system, but was a significant religious and essentially communal 
experience in which “the whole populace was wont to witness the performances,” where as 
in modern society it was only the “affluent classes.” Wagner pronounced that: “The public 
art of the Greek . . . was the expression of the deepest and noblest principles of the people’s 
consciousness: with us the deepest and noblest of man’s consciousness is the direct opposite 
of this, namely the denunciation of public art.”110 Public art for Wagner meant that art for the 
Greeks was not just an external form of entertainment but also the ritualized experience of 
deep humanity, beyond individualized externalized trappings; it expressed the very essence 
of society and self, connecting all beings together, the experience of communitas. Wagner 
believed that the Greeks institutionalized this form of artistic communal awareness allowing 
them to be cognizant of a greater whole beyond there own egos.  
The education of the Greek, from his earliest youth, made himself the subject of his 
own artistic treatment and artistic enjoyment, in body as in spirit; our foolish 
education, fashioned for the most part to fit us merely for future industrial gain, gives 
us a ridiculous, and withal arrogant satisfaction with our own unfitness for art, and 
forces us to seek the subjects of any kind of artistic amusement outside ourselves.111   
 
Wagner believed that art for the Greeks represented the deepest connections between human 
beings, the very fabric of society and self. Where as in modern culture individuals become 
estranged from essential characteristics of human nature and disconnected from each other, 
in short, they experience alienation. The modern person is indoctrinated into a social system 
based on extreme individualization, repression of basic aspects of human nature, separation 
from the products of labor, and disconnection from the greater community. Wagner believed 
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that as ancient Grecian civilization fell into fragmentation and decay so too did their highest 
art form, tragedy, as it was formerly representative of the harmonious balance between the 
needs of humanity and the essence of greater community: “Hand-in hand with the dissolution 
of the Athenian State, marched the downfall of Tragedy. As the spirit of Community split 
itself along a thousand lines of egoistic cleavage, so was the great-united work of Tragedy 
disintegrated into its individual factors.”112  
 The “spirit of Community” that Wagner discussed is exemplary of Turner’s concept 
of communitas. Turner asserted, “communitas breaks through the interstices of structure, in 
liminality; at the edges of structure, in marginality; and from beneath structure, 
inferiority.”113 Turner goes on to state “it is almost everywhere held to be sacred or ‘holy,’ 
possibly because it transgresses or dissolves norms that govern structured and 
institutionalized relationships.” Wagner connected to the religious/ritual nature inherent in 
the performance of tragedy. Turner continued to describe the distinct characteristics of 
communitas,  
instinctual energies are surely liberated by these processes, but I am now inclined to 
think that communitas is not solely the product of biologically inherited drives 
released from cultural constraint. Rather it is the product of peculiarly human 
faculties, which include rationality, volition, and memory, and which develop with 
experience of life in society.114   
 
Turner stated that communitas is a result of not only repressed instinctual drives, but also a 
product of the rational aspects of cognition, developed from the social nature of humanity. 
We could understand this as a combination of Feuerbach’s species recognition with 
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Proudhon’s rational freedom from contract. Likewise, Wagner argued that the Greek 
tragedian was inspired by both the god Apollo, “incarnated in actual living art” and by the 
god Dionysus, as “when, to all the rich elements of spontaneous art, the harvest of the fairest 
and most human life, he joined the bond of speech, and concentrating them all into one focus, 
brought forth the highest conceivable form of art—the DRAMA.”115 Drama for Wagner was 
the common, human, emotional experience, the most fundamental being the experience and 
consciousness of our own mortality. The fear of death is both terrifying and yet calming as it 
represents a return to the non-existence from which we all came and will return to. The tragic 
is a unifying feeling, a shared awareness of this fundamental truth; it has the power to 
connect all human beings through the past and into the future. As all humans pass through 
life, this connection is constantly renewed through new human fodder, it is outside all of the 
finite structures of society, and beyond, yet intrinsically represented within the individual 
life, thus all that is truly new only may come from it.  
 Wagner believed that Greek art channeled all forms of human expression toward 
these ends. Greek art was an all-inclusive ritual event that engaged the total being, and 
fulfilled the needs of the whole human both as an individual and as a member of a society. 
As Wagner stated “the individual man . . . can experience no higher need than that which is 
common to all his kind; for, to be a true Need, it can only be such and one as he can satisfy in 
Community alone.”116 He concluded that the highest duty for a true artist was to render the 
“fullest expression of Community” and this he only reaches through an understanding of 
drama. Drama portrays the universal in the particular; it goes beyond the individual to 
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portray our common being. It is a ritualized performance that results in the experience of 
communitas. This is where one may recognize the seeds of inspiration for Wagner’s concept 
of the Gesamtkunstwerk. Art, as a reflection of the state, had likewise dissolved into 
individual separate entities, music, poetry, dance, painting, architecture, etc. Each became 
focused solely on their own individual development, and surface beauty, rather than their 
inward connection to all of humanity, and the sublime. The main focus of art for Wagner was 
not the perfection of each individualized form itself, instead the goal and main aspiration of 
all arts combined should be towards the conveyance of drama. This is when the deepest and 
most innate human emotions and connection are experienced, tragedy of course being the 
most common type. He believed that only when the arts again become unified, their main 
objective to connect humanity to the deepest expressions of life, will art be rescued from this 
fragmented and exploitative profit based system and able to express the creative spirit of a 
freed humanity.  
 Wagner stated that the Athenian state and Greek tragedy operated under the symbolic 
function of Apollo, the idealized image of ancient man, portraying freedom, strength, and 
beauty. This cult of Apollo revitalized in the art of tragedy was gradually replaced by 
Christianity, which Wagner, like Feuerbach before him, characterized as a religion of egoism 
and slavery. The Christian passively waits through the misery of this life to get to the next 
life, effectively rendering life itself as a form of extended liminality. Wagner believed that 
Christianity was the ideological force that led to bourgeoisie society: “And thus we see with 
horror the spirit of modern Christianity embodied in a cotton-mill: to speed the rich, God had 
become our industry, which only holds the wretched Christian laborer to life until the 
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heavenly courses of the stars of commerce bring round the gracious dispensation that sends 
him to a better world.”117   
 For Wagner Christianity was distinct from the figure of Jesus Christ. Jesus 
symbolically represented the basic equality and brotherhood of all mankind, which stood in 
direct opposition to what Wagner considered to be the major downfall of the Athenian state 
society, its reliance on slavery. Apollo represented the free and beautiful people, but not all 
people, as the free were in direct opposition to the masses of slaves. Thus after the revolution 
of mankind, the society and artwork of the future would be represented by a return not just to 
the symbolic values of Apollo but those values in union with figure of Jesus of Nazareth 
representing a fundamental brotherhood of all humanity. Wagner’s characterization of the 
figure in his draft of the drama Jesus of Nazareth portrays Jesus as a revolutionary. This was 
a reflection perhaps of the way in which Wagner wanted to perceive his own identity at the 
time. Wagner’s goals for societal regeneration could be considered representative of what 
scholar Roger Griffin would consider to be and, archetypal revitalization movement. The 
author further mentioned, that historian Norman Cohn, whose work focused on persecutorial 
fanaticism, would regard the leader of such a movement as a “propheta who arises to lead the 
revolt of the Marginalized against the corrupt age and build a New Jerusalem.”118 Though 
never stated outright by the composer, there is a parallel sentiment in Wagner’s view of his 
own role in illuminating the need for a re-unification of religion with art.119  
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The Liminoid Revolution and Wagner as Prophet 
  
 Turner would characterize the revolution that Wagner desired and imagined as one 
that did not result in a reinvigoration of the old societal structure but resulted in a radical 
transformation of the old structures to a new structure, as “liminoid” rather and liminal: 
“Liminoid phenomena, on the other hand, are often parts of social critiques or even 
revolutionary manifestoes-books, plays, paintings, films, etc., exposing the injustices, 
inefficiencies, and immoralities of the mainstream economic and political structures and 
organizations.”120 Thus Wagner’s Zurich essays, as well as the initial ideology behind his 
later Bayreuth festival could be classified as liminoid phenomena. A further aspect of the 
liminoid, according to Turner, is that it is optional by nature, not obligatory as he considered 
the liminal to be. Wagner envisioned a new community as emerging from the breakdown of 
the old, a society of equal persons, a communitas of free and total beings. Turner paints an 
accurate description of the way a new society may begin from a liminoid situation such as 
Wagner’s:  
People who are similar in one important characteristic . . .withdraw symbolically, 
even actually, from the total system, from which they may in various degrees feel 
themselves ‘alienated’ to seek the glow of communitas among those with whom they 
share some cultural or biological feature they take to be their most signal mark of 
identity. Through the route of ‘social category’ they escape the alienating structure of 
a ‘social system’ into a communitas or social anti-structure.121  
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Anthropologist Anthony Wallace’s term revitalization movement could also be applied to 
effectively describe what Wagner was hoping for. Wallace (as paraphrased by Roger Griffin) 
would identify a further crucial element of this process as the appearance of a prophet who 
had a vision or revelation, on the basis of which,  
now personally rejuvenated he . . . undertakes the salvation of the community by 
imposing through preaching and proselytizing ‘a syncretism of both ancient and new 
fangled elements’ . . . the crisis of the old society is thus resolved by a reaffirmation 
of identification with some definable cultural system which has been created through 
the agency of the leader.122  
 
Wagner became rejuvenated through his experience of the liminal; his early economic 
marginalization, and his subsequent time as an outsider in exile allowed him to view societal 
structure from an exterior vantage point. He had a new perspective both spatially, while away 
from his home, and temporally, as he was in a state of timeless limbo not knowing when and 
if he could return. During this separation from society Wagner entered the liminal, which to 
use the language of anthropologist Maurice Bloch (as paraphrased by Griffin) could be 
regarded as a “world beyond process.” Where the initiates are able to see themselves and 
others “as part of something permanent, therefore life-transcending . . . thus empowered and 
transformed by their experience of liminality, they change into ‘a permanently transcendental 
person who can therefore dominate the here and now’ to which they originally belonged 
before their ritually induced schism from it.”123  
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 Wagner was both humbled and empowered by his experience of the liminal. It gave 
him the vision and freedom to put forth his ideas of a revitalization of art through revolution, 
which would in turn create a new society based on communitas. The judgments he cast on 
the problems of modern society, and his liminal position as genius artist ultimately helped 
excuse his own failures and foibles. Upon the failure of the revolution by external group 
means, he turned inward toward individual disengagement. His considered himself as part of 
a greater permanent unity, a liminal figure, a genius mediator between the eternal irrational 
and the finite now.124 Wagner’s identification of himself in the role of prophetic visionary, 
genus composer, even charismatic leader would push him toward a plan to create a place of 
permanent limonodality in his Bayreuth festival. However his pessimism would never be 
quite all encompassing, and he would continue to look for societal change, however it would 
not depend on the will of the group anymore. He would view himself as the charismatic 
leader whose message would lead the way towards change.  
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Chapter Three: 
Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche: 
The Charismatic Founding of a Tragic Culture, Liminal Vision, Liminoid Reality 
 
Introduction 
  
 Richard Wagner, still in exile in Lucerne, was unable to attend the 1850 Weimar 
premier of Lohengrin his friend Franz Liszt had arranged for him. Despite his lack of 
attendance, the happening itself briefly rejuvenated the composer prompting him to publish 
the librettos of Der fliegende Holländer, Tannhäuser, and Lohengrin. Much had occurred 
between the conception of those operas and their publication. The composer had been 
through a revolution, and while living in exile had focused on writing essays that expounded 
his new socio-political philosophies of art and life. As such his older compositional ideas did 
not match up with the vision purported in his 1849-1850 Zurich essays (discussed in Chapter 
2) or more importantly his just published 1851 essay “Opera and Drama.” This gap in style 
and meaning prompted critical conversation among both his friends and detractors. To 
respond to the discrepancies between his new ideals and his older compositions, Wagner 
wrote “A Communication to My Friends” as a preface to the librettos. He meant this essay to 
be a signpost for his future in two ways. Publically he revealed his grand plans for a ritually-
inspired festival of his works; second, he attempted to explain himself and address his critics 
through a self-defined and self-crowned title of genius.  
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Wagner’s festival plans had, like his Ring, been forged from the fire of revolution and 
exile, crafted from the utopic ideals he had amalgamated from various philosophical 
influences and socio-political goals. Victor Turner used the term liminoid phenomena to 
differentiate such subversive revolutionary activities from more conservative “inversive” 
liminal activities that function within existing social structure. Liminoid phenomena 
according to Turner are “often parts of social critiques or even revolutionary manifestoes—
books, plays, paintings, films, etc., exposing the injustices, inefficiencies, and immoralities of 
the mainstream economic and political structures and organizations.”1 Wagner’s early 
revolutionary essays and festival ideals had been steeped in the optimism of creating a new 
society based on Greek ideals, and contained many concepts from the philosophies of Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon and especially Ludwig Feuerbach. However, as Wagner witnessed the 
failure of the revolution and the inertia of political action, he began to lose faith in his former 
socio-political ideals. Instead he came to embrace the pessimistic philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer and continued to turn away from external solutions to man’s situation. 
Despite eventually gaining the patron he had long hoped, further problems and 
frustrations served to alter the festival and its creator’s original vision. All of which led 
Wagner to transfer his previous belief in a liminoid mass political revolution to a belief in a 
liminal cultural rejuvenation led by a charismatic individual (himself). Many of the 
composer’s supporters who bore witness to the earlier visions for the festival—Friedrich 
Nietzsche being the most notable and outspoken—called attention to the gulf between the 
idealism of the project’s initial vision and the betrayals of its structural reality. Wagner 
would try to reconcile this through a strategic alteration of his earlier liminoid ideals to a 
                                                
 1 Victor Turner, “Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative 
Symbology” Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 86.   
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more conservative liminal concept of a societal rejuvenation through an art-religion. He still 
hoped that as poet-priest he would lead society out of its state of fragmentation and egoism 
through an art-religion that culminated in a pilgrimage to Bayreuth. This vision however 
became more complex as the reality of the Bayreuth festival held truer to Turner’s 
classification of a liminoid phenomena, as an event attended out of choice, such as a concert 
rather than an event attended out of social or moral obligation such as a church service. In 
this chapter, I show how, despite his best efforts, Wagner had a vision caught between a 
liminal ideal and a liminoid reality. 
 
Sacred Festivals: Wagner Stages His Own Mythic Redemption 
  
 Wagner had finished his first prose draft of the poem of the Ring, “The Nibelung 
Myth,” back in 1848, while his mind was saturated with the ideals of his Young German 
friends and thoughts of a societal revolution subsequently for and through art. While in exile, 
following the failed uprising, his essay “Art and Revolution” attacked the conventional opera 
system, sighting its baseness, pointless displays of virtuosity, and the part it played in the 
bourgeoisie system. Wagner, like many of his contemporaries, exalted Greek ideals and 
culture; he believed Greek society encompassed all of the traits of humanity and met the 
needs of both the individual and the society. Art was part of a public process of community 
awareness, allowing its members to each experience a greater oneness. Ancient Greek 
tragedy was capable of revealing our common humanity, and as a ritual event it fostered the 
experience of communitas. From the Greek Wagner took several concepts: the unity of 
drama and music, myth, and the notion of a national festival. However, he was not 
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attempting to merely imitate. Wagner melded philosophical ideas (previously discussed in 
Chapter 2), his direct experience as an exile, and his own imaginative Greek history into a 
plan for his own context and use. Wagner built a case for the need of a festival embracing 
these ideals in his next essay, “The Art-Work of the Future.” Wagner believed that a work 
that held these ideals would have the ability to bring the individualized fragments of art and 
self together, unifying both artist and audience in an experience of communitas. At the end of  
“A Communication to My Friends” Wagner first publicly made known his plans to at “some 
future time” have a “specially-appointed festival” to “produce those three Dramas with their 
Prelude, in the course of three days and a fore-evening.”2 At the time the composer had not 
solidified the actual title or what the cycle would consist of, as he was still toying with 
“Siegfried’s Tod.” However, it revealed to his “friends” that Wagner had a grand idea to 
create his own festival long before he actually had any practical ability to do so. Wagner had 
even conceived of the place where such a festival would need to occur, a building that would 
not contain useless displays of ornate opulence but with an architectural design based entirely 
on the temporary needs of the production. Far form ornate, it would be made of simple 
planks, and be destroyed after the performances were over.  
In an early letter to his friend Ernst Kietz, Wagner discussed that he was thinking of 
setting his poem of “Siegfried’s Tod” to music, however it was not to be performed in just 
some run of the mill theatre. Wagner stated that he was “toying with the boldest of plans,” 
and continued,  
I would have a theatre erected here on the spot, made of planks, and have the most 
suitable singers join me here, and arrange everything necessary for this one special 
                                                
2 Richard Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future: Richard Wagner’s Prose Works, ed. Ashton W. Ellis, 
vol. 1 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & CO., Ltd., 1895), 391. [Emphasis in the original]   
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occasion, so that I could be certain of an outstanding performance of the opera. I 
would then send out invitations far and wide to all who were interested in my works, 
ensure that the auditorium was decently filled, give three performances—free, of 
course—one after the other in the space of a week, after which the theatre would then 
be demolished and the whole affair would be over and done with.3   
 
Wagner’s plan was to create a temporary space, simple in itself, to house an egalitarian 
gathering for all to witness a musico-dramatic myth. Upon the completion of the event the 
space would then be destroyed. Wagner’s concept of this place parallels what Turner referred 
to as the “setting of a place that is not a place, and a time that is not a time.”4 In this light 
Wagner’s mythic music-dramatic work may be viewed as a form of sacra which, as Turner 
theorized,  
May be the foci of hermeneutics or religious interpretations, sometimes in the form of 
myths . . . these symbols, visual and auditory, operate culturally as mnemonics . . . as 
‘storage bins’ of information, not about pragmatic techniques, but about cosmologies, 
values, and cultural axioms, whereby society’s deep knowledge is transmitted from 
one generation to another.5  
 
In creating a momentary, liminal space, where everyone would have equal access to the 
performance, the function of space itself would only be in service to the work’s needs. 
Wagner eliminated the problems he saw associated with conventional opera, thereby 
vanquishing the idea of art as merely a vulgar spectacle for the bourgeois. The performance 
would be a temporary event, outside of normal structural space, and outside of normal 
temporal space. The audience would pass from their usual roles and positions in societal 
structure to a temporary space where those roles would be suspended, as they became 
                                                
3 Richard Wagner to Ernst Kietz, 14 September 1850, Selected Letters of Richard Wagner, eds., trans. 
Stewart Spencer and Barry Millington (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), 216. 
4  Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 239. 
5 Ibid. 
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audience members, after which they would return to their usual roles in normal structure. The 
entire episode and space would vanish after the ritual performance. Turner noted that there 
are two models of societal structure, normal structural time where individuals are involved in 
hierarchical role playing and status incumbency, and society as a communitas “of free and 
equal comrades—of total persons.”6 The ritual performance of Wagner’s festival would 
facilitate such an experience of egalitarianism through communitas. For the anthropologist, 
society as we experience it is a varying combination of both, normal structural time and 
moments of sacred anti-structure. As he noted, “even where there is no mythical or 
pseudohistorical account of such a state of affairs,” as communitas, “rituals may be 
performed in which egalitarian and cooperative behavior is characteristic, and in which 
secular distinctions of rank, office, and status are temporarily in abeyance or regarded as 
irrelevant.”7  
Wagner’s initial festival plan seemed to be what could be considered a ritual occasion 
where, to quote Turner, individuals usually “deeply divided from one another in the secular 
or nonreligious world,” would “in certain ritual situations cooperate closely to ensure what is 
believed to be the maintenance of a cosmic order which transcends the contradictions and 
conflicts inherent in the mundane social system.”8 The “cosmic order” Turner referred to was 
the underling unity of humanity that had been obscured through the alienating forces of 
modern life. As Turner noted, practically all such rituals require a passage from one position 
in the “domain of structure” to another. In passing from structure to structure rituals may pass 
                                                
6 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 238. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
 141 
through a state of communitas: “Communitas is almost always thought of or portrayed by 
actors as a timeless condition, an eternal now, as ‘a moment in and out of time,’ or as a state 
to which the structural view of time is not applicable.”9 It seemed to be this timeless 
condition, an experience of communitas that Wagner was hoping to evoke. His musico-
dramatic works would provide a momentary respite from everyday structure and status 
hierarchies. The festival was to be a communal ritual event inspired by the unification of art 
and religion displayed in the performance of Greek tragedy.   
 Perhaps more noteworthy than the announcement of his festival plans, in this same 
essay, “A Communication to My Friends,” Wagner attempted to redeem his character and 
construct an identity that would serve to absolve him of his previous failures. This identity 
was based on what could be regarded as the liminal figure of the genius, a threshold 
character. Wagner’s narration of his personal development culminated in a specific definition 
of genius, one that attempted to explain some of his more questionable behaviors. In the 
composer’s words, he was trying to portray his “whole” self so that his “friends” may decide 
if they can “wholly” be his friends. In a jab at critics Wagner justified his tactic stating that 
he would not attempt to explain his works and character through “paths of abstract criticism,” 
like those who denounced him, but by pointing out his “evolutionary career,” and reviewing 
his works and “the moods of life that called them forth.”10 Wagner then strategically 
proceeded to outline his course of development as an artist. As an adolescent he struggled to 
form an individual identity. Wagner stated that his “first artistic Will,” like most adolescents, 
was “the impulse to imitate.” Thus he admits that like others, his first creations were 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, 286.  
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essentially imitations. He then stated that he believed that one’s artistic ability was directly 
related to the force of their “receptive faculty,”11 not as a result of some God-given talent.  
To explain what he meant by receptive faculty Wagner set up a dichotomy between a 
development motivated by profit and one that develops from sympathy. He differentiated 
between what he termed the “un-artistic, political temperament,” and the “un-political artistic 
temperament.” The former, from youth, limits the impressions from outside, “which in the 
course of man’s development, mounts to a calculation of the personal profit that his 
withstanding of the outer world will bring him, to a talent for referring this outer world to 
himself and never himself to it.” The latter, however, “is marked by one feature: that its 
owner gives himself up without reserve to the impressions which move his emotional being 
to sympathy.” Sympathy in this case might refer to a sense of empathy; the ability to ‘tune in’ 
to the underlying shared experience of mankind, to feel compassion, and communion with all 
of life. This then is what marks the “artistic temperament” for Wagner. Thus the more 
‘receptive’ one is to these impressions, the more one will be ‘filled up,’ so-to-speak, until 
there is, in Wagner’s words, an “ecstatic excess,” after which the individual will get an 
“impulse to impart.”12 This impulse to impart is the artist’s drive to create.  
Wagner coupled the artistic temperament with the un-political, and the un-artistic 
with the political. The political is associated with structures of limitation, and repression that 
keep the individual from experiencing true humanity. Further, he was dismissive of those 
brought up within such structures, as he believed they were taught from a young age to 
conform and eventually became motivated only by profit, and personal gain. In Wagner’s 
                                                
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
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narrative such characteristics take on a negative association, whereas those individuals who 
are extremely receptive to “sympathy” and do not, or are not able, to succumb to societal 
structures of repression and conformity gain a positive connotation. This narrative is an 
attempt to explain and justify Wagner’s own life troubles and behaviors while growing up. 
Rather than simply being an unusual child who struggled to fit in under the ordinary rubric, 
he, due to his extensive receptivity, disregarded the structures of society and was open to 
feelings of a whole greater than himself, which drove his need to create. The artist was 
essentially a receptacle in between the force or motive power of Life and the rest of society. 
The artist, as a result of his extreme receptivity is flooded to overflowing with the underlying 
life force, which then spills over in the form of creativity that he must share, the product of 
which is art. The artist was perpetually in a liminal space, a mediator between the whole and 
the individual, between the deeper anti-structural force of life and the illusions of structure.  
Wagner created a further division within the category of artist. For him the most 
important part of art was the expression of this underlying connective essence, the sublime. 
This for him was true art. Where as art that was just art, for lack of a better term, did not 
express this deeper emotive content, it may be beautiful but not true art. As Friedrich Schiller 
noted, “the sublime opens to us a road to overstep the limits of the world of sense, in which 
the feeling of the beautiful would forever imprison us.”13 In Wagner’s words the artistic force 
was either “set in motion by exclusively artistic impressions,” or by “impressions also 
harvested from Life itself.”14 The artist that was completely filled by only “artistic 
                                                
13 Friedrich Schiller, “On the Sublime,” Aesthetical and Philosophical Essays, ed., Nathan Haskell 
Dole (Boston: F. A. Niccolls & Company, 1902), 131. 
14 Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, 287. [Emphasis in the original] 
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impressions” had no room to absorb the impressions from the underlying force of “Life.” 
This individual “will develop as an absolute artist.”15 Wagner argued that the creations of 
absolute artists were based on the present, copying actuality, “not merely the actuality of the 
modern Present, but of Life in general—and treats it as her absolute foe.”16 Thus, this artist 
sees only the depressing state of man in conflict, but does not view art, as a potential force of 
unity, thus does not use any “Life Force” so-to-speak, to fashion art. Wagner continued to 
state that this class of artists included those involved in painting and especially in music.17 
On the other side there were artists who had strengthened their “receptive force” toward 
receiving Life impressions. Wagner maintained that, “On the path along which this force 
evolves, Life itself is at last surveyed in the light of artistic impressions, and the impulse 
towards imparting which gathers from the overfill of these impressions is the only true poetic 
force.”18  
At this juncture, for Wagner, it was the poet, not the musician, who was in tune with 
the underlying unity and force of Life. The poetic artist does not just portray life as it is, but 
attempts to shape life as it really is, as an underlying unity. Wagner placed an increased value 
on the type of artist he viewed himself as being, the true artist. Absolute artists, are in some 
sense just artists, they do not concern themselves or their art with the deeper aspects of life 
therefore they only encapsulate the circumstances as they are at the present time, or mimic 
the past. They do not attempt to create from reception of the underlying Life force, which 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Wagner will change this view upon his reading of Schopenhauer.  
18 Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, 287.   
 145 
would mark their art as true. The artist that creates motivated by these deeper impressions of 
the Life force can see past the surface divisions of everyday life that set man against man, 
and creates art that attempts to change the present and unify rather than mimic the divide. 
This deeper force is beyond the present everyday structures, thus it is truly generative of new 
ideas, truly imaginative. 
Wagner’s narration was a form of strategic identity building, setting the stage so-to-
speak. He created a dichotomy between the negative materialistic being, and the absolute 
artist caught in the illusions and divisions of everyday reality on one hand, and the positive 
sympathetic being sensitive to the underlying unity of mankind, the true artist, whom could 
produce art that didn’t just mimic the state of the world but could lead it toward change. This 
stage building, for lack of a better term, provided Wagner with a positive identity position to 
assume, that of the true artist, a role crafted and imaginatively matched to his own backstory. 
This culminated in Wagner’s own definition of the term genius, one that just happened to fit 
with the happenstances of his own life.  
 
Wagner’s Genius: That One Accepted Gift 
  
 Wagner’s evocation of genius seemed to have been one of the most rational things he 
could have done to explain himself in light of his critics at the time. It served to extricate him 
of the repercussions of some of his more eccentric behaviors and unsavory actions. However, 
the liminal nature of the term genius itself, residing somewhere between the normal and the 
exceptional, would later betray Wagner and repeal the very protection it initially gave as his 
behaviors could equally be explained as forms of madness, or degeneracy. The term genius, 
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like Wagner, evolved through the changing historical circumstances surrounding it. At points 
the term was used to describe both the most rational of individuals and analytic endeavors, 
yet it was also used to describe those who were the most in tune with the irrational and 
sensitive to instinct. I believe Wagner’s evocation of the term genius as a gift of receptivity 
to the irrational proved a very rational way to color the happenstance of his own life and the 
characteristics of his art.  
 This particular conjuration of genius occurs in a few pages from Wagner’s essay, “A 
Communication to My Friends” discussed earlier. Wagner takes the time to clarify that his 
“communication” is not for the purpose of making him out to be a “genius,” at least not in 
the conventional sense as an endowment from God or some natural gift allotted at birth. 
Instead, for Wagner, a genius is an individual who is extremely receptive to an already 
existing “universal substance” that impresses upon the individual a communal force. It is an 
awareness of the overarching connectivity of all; this receptivity allows one to intensely 
experience empathy, or “sympathy” as Wagner puts it. When this “force,” like that of 
individuality itself, “has been entirely crushed out by state-discipline, or by the complete 
fossilization of the outward forms of Life and Art,” geniuses are in short supply.19 This, he 
believed, is “proof that they are not cast upon life by the caprice of God or Nature.”20  
If the structural political conditions are oppressive to the individual and to the society 
in general, very few if any will be able to see beyond those surface constraints to proceed to 
produce true Art through a connection with the underlying “Life” force, as Wagner terms it. 
However, in epochs when there were few repressive structures geniuses were also unknown, 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 289. 
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as “no man was Genius, since all men were it.” Wagner sights “ages when both creative 
forces, the individualistic and the communistic, reacted on each other with all the freedom of 
unfettered nature, forever fresh-begetting and ever giving birth anew.”21 He, like many of his 
cohorts, held up ancient Greece as an example of such a culture with the perfect balance of 
the needs of the individual and that of the greater society, “when Speech, and Myth, and Art 
were really born.” Despite viewing ancient Greek society as a model Wagner does not expect 
art to create static monuments of the Ideal, rather, the goal was to create something dynamic 
in its potential to relate to all humans through time, and space. As Wagner states, “Art, must 
take that path which brings it into the most immediate contact with ever present Life; this 
path is that of Drama.”22 Drama is the common, human, emotional experience, most 
fundamentally the experience and awareness of our own mortality. The tragic is a unifying 
feeling, a shared realization of this fundamental truth; it has the power to connect all humans 
through the past and into the future.  
Wagner believed that for art to be created within modern society, the artist was forced 
to bend to either the public’s worship of the past, or its predilection for fashion.23 Therefore 
Wagner did not consider such artists to be true artists in the sense of his definition, rather, 
the true artist united past, present, and future through this universal and infinite human 
connection. Thus he must be at odds with the current society, ergo all true art, by its very 
nature, must be revolutionary. As Wagner elucidates, “[o]nly in times like ours, does one 
know or name these ‘Geniuses’; the sole name that we can find for those artistic forces which 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 280. 
23 Ibid. 
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withdraw themselves from the drill ground of the State and ruling Dogma, or from the 
sluggard bolstering-up of tottering forms of Art, to open out new pathways and fill them with 
their innate life.”24 The “new” pathways Wagner was referring to were not in his words, 
“arbitrary” or “private” but part of the greater communal work of many individuals through 
time, “whose conscious or unconscious instinct has urged” them to fashion “newer molds of 
Life and Art.”25 This “main causeway” that leads to the “new” is able to connect both the 
past and the future, and represents the whole of humanity whose task is innovation.  
Wagner uses a myth to demonstrate the “prime energy” that characterizes a Genius. 
The myth is about the son of a Viking King and Wachilde, a sea-creature/ humanoid woman 
who was given gifts from the three Norns. The first gave strength, the second wisdom, and 
the King was pleased. The third Norn bestowed upon the child, “the ne’er-contented mind 
that ever broods the New.”26 The King was upset at the gift and did not offer a reward to 
third Norn; insulted she took back the gift from the child. The child grew strong, wise and 
was always content. He never loved, but also never hated, he never felt the need to “change 
or venture.” Wate, as he was called, grew up, married and had a child, not for passionate 
reasons, but basically just because it was conveniently there as an option. Long story short, 
Wate had wisdom, strength and comfort, and he was always satisfied. Thus he did not 
experience desire, curiosity, drive, or passion, he was not in touch with the irrational. Wate 
lacked the basic instinctual awareness or inquiry of questionable situations especially when 
they should be heeded, he never experienced ill feelings towards others even when those very 
                                                
24 Ibid., 289.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 290. 
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feeling might warn him that those others could cause him harm. His inability to tune in with 
the basic drives of life and to be in touch with all the instinctual feelings of man, irrational as 
they may be, eventually cost him his life. “That one rejected gift: ‘the ne’er contented mind, 
that ever broods the New.’ The youngest Norn holds out to all of us when we are born, and 
through it alone might we each, one day, become a “Genius.”27  
In Wagner’s characterization, genius is a receptivity to an instinctual life force or 
drive that is not ever satisfied but continues to quest for the new, it is in all of us, yet 
repressed and subdued for various reasons, parental, educational, systemic. Wagner’s 
narrative is humbling, yet serves to transform what could be regarded as negative 
happenstances of his life into fortuitous circumstances. His struggles in life and difficulties in 
education and formal training or lack thereof is seen in a positive light as a reason that he was 
able to accept the Norn’s gift so-to speak. His father died before he had a chance to push the 
gift away, he did not get matriculated into the indoctrination that occurs in formal 
educational institutions. He was not a child prodigy and does not fit the colloquial 
understanding of genius. However, he renders the conventionally perceived traits of genius as 
ill conceived. As Wagner explains, “in our craze for education, ‘tis Chance alone that brings 
this gift within our grasp, —the accident of not becoming educated.”28 Wagner turns the 
disadvantages he was born with into a fortuitous chance. This “gift” bestowed by chance, 
“never left poor untrained Wagner,” and made “Art and Life” his educators, instead of the 
usual institutions of higher learning which he had failed to thrive in. Mere “chance” becomes 
the reason why he is able to gain the divine gift. To place the accountability on “chance” 
                                                
27 Ibid., 291. 
28 Ibid. 
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takes away the hubris or egotism of crowing oneself as genius. Rather than take 
responsibility for his lack of ability in everyday routes Wagner, through endowing upon 
himself this carefully defined title, is able to occupy the role of genius, one that has occurred 
by chance, one that is open to all yet, because of the societal structures of the time is often 
repressed and thrown aside.  
This title of genius excused Wagner from his anti-normative behavior. As sociologist 
Robert Nisbet aptly states, by the nineteenth century those thought to be genius “were 
excused from the ordinary conventionalities and could indulge in vices denied ordinary 
mortals simply because these vices, eccentricities, and unconventionalities sprang ineluctably 
from the individual's ‘genius.’”29 The perks ordained to the “genius” club had been in 
formation long before Wagner joined its ranks. The French philosophers of the eighteenth-
century Enlightenment were crowning themselves geniuses as they were critiquing the old 
regime. They, like Wagner, looked at institutions of indoctrination such as the church and 
university with a faultfinding eye. By the nineteenth century, German Romantics had 
likewise linked themselves to the concept of historical genius through racial ancestry. “They 
found individuals in the past of towering intellect and spiritual being who had helped form 
and then express the Germanic soul or consciousness.”30 The Romantic genius was marked 
not by the use of reason but through a plea to the irrational; feeling and instinct guided their 
experience.31 Prior to this the figure of the genius was to be found in Roman mythology, 
                                                
29 Robert Nisbet, “Genius,” The Wilson Quarterly 6 (1976): 99.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. “Geniuses were believed to have minds of such surpassing creativity or heroism that their 
rational limits could sometimes give way, leading to an affinity between genius and forms of insanity.”  
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believed to be an individual exemplar of the sacred spirit of nature that resides in all things, 
in other words the general unity that connects all particulars. It was also considered to be a 
tutelary spirit, protecting and guiding.32 In Roman mythology all things had a genius, each 
human’s intellectual gifts and abilities stemmed from their soul, which was a genius. One 
would pray to a host of genii for numerous reasons.33 This protective role was to become 
overlooked or separated out to its own path in folk and religious lore.  
In the historical linkage of the Greek concept of the daemon with the Roman genii, 
the former served the same protective function as the latter Roman genii, however could also 
be malevolent. An early instance of daemon holding an ambiguous character is found in 
Plato’s symposium, in the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon. Socrates is relaying a 
conversation he once held with the wise woman, Diotima of Mantineia about the concept of 
love. He relays that she characterized love as a mean between good and evil, “a great spirit 
(daemon), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.”34 The 
“daemon” love was a liminal being, one through which all is communicated between the 
sacred and profane, neither good nor bad. During the middle ages, genius as an allegorical 
figure was again cast as a mediator between the everyday and the divine, however he was 
given the further duty of moral guide. The Latin prose writer Apuleius combined the Roman 
                                                
32 Although the idea of genius can probably be traced back to the corresponding Greek concept of a 
daemon, its origins most likely stem from even earlier Etruscan, or Ancient Egyptian sources. John Evans, “A 
New Type of Carausius,” Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society, 4 (1904): 137. 
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34 Plato, Symposium, trans. Alexander Nehamas, and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1989), 45-6. “Whose power is to interpret “between gods and men” a “mediator who 
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concept a protective genius with the daemons of Platonic cosmology.35 As medieval prose 
scholar Denise Baker notes, “Apuleius establishes for the Middle Ages the precedent of 
casting Genius as a moral guide by equating this Roman god with the daemons of Platonic 
cosmology.”36 In his text De deo Socrates, genius is categorized as daemon and identified as 
“one of the secondary gods who act as mediators between heaven and earth.”37 Thus, like the 
Ancient Roman notion, we see the concept of genius taking on a duel role as protector and 
individualized mortal link to the unifying whole of immortality, however with the added duty 
of moral compass. In medieval allegory genius duty as mediator/priest was to regulate the 
actions of individuals through the elicitation of reason, this included guidance on instinctual 
drives like sexual activity.   
 Wagner, however, separated the notion of genius from its function as a protective 
sprit in the sense that it did not provide moral counsel or guide through rationality. Genius 
was essentially paired with the irrational as the instinctual needs of nature were not in 
themselves considered bad. For the composer increased “sensuality” was indeed a hallmark 
of genius. To some extent the forces of rationality and the imposed and unnatural chastity of 
the morality of religion actually became vilified.38 Societal structures that sought to repress 
and control the natural, instinctual, and irrational, were regarded by Wagner and his 
                                                
35 Lucius Apuleius Madaurensis (c. 125 – c. 180 CE) his most notable work is the Metamorphoses, 
otherwise titled The Golden Ass, It is known as the only Latin novel that has survived in its entirety. 
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Romantic cohorts as negative; the main cause of the problematic state of human society. 
Thus genius as a force that sought to repress such instincts through a call to rationality would 
not be a viable figure. However, Wagner’s genius does still serve a tutelary function, rather 
than act as a moral conscious, its evocation gave him a viable excuse for his actions. Wagner 
as genius had the ability to shirk societal norms of behavior without moral judgment as it was 
just part of his “gift,” which rendered him more sensitive than other men, more in tune, and 
thus more in need of the sensual. Further he was so fixated on the greater whole, the deeper 
level of “Life,” that he lost track of his own and because of this he experienced difficulty 
functioning in the everyday world. In a sense, the evocation of Genius provided the perfect 
protective identity for Wagner at a time when he was most vulnerable.   
 
From a Hopeful Liminal Artist of the Future to a Disillusioned Outsider  
  
 As 1851 came to a close Wagner still retained hope that there would be a revolution 
starting first in France, a hope he held on to well into 1852. After the continued failure of 
revolutionary means to change society, Wagner, like Proudhon before him, lost faith in 
external socio-political solutions. Aside from his waning belief in a renewed future state of 
society, 1852 brought the introduction of two people that were to be quite influential to 
Wagner’s own future, Otto Wesendonck, a partner in a lucrative New York Silk Company, 
and his young wife, Mathilde. Otto was to become a rather substantial patron to Wagner, 
alleviating some of his material miseries at the time through financial support, and by 
supplying a reasonable abode within which to work. In the near future, however, it was 
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Mathilde who was to provide Wagner with artistic inspiration and mental support—both of 
which apparently were not to come from his wife Minna.  
At that time, Wagner was at work on the Ring, a work based on political principles 
that he had since come to question, forcing him to reinterpret the work while still engaged on 
it. His previous political convictions, including the belief in a revolution through which a 
new societal structure would arise, had been the foundation of his artistic expectations and 
his own future as an artist to date. However, suddenly he felt there was no hope of 
revolutionary political and social change, no hope for the future integrity of art, thus no 
future where he would take his place in a status he felt he deserved. Wagner had essentially 
gone from a hopeful liminal position, waiting to be reintegrated into a new society, to a 
politically disillusioned outsider with no prospect of reintegration. This left him severely 
depressed even to the point of contemplating suicide. By 1854 Wagner was in debt again and 
charged with supporting himself, Minna, and her illegitimate daughter.  
In the fall of 1854, an acquaintance and fellow political refugee, Georg Herwegh, 
introduced Wagner to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Wagner thus began a life-long and 
life-changing preoccupation with Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which started by reading The 
World as Will and Representation. Thomas Mann called it “the greatest event in Wagner’s 
life.”39 After this initial reading, Wagner re-read Schopenhauer several times, discussed him, 
and continued to deliberate on tenants of his philosophy for the remainder of his days. As the 
figure of Schopenhauer enters into Wagner’s picture, the solution to the struggle between 
continuous needs of the individual and the greater society will become a problem solved 
through individual internal means of self-abnegation. Schopenhauer will effectively usurp the 
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drive or potentiality within the individual and place it outside, or as a receptacle. The force of 
the Will controls us; the composer’s genius is just a greater receptivity to the Will itself. Thus 
the genius becomes a liminal figure between two realms, a mediator to a greater force beyond 
the self of which the self is merely a small part.  
 
The Schopenhauerian Interlude. Wagner as the Sensual Genius Composer: Sex and 
Aesthetic Contemplation for All 
  
 Schopenhauer believed that total reality must consist of a phenomenal realm; a highly 
differentiated world of material objects in space and time, plus a noumenal realm, which is a 
single, undifferentiated thing, spaceless, timeless, nonmaterial, and inaccessible to experience 
or knowledge. The noumena and the phenomena are the same reality perceived in two 
different ways. In our individuated bodily existence we are separate physical objects in space 
and time thus temporary manifestations in the phenomenal world of something that is 
noumenal, immaterial, timeless, spaceless. Therefore in the ultimate essence of our being we 
are all one.40 Schopenhauer argued that this explained compassion/empathy and provided the 
foundation for morals or ethics. It is through compassion/empathy, the identification of 
ourselves with the other, that we get to know and understand one another and form bonds. In 
Kant’s view the main thing uniting human beings was reason, therefore for him rationality 
was the foundation for ethics. Schopenhauer however, denied that what unites us is reason. 
For him the unifying force did not just involve the nature of human beings alone but the 
nature of all existence, as everything that exists, rational or not, participates in the ultimate 
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oneness of being. Schopenhauer thought that life consists of endless willing, hoping, striving, 
and desiring that is inherently unsatisfiable; as the moment one wish is gratified another takes 
its place. Disappointment, frustration, illness, failure are common to the human experience 
leading eventually and inevitably to death. Thus happiness is only momentary and illusory, 
life is unavoidably tragic, and existence suffering. Since this harsh phenomenal world and the 
noumenal world are actually one and the same, the noumenal world must be something harsh 
as well, a blind, purposeless force or drive, entirely irrational and non-moral, unconcerned 
with anything to do with life or living beings. The noumenal realms manifestation in the 
phenomenal world was simply the irrational drive of existence that we see in ourselves, and 
all living things, thus all beings are the phenomenal embodiments of this noumenal force. 
Schopenhauer termed this force the “Will.” “The subject of cognition, appearing as an 
individual, is given the solution to the riddle: and this solution is Will. This and this alone 
gives him the key to his own appearance, reveals to him the meaning and shows him the 
inner workings of his essence, his deeds, his movements.”41 The only way away from life’s 
suffering was disengagement and denial of the Will, in other words self-negation, death of 
course representing the ultimate way to get underneath the veil of illusion.42  
 Despite his extreme pessimism, Schopenhauer believed that it was possible for 
humans to momentarily escape the ever present Will and experience a moment of peace. 
Activities such as sex, art, and especially music, allowed a temporary consciousness of a 
greater infinite unity. All of our lives end in death, however all our lives also begin with an 
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act of copulation. Hence, Schopenhauer believed that for most of us the strongest impulse 
next to the instinct for self-perseveration, “the will to life, expresses itself most strongly in 
the sex drive.”43 Awareness of sex is ever present in our minds, albeit subliminally, which is 
why it is referred to it so often, for example in the form of the double-entendre. Therefore, 
understanding an individual’s sexuality becomes essential in understanding that individual. 
The fullest expression of the individual personality is a loving sexual relationship in which 
paradoxically the barriers and limitations of selfhood are transcended, when the individual’s 
sense of self experiences one-ness with the other person in the sexual encounter.   
It is fundamentally this that in the higher phases of love gives such a poetical and 
sublime colour, nay, transcendental and hyperphysical turn to a man’s thoughts, 
whereby he appears to lose sight of his essentially material purpose. He is inspired by 
the spirit of the species, whose affairs are infinitely more important than any which 
concern mere individuals.44  
 
This concept is in many ways similar to Wagner’s Feuerbach-inspired continuum of love 
(discussed in Chapter 2), as one that flows from the initial transcendence of selfhood, through 
erotic love, to paternal, filial, and finally into awareness of the ultimate unity/brotherhood of 
all, love as communitas.  
In his notes Schopenhauer himself would be even more explicit; he would say that 
orgasm is a seemingly metaphysical experience, even if very short, that reveals to us the 
nature of things, for just an instant. Our experience of art shares this special characteristic, 
taking us out of ourselves. When we are absorbed in a work of art, we entirely forget 
ourselves, and our sense of time seems to stop. Schopenhauer thought this was because we 
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do indeed perceive objects of art outside time and space. He believed that art was 
representational, revealing the universal in the particular, unveiling a glimpse of the forms 
(Platonic) themselves. Music alone among the arts was not representational; according to 
Schopenhauer it was the self-expression of something that cannot be represented at all, 
namely the noumena; music was “a copy of the Will itself.”45 Music seems to speak to us 
from that deeper underlying unity, beyond what is accessible to language, understanding, or 
rational intellect. As such, Schopenhauer believed that music was a superior art. The great 
composers could be regarded as metaphysicians giving expression to truths about existence 
in a language that our intellects are unable to comprehend, or translate into words. For 
Schopenhauer, this was the nature of genius.   
 Wagner’s concept of genius (as previously discussed) became more pronounced upon 
his reading of Schopenhauer. On many fronts, his idea of genius already matched up with 
Schopenhauer’s portrayal. Schopenhauer, much like Wagner, believed that “for genius to 
emerge in an individual, it is as if a degree of cognitive power had been granted to him that is 
far in excess of the amount required for the service of the individual will.” Schopenhauer 
continued further to explain that this is why geniuses “tend to be lively to the point of 
distraction: the present is rarely enough for them because is does not fully engage their 
consciousness,” this is what endows them with a “relentless zeal” as “they are constantly on 
the lookout for new objects that would be worth considering.”46 Thus just as Wagner had 
suggested through his mythic parable of Wate, “the ne’er contented mind, that ever broods 
the New,” a lack of satisfaction with the present circumstances and an obsession with the 
                                                
45 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 285. 
46 Ibid., 209. 
 159 
new is the quintessential trait of a genius. This ability to see beyond the surface structures 
and singularities, to connect with the deeper substance of being, the greater whole, this 
awareness leaves the genius yearning for more than the everyday can provide.  
Schopenhauer considered imagination an essential feature of genius. “Thus, 
imagination broadens, as much in quality as in quantity, the genius’s field of vision beyond 
objects that are actually presented to him. This is why an uncommonly strong imagination is 
the companion – in fact the condition – of genius.”47 In a letter Wagner penned to Liszt 
months before his acquaintance with Schopenhauer’s work, he touched on many of these 
traits of genius. Wagner bluntly attempted to justify his need for extravagance as an aid in the 
daunting task of creative imagination: “I must at least help out my imagination and find 
means of encouraging my imaginative faculties. I cannot live like a dog, I cannot sleep on 
straw and drink common gin,” he continued imploring that he had an “intensely irritable, 
acute, and hugely voracious, yet uncommonly tender and delicate sensuality” one that must 
be fulfilled if he was to complete the “cruelly difficult task of creating in my mind a non-
existent world.”48 Wagner’s “delicate sensuality” needed to be fulfilled in order to fully 
utilize his genius imagination.  
Schopenhauer reasoned that genius’s dis-satisfaction with the everyday was due to an 
excess of “cognitive power” that caused them to spend the majority of their time 
contemplating “life itself” thus failing to think about the course of their own life, which they 
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would pursue “rather clumsily.”49 For Wagner this could easily be observed, as he in general 
made a mess of his education, failed at the usual channels of success, mishandled his 
finances, patrons, often his friendships, and his relations with women. However under the 
guise of genius these problematic social skills were to be considered a side effect of the “gift” 
of genius. Schopenhauer drew an opposition between the rational or abstract cognition of say 
a mathematician, and the intuitive cognition of a genius. He believed that “great genius is 
seldom paired with a preponderance of rationality; rather, the converse is generally the case 
and geniuses are often subject to violent and irrational passions.”50 This may at times make 
the genius seem rude or eccentric when dealing with so-to-speak normal individuals. As 
Schopenhauer stated, the genius, “will not think so much about the person they are speaking 
to, as to the things they are speaking about, which they bear vividly in mind: thus they will 
judge or narrate too objectively for their own good and talk about things that it would be 
shrewder not to mention, etc.51 Indeed many of Wagner’s contemporaries have attested to the 
composer’s bombastic narration of his poems, as well as his discourteous manner, ever-
shifting moods, and one-sided friendships.  
For both, Wagner and the philosopher, the primary characteristic of genius was an 
instinctual understanding and sensitivity to the deeper underlying fabric of reality. 
Schopenhauer introduced Wagner to his pessimistic vision of the underlying reality, the Will. 
The Will, never satisfied, drives us to strive for more things; as one desire is met, another 
will pop up in an endless stream of want until we die. For Wagner, prior to his acquaintance 
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with Schopenhauer, satisfaction was in itself problematic, being receptive to this force of 
constant yearning and desire was a positive gift that stoked the imagination and gave birth to 
genius. For Schopenhauer however, the Will in this regard was the cause of all suffering and 
essentially negative, one could only momentarily escape the misery through aesthetic 
contemplation. The philosopher believed that music was the most significant art form as it 
was a direct copy of the Will. Thus for Schopenhauer, “the creation of melody, the discovery 
of all the deepest secrets of human willing and sensation in it is the work of the genius,” 
whose activity comes not from conscious intention but from inspiration, for “the composer 
reveals the innermost nature of the world, and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language 
that his reason does not understand.”52 The composer/genius is guided by instinct not 
rationality in his service as mediator between the Will and the phenomenal illusions of 
everyday life. It was the job of a genius composer to use their instinctive gift of inspiration to 
convey these universal truths in a form that could be recognized and appreciated by those 
without the gift of genius, normal folk. In essence the genius’s “gift” is to give us all a 
moment of peace from the relentless needs of the Will through aesthetic contemplation.  
The genius is preoccupied with their instinctual connection to the realm beyond, this 
provided an explanation for their eccentric behaviors in everyday life thus to an extent 
alleviating genius of moral constraints. For Wagner genius was not the force of reason 
controlling his desires, but rather, the cause of them. The often difficult to understand and 
eccentric behaviors of a genius can, as Schopenhauer stated, “actually verge on madness,”53 
and he aptly observed that, “it has been frequently noted that genius and madness are two 
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sides of the same coin and blend into each other, and poetic enthusiasm has even been called 
a type of madness.”54 The philosopher recounted that in Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates stated 
that there are two types of madness, “one produced by human infirmity, the other was a 
divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.”55 Madness caused by a 
“divine release” from custom is similar to Wagner’s conception of the true artist who is able 
to shake free of mere convention or imitation of the past. However madness “produced by 
human infirmity” could just as easily be applied to explain eccentric behavior. Wagner’s 
legacy revealed that divine gifts are not without cost, as the composer’s art and behavior was 
often characterized as a result of deviancy rather than genius.56 What to friends and 
supporters could be deemed genius, to critics could, and often did condemn as madness or 
degeneracy. The essential factor as to whether Wagner was the receiver of the divine gift of 
genius or a madman was based on the earthly judgment of each individual and the verdict of 
society as a whole. The liminal position of the term genius is a place of both power and 
vulnerability. The divine gift must be socially recognized as genius and respected, or it will 
be considered madness and degraded. Thus, genius, the gift of divine madness, is a double-
edged sword, as was the case with Wagner. The liminal nature of genius had the power to 
protect Wagner from his own behavior, yet this same protection was rendered null and void 
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when the mantel of genius turned to madness for those who were not willing to recognize 
genius in a man they personally despised. 
 
Wagner’s Schopenhauerian Epiphany and a Frustrating Return to Structure 
  
 Wagner’s disillusionment with political solutions and his new Schopenhauerian 
influence came together to reveal to the composer ideas that he had always wished to give 
voice to. He now realized that it was false to believe that society was getting better, as 
cruelty, selfishness, greed, and betrayal were always a part of life and always would be. The 
idea that these negativities could be swept away and replaced by a new order based on 
Feuerbachian love, and Proudhonian self fulfillment was an illusion. These things could not 
be gained from the phenomenal world, as our existence here is fleeting and illusory. Wagner 
had already believed that what is permanent is outside space and time. However, after 
Schopenhauer’s influence he realized that the function of art could not be to unveil some 
future state of this world’s affairs or find a path towards some new socio-political system. 
The true value of art was centered outside of the empirical world, outside of finite time and 
space. Art was to be about ultimate and permanent values, of the singular infinite existence 
that connected all. In 1849 Wagner had published his essays “Art and Revolution,” and “The 
Artwork of the Future” in which he spoke of an equal unification of all the arts into a total 
artwork, Gesamtkunstwerk. However his newly acquired Schopenhauerian mindset led him 
to rethink the equality of all arts and by 1857 he was to publically recant this view. In his 
essay “On Franz Liszt’s Symphonic Poems,” he wrote: “music can never and in no possible 
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alliance cease to be the highest, the redeeming art.”57 Thus his former synthesis of the arts 
was being publicly repudiated along with his optimistic view of a future world built on 
Hellenic principles. Henceforth Wagner was going to allow music to dominate the opera 
rather than being confined to a role no more important than words or stage action. The 
external action on the stage is merely the visible representation of reality (phenomenal), 
while the real import lies in the internal, unseeable (noumenal) reality that is the music. This 
simultaneously gives expression to both the external world of social actions, as well as the 
personal internal world of desires.  
 Wagner’s Schopenhauerian hiatus resulted in the creation of Tristan and Isolde and 
halted work on the Ring itself for seven years. Nevertheless in 1862, three years before the 
premier performance of Tristan, he still continued to plan for the work and set specific 
conditions under which a special festival performance of the work would occur. Wagner 
wanted to have the event in a smaller city away from the typical urban audience, further he 
wanted it to not have the same expectations and routines that he felt ruined modern theatre. 
His descriptions were still similar to his earlier visions for the physical structure that would 
someday house the festival. The structure would be temporary with a simple amphitheater 
design. Likewise, the materials used to construct it would be no-frills wood, with auditorium 
seating and an invisible orchestra. He did not want the audience distracted by the status 
visibility of the usual presence of opera boxes, and the class level separation of traditional 
venues. Wagner’s ideal audience members would be educated, and in a relaxed atmosphere 
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away from their working lives so that they may experience the unfolding drama, and fully 
engage with the musical sound emanating from beyond. 
The composer figured that such a festival would have two possible sources of 
funding, either some kind of association or society of wealthy financiers together, or a 
singular royal patron. In the preface of his first public version of the “Ring” poem Wagner 
queried about who would give him the support he needed to complete the work, asking, 
“Will this prince be found?” Indeed a royal patron would come to the aid. Ludwig Otto 
Friedrich Wilhelm was only eighteen years old in 1864 when he ascended to the throne of 
Bavaria to become King Ludwig II. To quote Manfred Eger, author and director of the 
Richard Wagner Museum in Bayreuth, “Ludwig was pre-programmed for Wagner.”58 The 
young King had grown up surrounded by the legendry of the swan-knight. Ludwig had read 
the poem Lohengrin at thirteen and at fifteen had first witnessed Wagner’s operatic version, 
after which the young prince became obsessed with Wagner’s music. He proceeded to read 
Wagner’s other libretti as well as some of his prose works such as “The Art-work of the 
Future,” “Opera and Drama,” and “Music of the Future.”  
The new King first sought the composer out in the beginning of May 1864, after 
which he settled Wagner’s debts, and promised to aid him in his endeavors. However this 
was far from a happy ending. Wagner’s relationship with the King, much like the end result 
of his festival dreams in the creation of Bayreuth, proved both monumental and tempestuous, 
both were confounded by struggle and disappointment, yet also a continued hope and 
fascination. After their first encounter, they engaged in a series of enraptured 
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correspondence. Each professing his worship and adoration of the other, as Eger well stated, 
“both men were carried away by feelings of ideal harmony, as yet blind to each others 
failings.”59 Wagner for a time became close to the King, even so close as to become a source 
of advice in political matters. It was this unwanted source of political influence that soured 
the composer/ex-revolutionary’s already strained relations with several members of 
Ludwig’s cabinet. The situation resulted in several intrigues and issues that ultimately 
complicated both the composer’s financial backing and ultimately his relationship with the 
King.  
Despite these problems, there was however an initial plan made for a festival theater 
in Munich with the aid of Wagner’s old friend from the Dresden uprising Gottfried Semper. 
Nevertheless these elaborate and expensive plans were never fully embraced by Wagner as 
such they never came to fruition. It would seem that reality would interject many a frustration 
and obstacle onto Wagner’s path to Bayreuth. As previously discussed, the term communitas 
as a moment of anti-structural experience, best described Wagner’s highest ambition for the 
festival. However as Turner stated “life in ‘structure’ is filled with objective difficulties: 
decisions have to be made, inclinations sacrificed to the wishes and needs of the group, and 
physical and social obstacles overcome at personal cost.”60 Wagner experienced all of these 
concessions in his Bayreuth festival project. There were to be innumerable problems; the 
staging of the actual works and procuring of performers difficult and not in accordance with 
Wagner’s vision, problems in selection and construction of the actual site, and most pressing 
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constant problems in securing funds, that lead inevitably to fundamental alteration of the 
composer’s original ideal.  
The initial choice of city seemed to be the result of several circumstances. Wagner 
had recalled fond memories of traveling through Bayreuth in 1835 this led him to suggest to 
his second wife Cosima that they might select Bayreuth for a favored residence. Perhaps 
more consequential, Wagner realized that for the performance of the Ring to be as he wished 
it, it must be staged away from Munich. King Ludwig had forced a production of Das 
Rheingold in Munich in September of 1869 and in the composer’s eyes it had been a travesty. 
In a letter to Friedrich Feustel from 1871, chairman of Bayreuth’s municipal representatives, 
Wagner laid out his reasons for selecting Bayreuth, which conformed to his list of 
requirements for a proper city within which to stage his grand musical dramas.  
My reasons for choosing Bayreuth . . . as the place to carry out my plan . . . may be 
found in the demands that I have made upon such a locality. The place ought not to be 
a capital city with a permanent theatre, nor any of the more popular or larger resorts 
which especially in the summer, would attract quite the wrong sort of audience; it 
ought to be situated close to the heart of Germany, and be a Bavarian town . . . and I 
think it only right to do so in Bavaria, if I am to continue to enjoy the acts of kindness 
shown to me by the King of Bavaria. Moreover this friendly town and its environs left 
an attractive impassion upon me years ago.61 
 
Bayreuth’s city fathers were receptive to the idea of Wagner staging the festival there and 
decided relatively quickly to offer the composer a plot of land to build on free of charge. 
Despite the ease of permission there were problems from the beginning. The first site 
Wagner chose was deemed unsuitable for building, so another site was suggested, however 
the landowner’s refused to sell it, greatly frustrating the composer, finally the town 
persuaded Wagner to take a third plot of land they had recently acquired. While this all 
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progressed Wagner continued composition of the Ring. It was also during this time that the 
composer solidified the utopian ideals of his festival. Discussions between him and his young 
philologist friend Friedrich Nietzsche refined and strengthened the theoretical and spiritual 
associations between the Ring festival and the ritual performances of ancient Greek tragedies. 
  
Nietzsche, Wagner, and the Ideological Communitas of Bayreuth 
  
 Wagner first met Nietzsche on November 8, 1868.62 In a letter to his friend Erwin 
Rohde Nietzsche described the meeting, and his first impressions of Wagner.  
I am introduced to Richard, and address to him a few words of respect . . . [H]e is, 
indeed, a fabulously lively and fiery man who speaks very rapidly, is very witty, and 
makes a private party like this one an extremely gay affair. In between, I had a 
longish conversation with him about Schopenhauer; you will understand how much I 
enjoyed hearing him speak of Schopenhauer with indescribable warmth, what he 
owed to him, how he is the only philosopher who has understood the essence of 
music.63   
 
Shortly after this first exciting meeting, Nietzsche was offered a job as an assistant professor 
of philology at the University of Basel. During the break after his first semester of teaching 
he took Wagner’s invitation to visit him in Tribshen. Nietzsche often referred to his time in 
Tribschen as one of the best periods of his life, and he became a regular visitor to Wagner’s 
home there. The letters from this period idolize Wagner, the philosopher gushed that Wagner 
“shows in all his qualities such an absolute and immaculate greatness,” such an “unattainably 
noble and warm-hearted humanity,” such a “depth of seriousness” that he always felt he was 
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in the “presence of one of the century’s elect.”64 He did not replace his worship of 
Schopenhauer with Wagner; rather, he merged the two. For Nietzsche, Wagner, as man and 
as composer became the embodiment of Schopenhauer’s philosophy: “I have already written 
telling you how invaluable this genius of a man is to me, as a flesh-and-blood illustration of 
what Schopenhauer calls a genius.”65 Nietzsche was awestruck with Wagner’s charisma, as 
likewise the Wagners were at first taken with the young Nietzsche. He stayed with them 
many times, shared family events, and holidays. In a letter he wrote to his mother and sister, 
one can see the pride Nietzsche felt in being on such intimate terms with fame: “I have had 
my Christmas with the Wagners in advance,” and had “the indescribable pleasure of 
attending a Wagner concert right beside them.”66  
In his letters it becomes clear that Nietzsche loved the Wagners, and as of 1871 their 
relationship was at a high point. The two men often held long conversations on many topics 
of mutual interest, music, Schopenhauer, the decadence of the current society, and Greek 
culture. Wagner introduced Nietzsche to many of the books he had read as a youth, and 
Nietzsche studied them along with Wagner’s own writings. He was especially intrigued by 
Wagner’s idea that Greek tragedy could be reconstructed in the nineteenth century by 
substituting the orchestra for the role of the chorus. In the beginning paragraphs of “Art and 
Revolution” Wagner asserted that Greek tragedy had come about through a union of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian (as briefly discussed in Chapter 2), however he doesn’t really 
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develop the idea further. That was left to young Nietzsche, who attempted to illustrate that 
Greek tragedy did in fact developed out of music in his first book The Birth of Tragedy Out 
of the Spirit of Music, published in 1871. It was his attempt at an academic validation of 
Wagner’s written ideas. It was essentially a romantic work, heavily influenced by the ideas of 
Wagner and Schopenhauer, yet also touched on the ideas by other figures such as Hegel, and 
Schiller. A great many of the concepts considered in this book would lay the basic foundation 
on which Nietzsche’s later philosophy would be built. It essentially deals with the perceived 
problems of modern society.  
Each of the aforementioned influential figures including Nietzsche had a very similar 
characterization of late-nineteenth-century society. Modern culture was viewed as 
fragmented, without the unity and meaning that it was perceived previous societies had. 
Modern men were viewed as specialized, individualized creatures, without the ability to 
integrate or identify with the rest of society, or their own self, in a natural way. Nietzsche, 
like the others, questioned what was typical human culture, and what would be the best form 
of culture to make society whole again and create healthy individuals. His response to this 
query was in a way a typical romantic answer. He, like Wagner, examined a very idealized 
past society as the utopian solution to the present situation. Nietzsche argued that the ideal 
society would be archaic Greek (pre-ancient) society, the most powerful representation of 
that particular culture being fifth-century Attic tragedy. At this time, Nietzsche regarded 
Wagner’s musico-dramatic works as the most similar form of such tragedy. The solution for 
the philosopher was to break with the structures of the time and form a new utopian “tragic 
culture,” based and Wagnerian ideals.  
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Despite his Wagnerism, Nietzsche exerted his own distinctive perspective when 
examining the worth and meaning of life, and whether or not it is or can be justified. For 
Nietzsche the answer was essentially no, but he explained how a “tragic culture” could allow 
people to deal with this pessimistic fact in a healthy way. According to the philosopher, 
“archaic” Grecians were essentially metaphysical pessimists. He regarded the fact that 
Athenians of this period organized so much of their culture, political, and religious life 
around tragedy as evidence. They were in a way addicted to these ritualized depiction of 
destruction, where a heroic individual destroys themselves in a vain quest for self-
knowledge, the most notable of course being Oedipus. Nietzsche thought people liked 
watching tragedy because while watching ritualized self-destruction, in some deep sense they 
intuit that they are viewing the truth of the human condition, or the nature of reality itself. In 
other words, Oedipus’s fate is the fate of humanity, and perhaps oneself. People derive 
pleasure from knowing this truth, despite not being able to alter one’s inevitable dissolution 
of self (death). This idea is complicated further; on one hand, our greatest fear is usually this 
ultimate dissolution of our self through death; on the other hand, it is perhaps the ultimate 
form of pleasure. It is pleasurable in the sense that it is a return to our natural state or 
primordial unity, what we were before we came into being and what we will all eventually 
return to. In a Schopenhauerian sense, it would be the pleasurable return to our natural state 
after a short stay in the illusory world of individuality; for Nietzsche, a return to the 
Dionysian primal unity after a tiny sojourn in the Apollonian “dream” of individuality. We 
enjoy watching tragedy such as the destruction of Oedipus because deep down inside we 
realize that our own destruction would be horrible, but we would also experience it as a 
pleasurable return.  
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In Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde for example, this is why death is coupled with ecstatic 
pleasure, as a return to this eternal unity. In Nietzsche’s terms, it would be the experience of 
the “Dionysian orgiastic chorus,” or in Schopenhauer’s terms the experience of aesthetic 
contemplation. Essentially any time when one loses the sense of the differentiated individual 
self, it is just a taste of the real pleasure that one is thought to experience through genuine 
self-dissolution. So the inevitable dissolution of identity is both terrifying and gratifying at 
the same time. Likewise the knowledge that our identity is merely a brief illusion fated to be 
dissolved is both attractive yet also repugnant to us, which is why we like tragedy. In an 
Schopenhauerian sense, the paradox inherent in tragedy, the simultaneous experience of both 
pain and pleasure, is a reflection of an underlying metaphysical paradox. What most take to 
be the most real aspect of ourselves, our very individuality, is but an illusory appearance, the 
“veil of Maya” is in truth created by the non-individuated metaphysical entity, the Will: “The 
contrast between this genuine truth of nature and the cultural lie which pretends to be the 
only reality is like the contrast between the eternal core of things, the thing-in-itself, and the 
entire world of phenomena; just as tragedy, with its metaphysical solace, points to the eternal 
core of being despite the constant destruction of the phenomenal world.”67 Nietzsche thought 
that the realization of these basic truths of human reality aside from the pleasure of them 
could be terrifying to the point of revulsion. The good of tragedy is that it allows for the 
dissemination of this basic pessimistic truth about the world, however it is covered in an 
illusory appearance that makes it easier to stomach.  
In the views described here we already have all the constituent elements of a 
profound and pessimistic way of looking at the world and thus, at the same time, of 
the doctrine of the mysteries taught by tragedy: the fundamental recognition that 
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everything which exists is a unity; the view that individuation is the primal source of 
all evil; and art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation can be broken, a 
premonition of unity restored.68  
 
Tragedy begins with the music and dancing of the chorus who are in the throws of Dionysian 
intoxication. This kind of collective music making is the art form that brings us as close as 
possible to the experience of the “eternal core of things.” However, Nietzsche thought this 
Dionysian form alone would be too much to handle. Thus tragedy needed to be balanced with 
an Apollonian form of individuation Nietzsche termed semblance or schein. It is schein, the 
Apollonian aspect, which allows the crowd to watch the tragedy without becoming too 
distraught, as the true Dionysian experience would be the most intense pleasure coupled with 
the most intense pain in the same collectivity with no distinction. Tragedy itself is schein in 
that the events on stage are portrayed be actors, and the words and actions are individual 
instances of general truths. In other words, although through the performance each member 
of the audience is facing a general but existentially real truth about human life, the 
experience on stage is occurring to some particular other individual, for example Oedipus or 
rather the actor playing Oedipus. Therefore, great tragedy consists of collectively 
intoxicating Dionysian music combined with pleasing individualized Apollonian illusion. At 
the time, Nietzsche viewed Wagner’s musical dramas as a merging of the Dionysian force of 
collective intoxication revealing the truths of humanity (orchestra), merged with Apollonian 
illusion of the words and actions of heroic individuals (voice/words).  
 In Nietzsche’s view modern society had begun to realize the limits of the false 
optimistic, illusory culture in which it was submerged. This inversion of the truth had created 
the state of cultural crisis characterizing late-nineteenth-century Europe. However Nietzsche 
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did recognize that music and art had gained precedents in Europe: “What hopes must stir in 
us when we are assured by the most reliable auspices that the reverse process, the gradual 
awakening of the Dionysian spirit, is taking place in the world in which we live!”69 Nietzsche 
took revolutions in philosophy and music to be evidence that society was moving away from 
the current optimistic situation and back towards a state of affairs where a tragic culture 
would be possible. He pointed to the works of Kant and Schopenhauer in revealing the limits 
of rationalism, and showing that scientific optimism was merely an illusion. Musically, 
Nietzsche, like Wagner, regarded Beethoven as the first rediscovery of the power of 
Dionysian music. He sites Wagner’s music dramas as being the first attempt to merge this 
newly rediscovered Dionysian orchestral element with Apollonian mythic speech and 
actions.  
From the Dionysiac ground of the German spirit a power has risen up which has 
nothing in common with the original conditions of the Socratic [optimistic/rational] 
culture and which can neither be explained nor excused by these conditions; rather, 
this culture feels it to be something terrifying and inexplicable, something 
overpowering and hostile, namely German music, as we see it in the mighty brilliant 
course it has run from Bach to Beethoven, from Beethoven to Wagner.70  
 
For Nietzsche and Wagner a culture built on the celebration of such tragedy would give us 
more consolation and satisfaction, as it is closer to the truth of things than the illusion of 
scientific or political optimism or religion. Nietzsche stated that “only as an aesthetic 
phenomena can the world be justified.”71 For him, this is the only way that the world is at all 
justifiable, and why life could be possibly be worth living despite the miserable truth. What 
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he meant by “aesthetic” is that the world is essentially a place of irrational occurrences. 
Things do not happen according to some overarching principle that we can understand, or 
some divine plan, they are neither good or bad, things just happen, creation and destruction. 
This is life, this is all we have, and Nietzsche felt we should embrace it fully.72 
Nietzsche’s pessimistic view is based on recognition of the truth of existence, coupled 
with an appreciation of this existence. The tragic experience (realization of pessimistic truth) 
should not destroy one’s enthusiasm for life but should affirm it. In the preface to the second 
edition of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche reviews his earlier thoughts on pessimism. He 
finds that it was over-simplified, and that there are in fact different types of pessimism. 
Pessimism can be either a strong or weak form depending on whether it negates this world, 
or affirms it. Nietzsche viewed both Schopenhauer and Christianity as weak forms, as they 
both negate this world albeit in opposite ways. Schopenhauer believed the underlying reality 
was the Will, and that the Will should be denied/negated; Christianity believed that God was 
the underlying reality, and that God should be embraced/affirmed. These differences, 
however, were irrelevant for Nietzsche. It was the relation to the everyday world that 
mattered, and to him both of these forms negate this world and thus life itself. Nietzsche was 
of the belief that since we must live in a world of illusion, we should at least choose illusions 
that give us a glimpse at truth and still that affirm life.  
Of all the insights Nietzsche’s book presents, probably the most far reaching is the 
concept of the “Dionysian,” the notion that a primal and irrational force resides in all of us, 
and it should not be denied. The pleasure we take in this force, the impulses it creates, are a 
part of human nature and as such cannot be destroyed, fully controlled, or repressed. Failure 
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to recognize this Dionysian/irrational part of humanity is what created the sickness inherent 
in modern society and simply ensured that these forces would eventually assert themselves in 
a far worse ways. A successful culture provides a structure that allows individuals to 
negotiate these impulses in a healthy way. Nietzsche and Wagner suggested that a tragic 
culture would achieve this.  
 Despite the book’s negative feedback amongst Nietzsche’s academic peers, Wagner 
was enthusiastic about it and it seemed to have brought he and the budding philosopher 
closer together. In a letter to an old friend Nietzsche wrote: “I have made an alliance with 
Wagner. You cannot imagine how close we are now, and how are plans coincide.”73 
Nietzsche seemed to have had an idealistic dream, to be in his young adult stage of optimism 
when he wrote to his friend Erwin Rohde,  
even if we do not find many people to share our views, I still believe that we can 
fairly—not without loses, of course—pull ourselves up out of this stream, and that we 
shall reach an island on which we shall not need to stop our ears with wax any more. 
Then we shall be teachers to each other; our books will be merely fishhooks for 
catching people into our monastic and artistic community. We shall love, work, enjoy 
for each other—perhaps this is the only way in which we can work for the whole.74  
 
This utopian haze lingered over young Friedrich until he realized he was merely clumped in 
with the rest of the Wagnerians, at which point the haze began to clear. In another letter to 
Rohde he wrote “I am told that Nationalzeitung recently had the cheek to count me among 
‘Wagner’s literary lackeys.”75 This definitely fanned the embers of Nietzsche’s desire to 
exert his own independent self, and he had to rebel if he was ever to gain independence from 
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Schopenhauer’s all-encompassing philosophy and Wagner’s all-encompassing personality. 
Further, Wagner had never really recognized genius in Nietzsche; hence, this one sided lack 
of validation was quite a psychological point of contention for the philosopher. Wagner had 
never finished his academic studies, and was flattered and to have a young member of 
academic circles around to validate his work. Further, Nietzsche was somewhat of a kindred 
spirit to him and provided the composer with some of the best conversations on topics of 
their shared interest. The loss of their friendship was deeply felt by both. Years later at the 
Bayreuth festival in 1882 Wagner said to Nietzsche’s sister Elizabeth, “tell your brother, ever 
since he went away from me, I have been alone.”76  
 The split between them began slowly and quietly at first, as the philosopher began to 
excuse himself from Wagner’s invitations. To his other friends he began speaking of Wagner 
with sarcastic tone, which slowly became meaner. In the beginning he was more than happy 
(and proud) to run errands or do favors for the Wagners, now he wanted to avoid being used 
by them. One of the last requests Nietzsche accepted was to write an “appeal to the German 
people” on behalf of the patron of Wagner’s Bayreuth project. The last of Nietzsche’s 
“Untimely Meditations” was entitled, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth.” In this piece Nietzsche 
was still writing from the perspective of a devoted friend, but this familiarity and the 
perceptive nature of Nietzsche’s comments cut a little to close to home for Wagner. 
Nietzsche did however bestow a great deal of praise, referring to Tristan and Isolde as being 
“the actual opus metaphysicum of all art.”77 Nietzsche was very perceptive in his conceptual 
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understanding of Wagner’s art but also spoke some painful truths about his former friend’s 
life and personality. It was obvious that a level of passive-aggression had crept into his 
words. It was to be the first written trickle of the philosopher’s sense of idealistic betrayal, 
one that would eventually gush in his latter works.  
Nietzsche would later comment critically on the divide between the reality of the 
Bayreuth festival and the idealistic possibilities that had initially been envisioned. Even if 
Wagner’s music did in some way elicit a form of spontaneous communitas that served to 
inspire a tragic culture, as both he an Nietzsche believed; as Turner astutely observed that it 
was, “the fate of all spontaneous communitas in history to undergo what most people see as a 
‘decline and fall’ into structure and law.”78 This observation led Turner to differentiate 
between what he termed spontaneous or existential communitas, normative, and ideological. 
Normative communitas refers to any attempt at structuring what is otherwise an existential 
event; such an aim would occur over time when there became a “need to mobilize and 
organize resources” which in turn required “social control among members of the group in 
pursuance” of such endeavors. Turner believed that when the experience of communitas 
became subject to any forms of structural organization, the purity of this spontaneous anti-
structural event had already been pushed into the realm of structure. When individuals create 
various utopian models of society based on achieving the experience of existential 
communitas Turner referred to it as ideological communitas. In the anthropologist’s words, 
“it is at once an attempt to describe the external and visible effects—the outward form . . . of 
an inward experience of existential communitas, and to spell out the optimal social 
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conditions under which such experiences might be expected to flourish and multiply.”79 This 
is exactly the kind of situation that Wagner had been describing in his Zurich essays. It was 
also to be the kind of utopic thinking that he and his young professor and friend Nietzsche 
had initially been engaged in, which is why the philosopher felt what he took to be a later 
ideological betrayal so deeply.  
Nietzsche clung on as a friend to Wagner through the tough years of getting Bayreuth 
built. He still believed in the idealism of the project and its aim to revolutionize society 
through art. Therefore, he attended the inauguration and world premier of the Ring in August 
1876. Moreover, he was also at Wagner’s home for the receptions held for the patrons. From 
statements he makes in Ecce Homo however, he was far from pleased. It seems that the 
schein was wearing off.  
The beginnings of this book belong in the middle of the first Bayreuth festival; it 
presupposes a deep sense of alienation from everything around me there. Anyone 
who knows the sort of visions I was already having can guess what I felt when I woke 
up in Bayreuth one day. Just like a dream . . . And where was I? I did not recognize 
anything, I hardly recognized Wagner. I sifted through my memories in vain. 
Tribschen—a distant island of blissfulness: not a shadow of similarity. The 
incomparable days when the cornerstone was laid, the small society of people who 
belonged there, who celebrated, and who already had fingers for delicate matters: not 
a shadow of similarity. What had happened?—Wagner had been translated into 
German! The Wagnerians had gained control over Wagner!80 
 
The worst thing for Nietzsche was to watch Wagner catering to all this. Playing up to rich 
patrons and giving attention to people paying to see his work as if they meant something to 
him, and ignoring his friend Friedrich. To be fair, Wagner had struggled for years to see his 
works performed and to get Bayreuth built. Bayreuth, to Wagner and to those helping him at 
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the practical level, was more than just an idealistic vision of cultural and political 
revitalization. It was, to quote musicologist Hans Mayer, “a financial enterprise, a problem of 
organization of a highly unusual kind, and last but not least, a project of publicity and 
propaganda. This did not seem to concern Friedrich Nietzsche.”81 The philosopher felt deeply 
hurt by Wagner’s neglect and even more so by the idealistic betrayal. Nietzsche felt Wagner 
had denied everything they had believed. Rather than a meeting place for a subversive elite 
set of intellectuals meaning to improve society, he saw a bunch of wealthy ignorant 
aristocrats and phonies. These realizations made him very upset indeed. He wrote his sister, 
“I have had enough of it all! I do not want to even be at the first performance—but 
somewhere else, anywhere but here, where it is nothing but torment for me.”82 He dragged 
himself to the first cycle but sold his tickets for the second and left. As the philosopher noted, 
these mere admirers of Wagner’s music became Wagnerites, and their movement Wagnerism 
developed its own separate identity, simplified Wagner’s ideals, and created rituals that to 
some extent became disconnected from the composer who inspired them. Furthermore, the 
problematic realities inherent in the facilitation of a large-scale structural event resulted in 
the formation of a gap between the result and the initial conceptual ideal that inspired it. In 
the case of Bayreuth it continually involved the financial sustainability and viability of the 
festival.  
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Structural Pains: The Financial Struggles of Bayreuth 
  
 At the beginning of the Bayreuth endeavor support came from numerous channels: 
the first Richard Wagner Society founded in Mannheim offered their full backing, and the 
Committee of Management which took charge of festival fund allocation included several 
prominent members of the Bayreuth community including the Mayor, Theodor Muncker. By 
early 1872, a patronage plan had been conceived for the festival. The goal was to sell 1000 
certificates for a price of 300 thalers83 each in return for guaranteed seats to all performances. 
The symbolic foundation stone of the festival theatre was laid on Wagner’s fifty-ninth 
birthday, May 22, 1872. He and his family had left their house in Tribschen the month before 
and had settled permanently in Bayreuth. During the intermittent period Wagner continued 
his composition of Götterdämmerung, while at the same time maintaining and exhaustive 
regiment of correspondence and traveling around Europe giving concerts and soliciting 
potential patrons and benefactors. Further he was also overseeing matters of technical 
direction, allocating performers, and making artistic decisions along with administrative 
ones, all time-consuming and frustrating tasks.  
Wagner realized the intense amount of labor involved in making this festival a reality, 
conceding to Cosima “what tremendous will power I need for my enterprise, yet inwardly 
how finished with life I am!”84 By August 1873, only a third of the patrons’ certificates had 
been sold, creating considerable financial worry. Wagner attempted to plead his case for the 
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necessity of his festival as a form of revitalization for the German people to Otto von 
Bismarck, sending a copy of his essay The Stage Festival Theatre in Bayreuth, however the 
prince did not even acknowledge the letter. Adding to the insult, King Ludwig II also ignored 
Wagner’s request for some form of financial assurance. Representatives from various 
Wagner societies sent out a formal call to the whole of Germany to support the endeavor, 
which turned out to be a dismal failure. At this point construction was halted on the project 
and the composer feared that it would be a ruin. Desperate, Wagner even attempted to spin 
the significance of the festival, he wrote an appeal to Kaiser Wilhelm I asking that he 
consider the 1876 festival as a five year celebration of the 1871 peace treaty signed with 
France, and as such reserve 100,000 thalers toward the event. This request came to nothing. 
Wagner then had a plan to present the theater to the town of Bayreuth. Finally, just before 
this occurred, January 1874, Ludwig conceded and advanced the stressed composer the 
100,000 thalers he needed, however it was agreed that it was to be repaid through the money 
they received from patrons certificate sales. 
While finishing Götterdämmerung as he was going through this financial struggle, 
Wagner complained to Cosima about the futility he was feeling. She wrote in her diary that 
she discovered her husband “utterly depressed,” and that he busted out in earnest: “What is 
the point of all this hard work with which I have burdened myself and which will only be 
abused? Who cares about it? What encouragement have I for working it all out so laboriously 
except the thought that it might be enjoyed? It is madness—where am I supposed to get the 
strength?”85   
The first rehearsals commenced in the still unfinished festival theater in 1875. By the 
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end of that year Wagner learned that Bismarck had prevented a loan of 30,000 thalers that 
Kaiser Wilhelm was considering giving him. The loss of this money and the fact that most of 
the patrons’ certificates had not been purchased caused more financial strife for Wagner. This 
lack of funding was to result in a pivotal change in the ideal of the original concept that the 
festival be free of charge. Despite all the financial woes, the Wagners had previously still 
reserved 500 free seats. Notwithstanding, reality left them with little choice but to reduce that 
number to fifty and charge for the rest of the seats. In the face of all these difficulties, the 
first Bayreuth Festival still occurred August 13, 1876. Two emperors were in attendance, 
Kaiser Wilhelm and Dom Pedro II of Brazil, and Wagner felt honored. However, artistically 
he was extremely disappointed and even embarrassed, as there were numerous performance-
related issues to be addressed. Cosmia wrote, “Costumes, scenery, everything must be done 
anew for the repeat performances. R. is very sad, says he wishes he could die!”86 Critics took 
these early missteps as an opportunity to belittle the event in every way, and the general 
public came and went from the event without much ado. These early reactions crushed 
Wagner. To make matters worse the festival had ended in a 150,000-mark deficit that was 
Wagner’s sole responsibility.87 Again he tried to appeal to his estranged patron King Ludwig 
II, suggesting the festival theatre and its properties to be given over to Bavaria or the German 
Reich, after which they would pay an annual 100,000 marks, which would allow 500 or 600 
seats to be given away free to those who could not afford them. This suggestion was ignored. 
He then sent a paper out to patrons to ask for donations toward the debt; only one person 
responded.  
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At this point Wagner considered declaring the festival bankrupt and auctioning off his 
house Wahnfried to the highest bidder to settle the debts. It seemed he was fed up with the 
continued fight, as Cosima wrote in the spring of 1877, “R. says how sad it is that he has now 
reached the stage of wishing to hear nothing more about the Ring des Nibelungen and 
wishing the theatre would go up in flames.”88 The Wagners took great efforts to reduce the 
debt: the composer gave concerts in London, which earned a small amount, Cosima gave up 
her 40,000-mark inheritance, and they even considered emigration to America. Wagner, no 
stranger to humbling himself in times of financial strife, even suggested giving the Bayreuth 
staging of the Ring to the Court Theatre in Munich, the very place he initially sought to keep 
it from. In the fall of 1877 a new Society of Patrons was formed and Wagner pitched his 
plans of staging all his works there between 1878 and 1883, thus he began to train and 
prepare singers, musicians, and conductors. All of his endeavors seemed to go nowhere, and 
the theatre at Bayreuth sat empty, all rehearsals and practices canceled. Seeing the 
abandonment of his vision took a toll on the 64-year-old composer, exacerbating and already 
existing heart condition.  
The continued stress and struggle caused him to lose any faith he had in his earlier 
ideals for the project. Yet again, Ludwig finally gave in and granted an exhausted Wagner 
the remaining 100,000 to cover the deficit as an interest-bearing loan, which needed to be 
paid back out of the royalties of performances of the operas in Munich. In spite of all the 
strife, or maybe as a way out of it, Wagner worked on Parsifal from 1877-9. The composer 
called the work ein Bühnenweihfestspiel (a festival play for the consecration of the stage). 
Wagner saw Parsifal as a way to legitimate Bayreuth as a sacred place.  
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The work itself was a symbolic drama about redemption and compassion, the unity of 
all life told through myth and analogies of Christianity. He maintained that such a work could 
not be performed in a vulgar opera house along with the usual repertoire. Wagner created a 
quasi-religious and mystical aura for Parsifal, both in its composition and in his promotion of 
it. In turn this gave a temple-like significance to the failing Bayreuth Theater project. Parsifal 
as a sacred work required a sacred place with which to be performed, ritually, forever. 
Wagner wrote a letter to the King describing these ideas, and the King, perhaps swept away 
in the mysticism, agreed to sponsor the next Bayreuth festival. Wagner finished the score in 
January of 1882, and began preparing for the summer performances, which went much better 
than the inaugural 1876 year. However much to the composer’s chagrin he had needed to 
open all the performances except the first, which was reserved for patrons, to the ticket 
buying public. At the end of 1879, Wagner could no longer stomach the sight of his Bayreuth 
Theater empty and quiet; his hard fought vision so shortly lived. Thus he and his family 
traveled to Italy and stayed there till late summer, then slowly made their way back finally 
returning to Bayreuth in mid November 1880.  
 While Wagner was away, he continued the instrumentation of Parsifal and more 
importantly, did what he had done thirty years before while desperate and hopeless as a 
newly exiled being. The composer took to pen and began to write. He crafted several new 
documents beginning with “Religion and Art.” These essays reveal the evolution of his belief 
in himself and society, as well as his vision for his art, which became exemplified in Parsifal. 
This last trove of Wagner’s writings seemed to be a conscious attempt to sell the composition 
(Parsifal) to King Ludwig II and to the public as a sacred work, to save his Bayreuth vision 
and place himself firmly as the poet-priest of a larger ideal. This position would in turn serve 
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to save his identity and eradicate the failures and difficulties that the Bayreuth undertaking 
had involved. It would extricate the flaws in Wagner’s vision by placing the blame firmly on 
the lack of support of his would be followers and the flaws inherent modern German society 
as a whole. However at this juncture the position would be that of an outsider rather than that 
of an exile in a liminal position awaiting return to structure, or as a genius with the ability to 
bridge the ordinary to the extraordinary. As Turner differentiated, “liminality represents the 
midpoint of transition in a status-sequence between two positions,” whereas “outsiderhood 
refers to actions and relationships that do not flow from a recognized social status but 
originate outside it . . . such outsiders would include, in various cultures, shamans, diviners, 
mediums, and priests.”89 As poet-priest of an art-religion Wagner would become removed 
from structure, his power not reliant on the status incumbencies of societal structure, but 
ordained from beyond. Almost immediately after he returned to Bayreuth, Wagner penned a 
supplement to “Religion and Art,” entitled “What Boots this Knowledge?” followed by 
“Know Thyself,” written in the early part of 1881. In “What Boots,” Wagner announced the 
targeted resumption of Bayreuth stage festival performances in 1882.  
During this year Wagner was busy with the arrangements for his projected 1882 
festival return and had a hand in all elements, from selecting principle singers and choosing 
scenery, to overseeing staging and rehearsals. In early fall of that same year his essay 
“Herodom and Christendom” was published and he began instrumentation of the third act of 
Parsifal while at Bayreuth. Wagner finished the work in January of 1882 while in Palermo 
Italy. He then returned to Bayreuth that summer for the last time to premier his final work. 
Despite the fact that Wagner had a porch specially built for his Royal Highness, King 
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Ludwig II failed to attend either the premier of the work or the subsequent fifteen 
performances after, which saddened the composer greatly. Although Wagner was fairly 
satisfied with the performances, he was not quite as sure of the audience’s impression. 
Ironically, this was due to a request made of the audience to hold their applause, as to add to 
the sacred nature of the work.  
Directly after the festival Wagner returned to Italy, this time to Venice, in a rented 
suit of apartments along the Grand Canal, this is where he was to take his final breath on 
February 13, 1883. Six months before his death, Wagner responded to Leipzig opera director 
Angelo Neumann’s request to include Parsifal in performances at his theater by stating that, 
“Parsifal can only ever be part of what I have created in Bayreuth.” The composer went on to 
explain: “my festival theater there will present this one work alone in a production that is to 
be repeated there year after year. This isolation is conditioned by the whole conception of the 
subject itself.”90 Wagner realized that the initial ideal of his Bayreuth vision was dependent 
on more than the same superfluous events that take place in the average opera house. The 
composer wanted more, he wanted a sacred ritual event. Pragmatically he also knew that this 
work would either save or sink the whole festival endeavor. This led him in the same letter to 
maintain that, “my Bayreuth creation stands or falls with Parsifal.” Wagner was also 
concerned with how the work represented his legacy by saying: “of course, this creation will 
pass away with my death, for I know of no one, now or in the future, who could continue my 
work in the spirit of its creator.”91 He had taken pains to create a legacy for himself and to 
promote his festival, his identity and his works. His legitimacy had always rested on his 
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somewhat argued claim towards authority, either as a composer, rather than a dilettante, as a 
philosopher, rather than a quasi-metaphysician or more importantly as a true German artist. 
His power was an authority gained through the strategic use of liminal and outsider positions 
best explained with the Weberian concept of charisma.  
 
Wagner’s Charismatic Authority: The Liminal Over the Liminoid 
  
 Charisma refers to a quality of leadership that appeals to non-rational motives. Max 
Weber explained, “the concept of ‘charisma’ (the gift of grace) was taken from the 
vocabulary of early Christianity.”92 The term charisma then,  
could be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he 
is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or 
. . . exceptional powers or qualities . . . not accessible to the ordinary person, but are 
regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual 
concerned is treated as a ‘leader.’93 
 
Weber continued on to say that in some circumstances this “peculiar kind of quality” was 
thought of as “resting on magical powers, whether of prophets, persons with a reputation for 
therapeutic or legal wisdom, leaders in the hunt, or heroes in war.” Further the sociologist 
believed that “how the quality . . . would be ultimately judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or 
other such point of view” would be “entirely indifferent for purposes of definition.”94 This 
would allow one to examine such historical figures as Wagner, Jesus Christ, and even Adolf 
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Hitler as all exhibiting the same definitive characteristics of charismatic leadership/authority, 
while leaving the realm of value judgments separate.  
Weber thought the most important factor was how the individual was “actually 
regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples.’”95 Thus 
although the magical or extraordinary power characteristic of charisma was thought to be 
endowed from sources beyond the structural realm, the power of the charismatic individual 
within that realm was entirely dependent on the strength of the belief of their followers. 
Therefore the faith of their followers was both a potential source of power and weakness. 
Wagner had come to experience both in his Bayreuth struggles, which is why he attempted to 
structure his own art-religion complete with a final call to the faithful in his Parsifal in hopes 
of strengthening his authority and legitimizing his festival and his future legacy.   
 Wagner’s earlier ambition was to be a part of a mass revolution that would change 
society; increased status, prestige, moral freedom, and monetary gains were some outcomes 
he was hoping for. However, after the failure of such a revolution, he found himself in a 
place outside of his former society, as an exile in a new liminal position, but not the one he 
had hoped for. He began to imagine his own society of the future through his writings, and 
began placing himself in a position of liminality, as a genius. Wagner’s concept of genius, as 
an individual that was more in tune with the non-rational being of the universe, was akin to 
Weber’s characterization of the charismatic individual. To quote sociologists Charles Wright 
Mills and Hans Gerth, “Weber’s conception of the charismatic leader is in continuity with the 
concept of ‘genius’ as it was applied since the Renaissance to artistic and intellectual 
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leaders.”96 Weber’s genius was an exceptional man who exceeded the limits of everyday 
routine. In this way Wagner attempted to legitimize himself. Wagner’s definition of genius, 
and his subsequent application of the term to himself, as well as his Schopenhauerian 
inspired role of genius composer, was a strategic act directed towards his potential 
followers/audience. As Weber maintains, “it is recognition on the part of those subject to 
authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma.”97 Thus others recognition of his 
genius secured his validity as a composer and was the most necessary part of Wagner’s 
attempt at legitimation.  
To Weber, it was not just the leader’s extraordinary acts, miracles, or feats that 
legitimated his authority, but “the conception that it is the duty of those subject to charismatic 
authority to recognize its genuineness and to act accordingly. Psychologically this 
recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising 
out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.”98 Wagner did indeed subject his readers and his 
associates to this kind of scrutiny. He behaved and worded his writings in such a way that 
those who disagreed were either less than German, materialistic, or their art or personage was 
somehow fundamentally lacking. To show devotion was to recognize the master’s genius, 
then and only then could one also experience his gift. However, as discussed earlier, genius 
as a liminal figure can easily be disputed and turned into madness, as Wagner’s harsher 
critics revealed. His further financial struggles, loss of support from the former faithful, and 
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failure to solidify the viability of his Bayreuth enterprise, regardless of how monumental a 
feat it was, left the composer with little choice but to reposition himself again. This time his 
writings imagined an art-religion and positioned himself in a role beyond the instabilities of 
structure as poet-priest of Bayreuth. He himself as charismatic individual would lead an art 
movement of symbolic rejuvenation that would refresh religion and revitalize society. Weber 
observed that, “the bearers of charisma, the oracles of prophets . . . alone could integrate 
‘new’ laws into the circle of what was upheld by tradition.”99 Likewise Wagner was 
altogether able to introduce new uses of chromaticism into his musical works, introduce an 
influential stance on the unification of all arts, and latter combine art-religion into a new 
cultural revivalist theory.  
 Weber’s philosophical view of historical theory was built upon a balance between 
such charismatic movements, which could consist of both leaders and ideas, and rational 
routinization which included long lasting institutions of societal organization, and economic 
and material systems and interests. Rationalization was an important element in Weber’s 
concept of history. Weber believed in what Schiller had termed the de-divination of the 
world, which Weber then translated as the disenchantment of the world. For the sociologist, 
the building of institutional structures implied an increase in secular rationalization. However 
“the extent and direction of ‘rationalization’ is thus measured negatively in terms of the 
degree to which magical elements of thought are displaced, or positively by the extent to 
which ideas gain in systematic coherence and naturalistic consistency.”100 The process of 
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rationalization is interspersed by historical breaks when the normal structural institutions and 
usual forms of life become inadequate in “mastering a growing state of tension, stress, or 
suffering.”101  
Weber introduced the concept of charisma as a balancing factor against the 
inadequacies of such bureaucratic structures, in other words, as a way to reintroduce magic or 
enchantment back into a bleak world. The charismatic individual is usually at odds with the 
normal structures of society. Through their liminal position both as a member of that society 
yet outside normal organizational structures, the charismatic leader is able to present a new 
vision to potential followers who are also oppressed by the bureaucratic status quo. Thus the 
charismatic leader may be a revolutionary. Weber stated that “charisma, in its most potent 
forms, disrupts rational rule as well as tradition altogether and overturns all notions of 
sanctity . . . in this purely empirical and value-free sense charisma is indeed the specifically 
creative revolutionary force of history.”102 The charismatic individual sounds remarkably 
similar to Wagner’s notion of a true artist, who is also at odds with the society in which they 
function, therefore a revolutionary.  
Weber further observed that historically, “revolution typically developed into 
associations of notables . . . after they had passed through a period of charismatic excitement 
that broke down class and status barriers in favor of one or several heroes.”103 Wagner 
himself took part in revolutionary endeavors with several “notables” and became a mythic 
hero in some sense. This breaking down of class and status barriers toward a universal 
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brotherhood, or as Turner would term it communitas is what the composer was conceiving 
of. The anthropologist likewise noted that the numerous traits that such charismatic 
“movements share with the liminal situation in traditional ritual systems suggest that these 
movements too have a liminal quality.” However unlike normal instances of liminal events, 
such movements are not institutionalized or preordained, instead they often occur in times of 
radical change.104 This was very much the case with Wagner, the philosophical ideas that 
shaped his initial Zurich essays were gleaned from his Young German cohorts at a time of 
economic disparity, class disdain and political revolution.  
Wagner struggled to give these ideals legitimacy, at first through socio-political 
changes however after this avenue failed the composer retreated and soon found the 
metaphysical realm of Schopenhauer and altered his original vision. The construction of 
Bayreuth seemed to complete that vision, the culmination of years of effort. In reality it was 
only to be marred by financial failure and a struggle for legitimacy. However as Turner 
noted, “religion and ritual . . . often sustain the legitimacy of social and political systems or 
provide symbols on which that legitimacy is most vitally expressed.” Wagner understood 
this. Further, he cultivated a realization that there was power in a position outside of 
structure. This led the composer to call on his Schopenhauerian faith toward a merging of art 
and religion. Art would serve to refresh the true meaning of the stale symbols of religion and 
revitalize its connection with humanity. This resulted in his last musical work Parsifal, as 
well as his last essays, most notably “Religion and Art.” Turner had observed that when “the 
legitimacy of cardinal social relations is impugned,” as in a failed or declining political 
system, “the ritual symbolic system too which has come to reinforce such relations ceases to 
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convince.”105  
This is precisely what Wagner argued in “Religion and Art,” that due to the 
materialistic state of society, the symbols of the Christian religion which began based on 
compassion had become controlled by agencies of power and monetary authority distorting 
and veiling the true original meaning of the symbols. This resulted in a religion that could no 
longer facilitate a society built on compassion, but was consequently stuck in the limbo of a 
corrupt economic situation. Wagner and his festival seemed to also be caught in such a limbo 
at the time of writing this essay. As Turner deduced “it is in this limbo of structure that 
religious movements, led by charismatic prophets, powerfully reassert the values of 
communitas.”106 In his writings Wagner, as prophet, also asserted the power of communitas, 
eventually reaching what appeared to be the realization of his vision with the founding of the 
Bayreuth festival grounds. However, as Turner observed, once such a movement “attains its 
apogee and loses its impetus . . .the spontaneous forms of communitas are converted into 
institutionalized structure, or become routinized, often as ritual.”107  
Indeed, Wagner’s initial vision of his ultimate festival space, within which to provide 
the optimal condition necessary to facilitate communitas needed to be altered to fit the 
economic and bureaucratic circumstances. Thus despite his personal efforts and struggle, 
structural, economic systems, and the pragmatic concerns of reality turned his early Bayreuth 
idealism into a shell of its former self. Wagner was unable to muster the most important 
support he needed from his followers, financial assistance. As Weber stated, “the 
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effectiveness of charisma rests on the faith of the ruled, their approval of the designated 
successor is indispensable.”108 As Wagner was to discover, his friends’ faith in his vision and 
himself was requisite for the continued success of his enterprise. The liminal position he 
placed himself in as a charismatic leader drew as many detractors as it did backers, and when 
it came down to the fulfillment of material needs, far more skepticism than faith. The 
composer found himself in a position he was all too familiar with, the solution he turned was 
a familiar one as well. Wagner needed to return to a place of power he had been familiar with 
in many permutations throughout his life; a liminal place removed from the constrictions and 
responsibilities of societal structures and status roles. However this time rather than inhabit a 
liminal position with hope of reintegration into an revitalized society, he would assume the 
position of an outsider, as he would not be returning to either a changed society, or as a 
changed being. Wagner was to put himself in the place of a mediator between the sacred and 
the profane, the illusions of everyday and realty of the infinite.  
Through his late writings and promotion of the work Parsifal Wagner attempted to 
strategically place himself in such an advantageous position, instead of earthly genius 
composer, as an agent of the sacred, the role of an outsider. The composer attempted to 
assume the role of poet-priest/master of the temple of Bayreuth, to solidify his ideals, and his 
work Parsifal as a sacred and repeated ritual occurrence. Despite his fears of who would 
continue the endeavor in his spirit after his demise, his Wagnerites helped to cement his 
legacy and myth long after he was gone. As Turner noted, when this kind of ritualization 
occurs the prophet and his followers actually become a “behavioral model to be represented 
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in stereotyped and . . . selected form.”109 Turner further assessed that, “the historical deeds of 
the prophet and his closest companions become a sacred history, impregnated with the 
mythical elements so typical of liminality.” This became true to an extent as Wagner worked 
very hard at the imagination of his own myth and legacy through strategic placement of 
himself and his works. Turner further observed that in ritual structure “both the deeds of the 
founder and his visions and messages achieve crystallization in the symbolic objects and 
activities of cyclical and repetitive rituals.”110 For Wagner, Parsifal would serve to 
consecrate Bayreuth, it would only take place there, leaving followers to make the pilgrimage 
to pay homage and be a part of the unifying power of the service/performance. As Turner 
noted “pilgrimages are liminal phenomena . . . they also exhibit in their social relations the 
quality of communitas.”111  
The composer believed that the music itself would serve to refresh ritual symbols, and 
revitalize them by reconnecting humanity with the deep level of conscious reality. This 
connection was exemplified in the trait of compassion. As he stated in the beginning of his 
essay “Religion and Art,” “Where Religion becomes artificial, it is reserved for Art to save 
the spirit of religion by recognizing the figurative value of the mythic symbols which the 
former would have us believe in their literal sense, and revealing their deep and hidden truth 
through an ideal presentation.”112 This “ideal presentation” Wagner speaks of, was music, 
and not just any music, his own musico-dramatic works. Wagner maintained that we must,  
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[k]eep our senses open to the mediator of the crushingly sublime, and let ourselves be 
gently led to reconcilement with this mortal life by the artistic teller of the great 
World-tragedy. This Poet priest, the only one who never lied, was ever sent to 
humankind at epochs of its direst error, as mediating friend: us, too, will he lead over 
to that reborn life, to set before us there in ideal truth the ‘likeness’ of this passing 
show, when the historian’s realistic lie shall have long since been interred beneath the 
mouldering archives of our civilization.113  
 
 The type of rejuvenation that Wagner was seeking now was not based on a 
revolutionary reordering of society as he was seeking in his Zurich writings. Now he was 
writing about a regeneration of what he took to be the original meanings behind one of the 
main ordering forces of society, religion. It was a more conservative approach, more a 
revitalization of the status quo that would hopefully lead to a more respectful position for the 
poet-priest who led the way. The differences of these two forms of revitalization are 
discussed by Turner; Wagner’s writings and vision for Bayreuth in many ways are at odds 
with the reality that occurred. In this way the Bayreuth enterprise seems to be a nexus of both 
what Turner would deem a liminal, and a liminoid situation. 
 The anthropologist attempted to illustrate the differences between liminal situations 
which he believed evolved historically earlier than liminoid situations, he took the latter to be 
a result of post-industrialization, as labor time and leisure time became oppositional entities. 
As Turner observed, “one works at the liminal, one plays with the liminoid.”114 However, he 
maintained that liminal situations still do exist in post-industrial societies alongside the 
liminoid, although they are rare and often reduced from their original form. For example the 
initiation rights of fraternities or masonic orders have been reduced down conceptually from 
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their original notion, the initiation of the neophyte to a new status, a rite of passage. Turner’s 
examples of liminoid phenomena on the other hand, were “leisure genres of art, sport, 
pastimes, games, etc.”115 Therefore liminal situations are usually considered obligatory and 
dependent on already established symbolic knowledge and are dependent on greater societal 
recognition. Whereas liminoid situations are considered a matter of choice, and are usually 
not dependent on already established symbols, they usually create their own forms and 
depend on recognition usually only by small groups, or sects. The liminoid can be removed 
from the basic process of rites of passage, and can also be individualized. As Turner explains, 
“the solitary artist creates the liminoid phenomena, the collectivity experiences collective 
liminal symbols.”116 Likewise, Wagner as solitary artist, struggled, pushed, and shoved his 
festival at Bayreuth from vision to reality alone.  
The conflict in Wagner’s Bayreuth could be that it sits between both the concept of 
the liminal and the liminoid. Wagner’s original vision was of a free festival, one that was on 
par with a liminal religious ritual, an event in which the entire community would participate, 
to be rejuvenated and re-enter normal structure with a refreshed mindset of connection and 
compassion. However various structural problems rendered Bayreuth more a liminoid genre. 
As Turner stated, “the liminoid is more like a commodity—indeed, often is a commodity, 
which one selects and pays for.”117 Bayreuth turned from a free festival open to all, to a paid 
experience for wealthy educated elites. Liminal events, Turner noted, are often a result of a 
collective crisis or social process, often “enforced by socio-cultural ‘necessity’ . . . but 
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contain the ‘freedom’ and the potentiality for the formation of new ideas, symbols, models, 
beliefs.” Therefore liminal phenomena tend to be more conservative and renew already 
established symbols, and reinforce the usual status roles and recognized structures. However 
liminal phenomena also contain the potential for change or creative possibilities that are 
outside or beyond the status quo. This seemed to have been the kind of conservative socio-
cultural situation that provoked Wagner’s late concept of the festival, as opposed to his early 
days as a naïve revolutionary. Liminoid genres, on the other hand, are usually revolutionary 
and seek to create a new set of social structures and status roles, which are not yet recognized 
by greater society. That is why liminoid genres are usually the product of a smaller interest 
group or are “characteristically individual products,” thought they may have mass effects.118 
Turner further stated that they often are “assigned to ‘leisure’ activities,” rather than activities 
that elicit greater social duties or awareness. He noted that current liminally-based 
phenomena would for example include the activities of churches or religious based sects, 
however ‘liminoid’ phenomena would include concerts, or other entertainment events of 
choice rather than moral or social obligation.119  
As German society had shifted from the revolutionary state it had been into a more 
stable period, Wagner’s creation of Bayreuth, which initially came more from his own 
individual ideals, and those of the young German movement, seemed out of step with the 
current political climate. Wagner himself had also played down his revolutionary past just 
enough to fit in with his new royal patronage. In this new conservative fashion, rather than 
create a new world, Wagner wanted to refresh and revitalize the meaning of the symbols 
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already recognized in the old one. His idealistic plans to create conditions that would 
optimize spontaneous communitas resulted in an institutionalized liminoid structure, which 
itself became routinized in the form of a ritual performance, complete with the expectation of 
a pilgrimage to see a work (Parsifal) promoted as a kind of sacred relic only to be witnessed 
on Bayreuth’s holy temple ground.  
In regards to Turner’s differentiation of the two genres, the composer attempted to 
overcome the liminoid result he was faced with in by covering it with a liminal ideology. The 
festival event in reality had became a concert experience that was an offering to only the rich 
and elite, an event attended by choice not obligation, therefore fitting more into what Turner 
would consider a liminoid phenomena. Wagner tried to overlay this structure with his written 
ideologies of  “Religion and Art,” which only served to create a contradiction between a 
liminal ideal and the liminoid structure. However Turner himself suggested, that perhaps in 
performance genres the clear distinction between these two classifications does not hold, 
noting that, “in fact, all performative genres demand an audience even as they abandon a 
congregation. Most of them, too, incarnate their plots or scores in the synchronized actions of 
players. It is only formally that these aesthetic progeny of ritual may be described as 
individual creations.”120 Thus such events regardless of their structure reach beyond the 
individual and become an instance of communitas, as the audience, and the performers 
together must all engage in a shared symbolic recognition. Perhaps such an instance alone is 
enough to reconcile Bayreuth’s liminal/liminoid contradiction and with it define Wagner’s 
legacy.
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Conclusion 
 After failing to attain his desired identity status using existing social norms, Richard 
Wagner sought an alternative aesthetics-based route. His participation in rebellion resulted in 
a period of exile, where in a liminal space, he was free to write of his hopes for a different 
future, a future that never materialized. After his disillusionment with political solutions, he 
discovered the work of Schopenhauer and found validation. He strategically positioned 
himself in the liminal role of genius composer, mediator between the noumena and the 
phenomenal world through music. Further, he attempted to create a permanent liminal space 
for his art, the temple of Bayreuth. Wagner’s liminal positioning rendered his role as 
historical icon and charismatic leader of a movement (Wagnerism), a point of continuous 
debate.  
Wagner was and continues to be a prismatic figure; many individuals have 
perpetuated and continually created different narratives around him through time and space 
seeking to appropriate both the composer as a symbolic entity, and his works to forge a set of 
meanings relevant to their own needs. Various models have been used to demonstrate such 
narratives. In Turner’s theory of social drama historical change fluctuates rather than being a 
smooth process. Social dramas mediate between fixed states or structures, resolving crisis 
either through a return to the normal state/structure or by shedding light on new patterns or 
possibilities of structure through newly formed allegiances or oppositions. They can serve as 
an entryway into understanding a larger cultural aesthetic, dramatizing patterns of culture, 
and illustrating them through the generation of socio-cultural texts. However, these texts may 
remain stuck in the realm of aesthetics, mere descriptions whose utility is in depicting and 
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thus reifying normal patterns of culture. Thus, this model does not make room for potential 
new patterns of resolution either through individual or group agency, which are the active 
and performative aspects of culture.  
Wagner did indeed create such social texts, and as a symbolic figure, his works (both 
musical and literary) became a revolving aspect of the cultural texts in his own time and 
continuing now as dynamic aspects of cultural performance. As cultural artifacts, Wagner’s 
musical works and writings have remained actively involved in historical change. The 
encroachments of everyday structural realities, both economic and political, caused numerous 
conflicts in Wagner’s attempt to retain a static liminal space for his art. Thus the structural 
constraints of time and place are reflected back in his legacy, the meaning of which has 
become part of a dynamic historical narrative.  
 Perhaps the most important implication of Wagner’s legacy is his narrative of cultural 
renewal. Moving forward into the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries, narratives of 
cultural renewal became less concerned with forms of universal brotherhood and increasingly 
intertwined with notions of national and racial identities. Likewise, Wagner’s own writings 
mimic this effect. His earlier Zurich writings reflect notions of universal brotherhood; his 
later regeneration essays, unfortunately influenced by Arthur de Gobineau’s theory of the 
Aryan supremacy, displayed racist, anti-Semitic, and mythic nationalist ideologies. 
Alongside a call for vegetarianism as a route back to the empathy he thought lost in 
capitalistic society, Wagner purported the purity of a specifically Aryan Christ’s blood, as the 
symbolic pinnacle of the compassion of the human species. The sentiments these writings 
expressed are not unique, and in many ways reflect undercurrents already sweeping through 
fin de siècle Europe. Concepts of racial purity and nationalism, blood and soil (Blut und 
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Boden) were to become linked as Germany began to embrace what it took to be rural, volk 
culture.  
 While in the present study I do not link Wagner to a form of primordial modernism 
nor characterize him as a proto-fascist, my aim has been to portray him as an individual who 
adapted—both unconsciously and consciously—through changing historical conditions 
greater than the individual, strategically navigating socially derived circumstances. Perhaps 
the biggest testament of Wagner’s genius is his imagination and ability to alter others’ 
perspectives of him, to gain legitimacy and thwart criticism through positioning himself in 
places of liminal significance.  
The conflict between liminoid structures and liminal sentiments can be witnessed in 
Wagner’s struggle for authority. He realized the power and continued potential of liminal 
phenomena, as a religion based on the continuous ritual connection of human beings through 
art. However, to structure such an un-structural phenomena as communitas already plants the 
seeds of decline within the event. Wagner could not overcome the economic and institutional 
realities of the post-industrial capitalist system that had already been established. This was 
his biggest barrier to building a structure that would guarantee the egalitarian quality of, and 
ensure the obligation toward a ritual religious event for all. This rendered the Bayreuth 
festival more a liminoid phenomena, despite Wagner’s best attempt to overlay it, and shape it 
into a profound liminal experience.  
 However, perhaps this failure once again can be turned into a saving grace for the 
composer. Rather than in a negative light, Turner saw the liminoid as “an advance in the 
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history of human freedom.”1 The anthropologist stated that he enjoyed the “separation of an 
audience from performers and the liberation of scripts from cosmology and theology.”2 He 
continued,  
as a member of an audience I can see the theme and message of a play as one among 
a number of ‘subjunctive’ possibilities, a variant model for thought or action to be 
accepted or rejected after careful consideration. Even as audience people can be 
‘moved’ by plays; they need not be ‘carried away’ by them—into another person's 
utopia or ‘secular sacrum.’3 
 
The audience may be “moved” or experience a moment of communitas, a moment of shared 
symbolic meaning, but not “carried away” by the experience. In the liminoid, choice is both a 
defining factor and the nexus of its potential. Turner believed that normal society, and the 
individual life for that matter, continually oscillates between the need for structure and the 
need for the experience of communitas. The best way to provide for this need has been a 
question that has preoccupied many a thinker. Turner observed that attempts to provide 
stable, structured, fulfillment of the need of communitas, no matter how utopic or idealistic, 
was doomed to failure. The experience of communitas is not a form of regression back to the 
primitive, as Adorno and Freud argued; it is just a shared element of humanity, one of many, 
neither good nor bad in itself. We need greater society and structure to survive but these very 
structures may take on a life on their own beyond the humans they are built to serve, thus 
effectively keeping us from our true unification, our species-being. We all need a moment 
free of this repression and these externally imposed categories, a moment to commune 
                                                
 1 Victor Turner, “Frame, Flow and Reflection: Ritual and Drama as Public Liminality.” Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies 6, (1979): 497.  
 
2 Ibid., 497. 
3 Ibid. 
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together as human beings. The liminoid genre of post-industrial society may provide these 
moments without the need to surrender to an all-encompassing structure. These may be that 
instant of aesthetic contemplation that Schopenhauer believed freed us momentarily from the 
all-encompassing grasp of the Will. Adorno himself believed both in this primitive aspect 
and the fact that Wagner’s music could allow us to glimpse it.  
Looking toward the postmodern, these moments of chosen leisure time activities, 
which provide us a momentary respite from the daily grind of structure, could be regarded as 
a therapeutic break, allowing just enough comfort to keep us going in the very structure that 
does not fulfill us. Mere diversions that could be considered a form of regression back to a 
primitive nature, or a momentary comfort that keeps us from be conscious of, or revolting 
against, the real political and economic suppression we live under in a capitalist system. Yet 
these instances of relief could also, as Turner believed, hold the seeds of choice, an escape 
not only from the moment but from the all-encompassing capitalist system as well. That is 
perhaps optimistic, but I argue that, despite all his posturing and devotion to Schopenhauer’s 
pessimistic view, Wagner was at heart an optimist. If not, he would not have had the fortitude 
to continue on as long as he did.   
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